{"title":"Assertion and Convention","authors":"M. Green","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.8","url":null,"abstract":"In light of a view of assertion as a product of cultural evolution, we disentangle a number of distinct questions that might be raised concerning the relation of assertion to convention and lay down eight benchmarks that any viable theory of assertion should respect. We next consider two well-known forms of conventionalism about speech acts, that of Millikan and that associated with Austin and Searle, showing why neither approach is viable. We go on to develop two positive accounts of assertion, one in terms of belief expression, the other in terms of commitment, neither of which requires what we shall term “extra-semantic conventions.” From there we consider two recent defenses of a form of conventionalism offered by Stainton (2016) and Jary (this volume), showing that neither succeeds in its aim. The lesson that we may draw from the failure of these arguments is that assertion is facilitated by, but does not crucially rely on, extra-semantic conventions.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123369072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Commitment Accounts of Assertion","authors":"Lionel Shapiro","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.3","url":null,"abstract":"According to commitment accounts of assertion, asserting is committing oneself to something’s being the case, where such commitment is understood in terms of norms governing a social practice. Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter elaborate and compare two types of commitment account, liability accounts (associated with C. S. Peirce) and dialectical norm accounts (associated with Robert Brandom), concluding that the latter are more defensible. Section 3 argues that both types possess an advantage over rival normative accounts of assertion in that they needn’t presuppose any notion of an assertion’s correctness. Section 4 shows how dialectical norm accounts can explain relations between assertion and truth. Section 5 sets forth objections that have been raised against commitment accounts, and argues that responses are available on behalf of dialectical norm accounts. Section 6 proposes that a liberalized dialectical norm account can illuminate phenomena sometimes seen as supporting truth relativism.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123770149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Testing for Assertion","authors":"M. Montminy","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.14","url":null,"abstract":"How can we tell whether someone has made an assertion? In many cases, the answer is obvious. But often, it is not. In this chapter, the author argues that a theory-independent test for assertion is not possible. This means that as theoreticians, we have some freedom regarding our answer to the question. This freedom is not unlimited, though. Intuitions about clear cases should be respected, and the answer should be shown to be theoretically fruitful. The author defends the view that an assertion is the expression of belief. In the last section, this view is applied to utterances made in controversial philosophical settings.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116705219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Norm of Assertion and Blame","authors":"Jessica Brown","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.28","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most popular suggestions for the norm of assertion is the knowledge norm: one is in a good enough epistemic position to assert that p if and only if one knows that p. In the face of intuitive counterexamples to the norm, defenders have responded by appealing to the distinction between whether one conforms to a norm and whether one is blameworthy: one can violate a norm and yet be blameless or conform to it but nonetheless be blameworthy. Furthermore, some suggest that it’s futile to search for a norm such that whether one conforms to the norm aligns with whether one is blameless. They appeal to the failure of luminosity to defend the pessimistic conclusion that, for any norm whatsoever, the notions of norm conformity and being blameworthy can come apart. In this paper, the author assesses this defense of the knowledge norm of assertion. She criticizes the argument from the failure of luminosity to the pessimistic conclusion and argues that there is no easy way to reformulate it successfully. The discussion of the pessimistic conclusion distinguishes a variety of different explanations of how norm conformity can come apart from whether one is blameless, and the limitations of these explanations. Thus, it also provides some guidance on when it is reasonable to defend the knowledge norm of assertion against counterexample by appeal to the distinction between norm conformity and whether one is blameless.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115408013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"De Se Assertion","authors":"Isidora Stojanovic","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.19","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 De se attitudes, that is, attitudes that we have about ourselves in a first-personal way, have long been recognized as interestingly different from other attitudes. However, speech acts and, in particular, assertions that we make about ourselves have barely begun to draw philosophers’ attention. This chapter discusses some recent proposals that aim to bridge the gap between the significance of the de se phenomena in thought and the way that we express those attitudes in language. Section 1 provides some background on the de se and the essential indexical. Section 2 surveys proposals that make use of centered contents in modeling assertion and communication. Section 3 discusses the main motivations for the idea that centered contents are not only the contents of de se attitudes but also of the corresponding assertions.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128952951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assertion and the Declarative Mood","authors":"Mark Jary","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.50","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that assertion is fundamentally linguistic, in that it is a practice that can exist only in a speech community that has a linguistic form specified for the performance of assertions, that is, a declarative mood marker. Such a conception is required in order to distinguish assertion from other content-conveying linguistic acts, such as presupposition and implicature. The declarative mood also plays an information-structure role, but this can be separated from its role as an indicator of illocutionary force. Finally, while in human natural languages the declarative is a sentential mood, consideration of imaginary languages lacking the category of sentence shows that the declarative need not be sentential.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122213042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Formal Models of Assertion","authors":"E. Olsson","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.43","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides an overview of different formal models that could be of interest to epistemologists interested in assertion. It also says something about where they fit into the general picture of assertion as a phenomenon involving both an asserter and an assertee. The author’s perspective is that of the philosopher rather than that of the logician. A semiformal level of description is employed, partly because some models are highly complex and merely introducing the basic formal machinery, let alone some elementary results or proofs, would consume too much space. The term “formal” is used in a broad sense to include theories that have mathematical or logical elements, even if they are not completely formal. The discussions cover Bayesian models of assertion and logical models.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132262136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Silencing and Assertion","authors":"A. Tanesini","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.31","url":null,"abstract":"Theories of assertion must explain how silencing is possible. This chapter defends an account of assertion in terms of normative commitments on the grounds that it provides the most plausible analysis of how individuals might be silenced when attempting to make assertions. The chapter first offers an account of the nature of silencing and defends the view that it can occur even in contexts where speakers’ communicative intentions are understood by their audience. Second, it outlines some of the normative commitments characteristic of assertion when used in the speech act of telling. This commitment view of assertion is then used to explain silencing as a matter of being deprived of the ability to make some of the commitments one is trying to acquire. Finally, the main rivals of the commitment view of assertion endorsed here are shown to be unable to account for silencing, at least when they are considered in their purest form.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130817035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：