{"title":"Moore’s Paradox and Assertion","authors":"C. Littlejohn","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.12","url":null,"abstract":"If I were to say, “Agnes does not know that it is raining, but it is,” this seems like a perfectly coherent way of describing Agnes’s epistemic position. If I were to add, “And I don’t know if it is, either,” this seems quite strange. In this chapter, we shall look at some statements that seem, in some sense, contradictory, even though it seems that these statements can express propositions that are contingently true or false. Moore thought it was paradoxical that statements that can express true propositions or contingently false propositions should nevertheless seem absurd like this. If we can account for the absurdity, we shall solve Moore’s Paradox. In this chapter, we shall look at Moore’s proposals and more recent discussions of Moorean absurd thought and speech.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126295240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating","authors":"Jessica Pepp","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.40","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the prospects for justifying the somewhat widespread, somewhat firmly held sense that there is some moral advantage to untruthfully implicating over lying. The author calls this the “Difference Intuition.” The author defines lying in terms of asserting but remains open about what precise definition best captures our ordinary notion. The author defines implicating as one way of meaning something without asserting it. The author narrows down the kind of untruthful implicating that should be compared with lying for purposes of evaluating whether there is a moral difference between them. Just as lying requires a robust form of assertion, so the kind of untruthful implicating to be compared with lying requires a robust form of implicating. Next, the author sets out various ways of sharpening the Difference Intuition and surveys a range of approaches to justifying one class of sharpenings. The author finishes by sketching an approach to justifying an alternative sharpening of the Difference Intuition, which is inspired by John Stuart Mill’s discussion of lying.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123734696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proxy Assertion","authors":"K. Ludwig","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.13","url":null,"abstract":"In proxy assertion an individual or group asserts something through a spokesperson. The chapter explains proxy assertion as resting the assignment of a status role to a person (that of spokesperson) whose utterances acts in virtue of that role have the status function of signaling that the principal is committed in a way analogous to an individual asserting that in his own voice. The chapter briefly explains how status functions and status roles are grounded and then treats, in turn, the case of a spokesperson for an individual and a group and the differences in the significance of what the spokesperson does in each case. Finally, it reviews complications introduced by spokesperson autonomy, where the spokesperson is given leave to represent her principal’s views or positions in her own words and to respond to questions on his behalf.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"227 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124369383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assertion and Fiction","authors":"M. García‐Carpintero","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.18","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses three issues about the relations between fiction and assertion that have figured prominently in recent debates. In the first section, it addresses questions about assertions in connection with fiction raised by the standard occurrence of prima facie empty referential expressions in fictions. In the second, it considers whether fictions can make assertions, or related assertoric acts. The third and final section explores the possible effects that this would pose for the distinction between fiction and non-fiction.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127078203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assertion and Mindreading","authors":"W. Horton","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.47","url":null,"abstract":"Pragmatic accounts of assertion commonly assume that language users engage in some form of mindreading. For example, Stalnaker proposed that the critical context for any assertion is the set of pragmatic presuppositions that can be taken as shared between speaker and addressee—that is, their common ground. From a cognitive psychological perspective, though, the processing and representational requirements of considering common ground are substantial. This chapter considers several cognitively oriented descriptions of mindreading in communication, contrasting the metarepresentational requirements of speaker meaning with the more general psychological construct of false belief in theory of mind. Ultimately, the cognitive demands of real-time conversation may circumscribe the ability of language users to engage in sophisticated forms of mindreading during the communication of assertion.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133996685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can Groups Assert That P?","authors":"Deborah Tollefsen","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.34","url":null,"abstract":"When a group or institution issues a declarative statement, what sort of speech act is this? Is it the assertion of a single individual (perhaps the group’s spokesperson or leader) or the assertion of all or most of the group members? Or is there a sense in which the group itself asserts that p? If assertion is a speech act, then who is the actor in the case of group assertion? These are the questions this chapter aims to address. Whether groups themselves can make assertions or whether a group of individuals can jointly assert that p depends, in part, on what sort of speech act assertion is. The literature on assertion has burgeoned over the past few years, and there is a great deal of debate regarding the nature of assertion. John MacFarlane has helpfully identified four theories of assertion. Following Sandy Goldberg, we can call these the attitudinal account, the constitutive rule account, the common-ground account, and the commitment account. I shall consider what group assertion might look like under each of these accounts and doing so will help us to examine some of the accounts of group assertion (often presented as theories of group testimony) on offer. I shall argue that, of the four accounts, the commitment account can best be extended to make sense of group assertion in all its various forms.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132544854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Slurs, Assertion, and Predication","authors":"Christopher Hom","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.32","url":null,"abstract":"A multidimensional account of the meanings of slurs holds that a slur has both literal, truth-conditional content (which is neutral) and conventional implicature (which is derogatory). This chapter offers a careful examination of the motivations and commitments for a multidimensional account and argues that the theoretic costs for such a view are prohibitive. One of the primary motivations for a multidimensional account over a purely truth-conditional account is the apparent wide-scoping phenomenon of slurs (e.g., that derogatory content does not seem cancellable under negation). The chapter argues that carefully distinguishing between predication and assertion not only dispels the misconception that the phenomena in question is centrally about scope but also vindicates the purely truth-conditional account as a more general and unified explanation.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114705924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Austin on Asserting and Knowing","authors":"R. Fiengo","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.10","url":null,"abstract":"Austin argued that asserting is a family of four systematically related illocutionary acts: that, when we assert, we are always either Calling an item something, or Describing an item as something, or Exemplifying an item as something, or Classing an item as one thing rather than another. In this chapter, the author argues that each of these four assertive illocutionary acts implies a characteristic knowing of an item; that there are four ways to know an item, each way providing justification for one kind of asserting. If we assert something about an item and are challenged—if we are asked How do you know?—we justify our asserting in terms of the knowledge of the item that our asserting implied. By focusing on the question of how we know, this chapter attempts to clarify the relationship between our common assertive practices and the knowledge we bring to it.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123183960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stalnaker on the Essential Effect of Assertion","authors":"L. Clapp","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.1","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter is concerned with answering this question: What is Stalnaker’s Grice-inspired model of communication, and how does this general model guide and constrain an account of the speech act of assertion? In Section 1, the author explains and motivates Stalnaker’s general Grice-inspired model of communication, and then in Section 2 examines how this model guides and constrains an account of the speech act of assertion and thereby leads to Stalnaker’s claim concerning the “essential effect” of assertion. In Section 3, the author considers two challenges for Stalnaker’s claim: the first challenge concerns assertions of necessary truths, and the second concerns assertions of propositions that are (already) commonly believed. Finally, in Section 4, the author briefly considers a more fundamental challenge for the general Grice-inspired model of communication within which Stalnaker’s claim is formulated.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130416534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category","authors":"H. Cappelen","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190675233.013.6","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter defends the view that research about language and communication should not appeal to anything that falls under the label “assertion.” According to the No-Assertion view (Cappelen 2011), what philosophers have tried to capture by the term “assertion” is largely a philosopher’s invention. It fails to pick out an act type that we engage in, and it is not a category we need in order to explain any important component of our linguistic practice. The phenomena that theories of assertion aim to explain are better accounted for by appeal to the notion of what is said. Sayings are governed by variable norms, come with variable commitments, and have variable causes and effects. This chapter outlines the No-Assertion view, presents some of the core arguments in favor of it, and responds to some criticisms.","PeriodicalId":310780,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Assertion","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129518276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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