{"title":"Social Identity and Assertion","authors":"C. Johnson","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.51","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.51","url":null,"abstract":"This article details three threads of philosophical work that focus on and illuminate the differences that social identity makes to an agent’s ability to use assertion. These threads include the literature on testimonial injustice, the literature on illocutionary silencing, and the literature on extracted speech and epistemic exploitation. Testimonial injustice occurs when an agent is unfairly restricted in her ability to transmit knowledge by testifying (typically by using an assertion). Illocutionary silencing occurs when an agent is kept from successfully making a speech act like an assertion at all. Speech is extracted when a speaker’s speech is unjustly elicited or when her speech is used to perpetuate injustice against her. This can also constitute epistemic exploitation, which occurs when a marginalized speaker is compelled, through social manipulation, to provide a privileged person with knowledge. Epistemic exploitation often occurs through compelled assertion. In each of these cases, social identity makes a difference to a speaker’s ability to use assertion to her own ends.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126247010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Function of Assertion and Social Norms","authors":"P. Graham","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.30","url":null,"abstract":"A proper function of an entity is a beneficial effect that helps explain the persistence of the entity. Proper functions thereby arise through feedback mechanisms with beneficial effects as inputs and persistence as outputs. We continue to make assertions because they benefit speakers by benefiting speakers. Hearers benefit from true information. Speakers benefit by influencing hearer belief. If hearers do not benefit, they will not form beliefs in response to assertions. Speakers can then only maintain influence by providing true information, often enough. The function of assertion is then inducing true hearer belief. When interests conflict, however, some mechanism must ensure that speakers provide true information often enough, instead of deceiving, or providing information regardless of quality. In humans, a core mechanism stabilizing true assertion involves social norms for truth telling. We tell the truth partly because we prescribe and enforce telling the truth.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132213566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Threats, Warnings, and Assertions","authors":"H. Liberto","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.22","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores warnings and threats through the lens of popular illocutionary taxonomies. It argues that if we tap into moral philosophy to help carve out some important distinctions between types of warnings and threats, we find that these more specific concepts do constitute illlocutions. It shows that the principles used by John Searle, Kent Bach, and John Harnish to differentiate the categories of illocutions can be employed to analyze warnings and threats. When unconditional, warnings generally have what Searle calls an assertive illocutionary point, and threats a commissive (commitment-making) illocutionary point. However, the best way to explain conditional threats or warnings is through a combination of illocutions. The article concludes by describing a specific type of threat: noncommittal threats. It argues that noncommittal threats, unlike all other threats, involve assertions.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125348380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action","authors":"Mikkel Gerken, E. Petersen","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.49","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter surveys the work on epistemic norms of action, practical deliberation, and assertion. In doing so, it is considered how these norms are interrelated. If there are important similarities between the epistemic norms of action and assertion, these may have important ramifications for how we should think about asserting. Thus, the chapter indicates how thinking about assertions as a speech act might benefit from a broader action theoretic setting. In consequence, we begin by considering the epistemic norms of action and practical deliberation on the market. On this basis we proceed to considering the epistemic norms of assertion. Finally, we consider their interrelation and wider ramifications.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134465017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Promising and Assertion","authors":"Mark van Roojen","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.39","url":null,"abstract":"Even if promising is a kind of assertion or accomplished by making an assertion, it has a normative upshot that goes beyond the normative upshot of ordinary assertions. When one breaks a promise, one is liable to criticism for actions subsequent to making the promise—a kind of criticism to which merely asserting something would not make one liable. This article explores various explanations for the ways in which a promise creates these obligations. It distinguishes those that see the relevant obligations as falling out of some prior obligation and those that treat promissory obligation as a new creation. If obligations generate reasons to comply, these latter accounts seem to postulate reasons that come from nowhere, and this in turn has led to some puzzlement. This article surveys the puzzlement, as well as ways to embrace it and ways to avoid it, while also examining reasons to be glad one can bind oneself by promising. Finally, it explores the possibility that promises as illocutionary acts are a species of assertion or constituted by assertions.