{"title":"7. Digital Minds","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"‘Digital minds’ asks: what might the human‒digital interface and the prospects of artificial intelligence reveal about the mind‒body problem? The extended mind hypothesis states that our memories can be stored on external devices, such as our phones. The parity principle states that a process in the external world counts as part of our minds if it is the case that if this process were to occur inside the head, the process would be part of our minds. Can computers think? The Turing test is thought by some to test for computer thought or intelligence. The Mayan language room argument is a variation of John Searle’s much-discussed argument that aims to show that computers cannot understand language, or in other words that ‘syntax is not sufficient for semantics’. There are many other questions that reside in the intersection of ethics and artificial intelligence.","PeriodicalId":285580,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128146039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"5. Consciousness","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"‘Consciousness’ asks: what is consciousness? The concept of consciousness is the subject of much discussion and there is much debate over whether it can be defined at all. Is it possible for a human to know what it is like to be a bat, a creature whose conscious experience is radically different from ours? There are various different forms of consciousness: creature consciousness, state consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, and access consciousness. The ‘hard problem’ is the problem of providing a scientific explanation of consciousness. What is the purpose of consciousness?","PeriodicalId":285580,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128786491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"2. Behaviourism","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"‘Behaviourism’ looks at the view that mental states—beliefs, desires, emotions, and so forth—are merely sets of behaviours. What is the motivation for and feasibility of the view? Gilbert Ryle criticised Cartesian dualism, which is based on the idea that dualists are making a ‘category mistake’. He put forward his own behaviouristic theory of mind. Behaviourism avoids ‘the problem of other minds’. If the mind is behaviour, it is clear that other people have minds, but if the mind is an inner experience, then the only person who can be certain of having a mind is the person having the experience.\u0000Behaviourism has a number of theories relating to intelligence and conceptions of dispositions.","PeriodicalId":285580,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115733500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"1. Dualism","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"‘Dualism’ asks: is the mind distinct from the body? Dualism is the theory of mind that answers this question in the affirmative. Looking into Dualism’s ancient origins show us some of the key arguments for dualism. Dualism is thought, by its proponents, to solve one of the great problems in philosophy: the mind‒body problem. Cartesian dualism and René Descartes’s arguments are based on the premise that it is possible to imagine one’s mind existing without one’s body and one’s body without one’s mind. There are also two contemporary arguments for dualism: the knowledge argument, according to which dualism must be true because knowledge of all physical facts does not suffice for understanding conscious experience, and the so-called ‘zombie’ argument according to which the mind must be distinct from the body since a bodily duplicate of a human would not have conscious experiences. Can conceivability be a guide to possibility? In other words, whether one’s ability to imagine a certain situation is reason to believe that such a situation is possible.","PeriodicalId":285580,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116588921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"4. Intentionality","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"‘Intentionality’ asks: what is distinctive about the mind? Some philosophers have argued that the mark of the mental is intentionality: the mind’s ability to represent things in the world. Beliefs, perceptions, desires, and hopes are intentional since they are about, or in some sense point to, things in the world. Different intentional states are thought to have distinct ‘directions of fit’. There are four interrelated puzzling features of intentionality. In addition, there are three theories of intentionality (the pictorial, causal, and teleological). Does intentionality pose a problem for physicalism?","PeriodicalId":285580,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126128550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"6. Emotions","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"‘Emotions’ asks: how ought we to understand the emotions? There are a number of body-based theories of the emotions, according to which an emotion is an awareness of certain bodily processesWilliam James presents an ‘subtraction argument’, which is the thought experiment which asks us to imagine what is left of an emotion if we subtract the relevant bodily processes from an emotion.\u0000Body-based theories can be contrasted with judgement-based theories, which align emotions with judgements. There are also a number of theories of emotions put forward by proponents of the embodied mind thesis, who see the somatic nervous system, which controls voluntary actions such as reaching and walking, as playing a crucial role in emotion.","PeriodicalId":285580,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114814635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"3. Physicalism","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"‘Physicalism’ looks at the view that everything that exists today—including human minds—came about in virtue of the rearrangements of and interactions between the physical particles and forces that emerged after the universe’s birth. There are a number of different versions of physicalism: identity theory, functionalism, mysterianism, eliminativism, non-reductive physicalism, and emergentism. The concept of multiple realization allows for the same type of mental states to have different neural signatures and contrasts physicalism with panpsychism, the view that the fundamental components of the universe are conscious. Most physicalists maintain the strongest philosophical argument for physicalism, what has come to be known as ‘the causal argument for physicalism’.","PeriodicalId":285580,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126281350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}