Assertion and Convention

Abstract

In light of a view of assertion as a product of cultural evolution, we disentangle a number of distinct questions that might be raised concerning the relation of assertion to convention and lay down eight benchmarks that any viable theory of assertion should respect. We next consider two well-known forms of conventionalism about speech acts, that of Millikan and that associated with Austin and Searle, showing why neither approach is viable. We go on to develop two positive accounts of assertion, one in terms of belief expression, the other in terms of commitment, neither of which requires what we shall term “extra-semantic conventions.” From there we consider two recent defenses of a form of conventionalism offered by Stainton (2016) and Jary (this volume), showing that neither succeeds in its aim. The lesson that we may draw from the failure of these arguments is that assertion is facilitated by, but does not crucially rely on, extra-semantic conventions.