Social Identity and Assertion

Abstract

This article details three threads of philosophical work that focus on and illuminate the differences that social identity makes to an agent’s ability to use assertion. These threads include the literature on testimonial injustice, the literature on illocutionary silencing, and the literature on extracted speech and epistemic exploitation. Testimonial injustice occurs when an agent is unfairly restricted in her ability to transmit knowledge by testifying (typically by using an assertion). Illocutionary silencing occurs when an agent is kept from successfully making a speech act like an assertion at all. Speech is extracted when a speaker’s speech is unjustly elicited or when her speech is used to perpetuate injustice against her. This can also constitute epistemic exploitation, which occurs when a marginalized speaker is compelled, through social manipulation, to provide a privileged person with knowledge. Epistemic exploitation often occurs through compelled assertion. In each of these cases, social identity makes a difference to a speaker’s ability to use assertion to her own ends.