{"title":"4. 意向性","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"‘Intentionality’ asks: what is distinctive about the mind? Some philosophers have argued that the mark of the mental is intentionality: the mind’s ability to represent things in the world. Beliefs, perceptions, desires, and hopes are intentional since they are about, or in some sense point to, things in the world. Different intentional states are thought to have distinct ‘directions of fit’. There are four interrelated puzzling features of intentionality. In addition, there are three theories of intentionality (the pictorial, causal, and teleological). Does intentionality pose a problem for physicalism?","PeriodicalId":285580,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"4. Intentionality\",\"authors\":\"B. Montero\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"‘Intentionality’ asks: what is distinctive about the mind? Some philosophers have argued that the mark of the mental is intentionality: the mind’s ability to represent things in the world. Beliefs, perceptions, desires, and hopes are intentional since they are about, or in some sense point to, things in the world. Different intentional states are thought to have distinct ‘directions of fit’. There are four interrelated puzzling features of intentionality. In addition, there are three theories of intentionality (the pictorial, causal, and teleological). Does intentionality pose a problem for physicalism?\",\"PeriodicalId\":285580,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction\",\"volume\":\"46 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
‘Intentionality’ asks: what is distinctive about the mind? Some philosophers have argued that the mark of the mental is intentionality: the mind’s ability to represent things in the world. Beliefs, perceptions, desires, and hopes are intentional since they are about, or in some sense point to, things in the world. Different intentional states are thought to have distinct ‘directions of fit’. There are four interrelated puzzling features of intentionality. In addition, there are three theories of intentionality (the pictorial, causal, and teleological). Does intentionality pose a problem for physicalism?