{"title":"2. 行为主义","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"‘Behaviourism’ looks at the view that mental states—beliefs, desires, emotions, and so forth—are merely sets of behaviours. What is the motivation for and feasibility of the view? Gilbert Ryle criticised Cartesian dualism, which is based on the idea that dualists are making a ‘category mistake’. He put forward his own behaviouristic theory of mind. Behaviourism avoids ‘the problem of other minds’. If the mind is behaviour, it is clear that other people have minds, but if the mind is an inner experience, then the only person who can be certain of having a mind is the person having the experience.\nBehaviourism has a number of theories relating to intelligence and conceptions of dispositions.","PeriodicalId":285580,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"2. Behaviourism\",\"authors\":\"B. Montero\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"‘Behaviourism’ looks at the view that mental states—beliefs, desires, emotions, and so forth—are merely sets of behaviours. What is the motivation for and feasibility of the view? Gilbert Ryle criticised Cartesian dualism, which is based on the idea that dualists are making a ‘category mistake’. He put forward his own behaviouristic theory of mind. Behaviourism avoids ‘the problem of other minds’. If the mind is behaviour, it is clear that other people have minds, but if the mind is an inner experience, then the only person who can be certain of having a mind is the person having the experience.\\nBehaviourism has a number of theories relating to intelligence and conceptions of dispositions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":285580,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction\",\"volume\":\"117 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy of Mind: A Very Short Introduction","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198809074.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
‘Behaviourism’ looks at the view that mental states—beliefs, desires, emotions, and so forth—are merely sets of behaviours. What is the motivation for and feasibility of the view? Gilbert Ryle criticised Cartesian dualism, which is based on the idea that dualists are making a ‘category mistake’. He put forward his own behaviouristic theory of mind. Behaviourism avoids ‘the problem of other minds’. If the mind is behaviour, it is clear that other people have minds, but if the mind is an inner experience, then the only person who can be certain of having a mind is the person having the experience.
Behaviourism has a number of theories relating to intelligence and conceptions of dispositions.