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131330296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rhetorical Questions as Indirect Assertions","authors":"M. Reimer","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.16","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores, defends and develops the implications of the view that rhetorical questions are often used to make assertions, albeit indirectly. After introducing the phenomenon through a variety of examples, reflecting on the philosophical significance of that phenomenon and defining several key terms, the author explains why she regards rhetorical questions as models of indirect assertion. She then presents and informally analyzes a lengthy passage from the neuroethics literature involving a series indirect assertions made by way of rhetorical questions. This is followed by a trio of arguments in defense of that analysis. These arguments involve appeals to: punctuation, “asserogatives” (questions asked indirectly by making assertions), the lying/misleading distinction, ontological parsimony, and Gricean methodology. In the conclusion section, she draws attention to, and briefly remarks on, a host of questions raised by the proposed view—questions which would need to be addressed in a more fully developed and defended account of rhetorical questions as indirect assertions.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129263795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Indicativity View","authors":"Peter Pagin","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.5","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter gives a presentation and a justification of the indicativity account of assertion, originally proposed in Pagin (2011). This account is entirely nonnormative. Neither the existence of norms nor the existence of normative attitudes is required. Assertion is explained in terms of credence-related dispositions to utter linguistic expressions and credence-related dispositions to react to such utterances. The view can be briefly summarized as follows: An assertion is an utterance that is prima facie informative. For an utterance to be informative is for it to be uttered partly because it is true. What this amounts to is spelled out differently for the speaker and for the hearer. Simplified, it amounts to the following: the speaker makes the utterance partly because of believing the proposition expressed, and the hearer believes the proposition because of the utterance. Details and qualifications are provided. The two final sections are devoted to empirical support from psychology, especially the so-called truth bias.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116243702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assertibility and Paradox","authors":"T. McCarthy","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.44","url":null,"abstract":"Antinomies involving the assertibility modal arise when we consider what are called “syntactic interpretations” of the assertibility operator A, translation schemes in which the operator is interpreted in terms of a monadic predicate in the nonmodal fragment of the language. Such a translation scheme, of course, is nothing more than a systematic attempt to replace the assertibility modality by a concept, and trouble tends to arise precisely when the concept is too truthlike. In this chapter, a number of paradoxical syntactic interpretations of the assertibility modality are explored. In each case, the paradox consists in an inconsistency affecting the syntactic transcription of certain apparently unexceptionable combinations of modal principles concerning the assertibility operator. It is argued that the modal construal of the notion of assertibility is fundamental, and a standard model theoretic semantics is presented for it. I finally suggest that an assertibility predicate for a language L with the assertibility operator be recovered at the metalinguistic level: a sentence p will be said to be assertible in L if and only if the sentence Ap is true in L, with the result that the alternative forms for a theory of the assertibility property in L exactly mirror the alternative forms for a theory of truth for L. Some consequences of these observations for the philosophy of mathematics are explored.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125129106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assertion of Knowledge","authors":"Patrick Rysiew","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.24","url":null,"abstract":"Assertions of knowledge—that is, assertions which constitute ascriptions of knowledge—have served both as a central source of data in the epistemological theorizing and as an important target of such theorizing themselves. This chapter considers three issues concerning knowledge ascriptions that have figured prominently in recent discussion: their use as evidence for specific epistemological claims and theories, the pragmatics and psychology of knowledge ascriptions, and the social role(s) that the relevant assertions might play. There are important interactions among these topics; and they, and positions taken in response to them, interact as well with central questions about both assertion and linguistic communication generally. One central point on which epistemologists divide, however, is over how closely tied various features of our knowledge-attributing behavior are to semantics, or to (presumed) facts about assertion per se.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130586645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assertion among the Speech Acts","authors":"M. Sbisà","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.7","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses how assertion is an illocutionary act. Once assertion is taken to be an illocutionary act, the question arises of how it relates to other illocutionary acts. This is the main issue tackled in this article, and it is two-fold. It examines how assertion relates to illocutionary acts that are in some way similar to it, at least as to their involving the utterance of plain declarative sentences; and how assertion and its cognates should best be collocated within the whole gamut of illocutionary acts. The former exploration will rely upon a largely intuitive grasp of the “family” of assertive illocutionary acts; the latter will involve both a fuller characterization of assertion and reconsideration of illocutionary act classification. The article then turns to the question of the role or rank of assertion among illocutionary acts: whether it is “just” one among them, or there are reasons for granting it some primacy or some special function.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128312825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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