ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Is Anyone Listening? Does US Foreign Assistance Target People's Top Priorities?","authors":"B. Leo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2597858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2597858","url":null,"abstract":"The United States government has made repeated declarations over the last decade to align its assistance programs behind developing countries’ priorities. By utilizing public attitude surveys for 42 African and Latin American countries, this paper examines how well the US has implemented this guiding principle. Building upon the Quality of Official Development Assistance Assessment (QuODA) approach, I identify what people cite most frequently as the ‘most pressing problems’ facing their nations and then measure the percentage of US assistance commitments that are directed towards addressing them. By focusing on public surveys over time, this analysis attempts to provide a more nuanced and targeted examination of whether US portfolios are addressing what people care the most about. As reference points, I compare US alignment trends with the two regional multilateral development banks (MDBs) – the African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Overall, this analysis suggests that US assistance may be only modestly aligned with what people in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America cite as their nation’s most pressing problems. By comparison, the African Development Bank – which is majority-led by regional member nations – performs significantly better than the United States. Like the United States, however, the Inter-American Development Bank demonstrates a low relative level of support for people’s top concerns. The paper concludes with a number of policy questions, which should be considered if the US government plans to concertedly pursue closer alignment with local concerns and priorities. These include whether the US government should (1) require regular citizen surveys to help formulate foreign assistance strategies and programmatic priorities; (2) recalibrate health assistance programs in Sub-Saharan Africa; (3) increase support for the African Development Bank; (4) expand under-utilized private sector-based development tools, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; (5) increase its engagement in select Latin American countries to help combat crime and insecurity; (6) better leverage the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which is the only U.S. development institution with an explicit mandate to support country-based priorities; and (7) expand support for USAID’s under-resourced economic growth programs, such as the Development Credit Authority.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133688731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Political Economy of Regional Power: Turkey Under the AKP","authors":"A. Bank, Roy Karadag","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2145876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2145876","url":null,"abstract":"In 2006/2007 Turkey became a regional power in the Middle East, a status it has continued to maintain in the context of the Arab Spring. To understand why Turkey only became a regional power under the Muslim AKP government and why this happened at the specific point in time that it did, the paper highlights the self-reinforcing dynamics between Turkey’s domestic political-economic transformation in the first decade of this century and the advantageous regional developments in the Middle East at the same time. It concludes that this specific linkage – the “Ankara Moment” – and its regional resonance in the neighboring Middle East carries more transformative potential than the “Washington Consensus” or the “Beijing Consensus” so prominently discussed in current Global South politics.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131023885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"New Tools for the Analysis of Political Power in Africa","authors":"I. Rainer, Francesco Trebbi","doi":"10.3386/W18424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W18424","url":null,"abstract":"The study of autocracies and weakly institutionalized countries is plagued by scarcity of information about the relative strength of different players within the political system. This paper presents novel data on the composition of government coalitions in a sample of fifteen post-colonial African countries suited to this task. We emphasize the role of the executive branch as the central fulcrum of all national political systems in our sample, especially relative to other institutional bodies such as the legislative assembly. Leveraging on the impressive body of work documenting the crucial role of ethnic fragmentation as a main driver of political and social friction in Africa, the paper further details the construction of ethnic composition measures for executive cabinets. We discuss how this novel source of information may help shed light on the inner workings of typically opaque African political elites.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116365918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Income, Democracy, and the Cunning of Reason","authors":"D. Treisman","doi":"10.3386/W17132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W17132","url":null,"abstract":"A long-standing debate pits those who think economic development leads to democratization against those who argue that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government--but in the medium run (10 to 20 years). The reason is that, for the most part, higher income only prompts a breakthrough to more democratic politics after the incumbent leader falls from power. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the leader's odds of survival. This logic--for which I provide evidence at the levels of individual countries and the world--helps explain why democracy advances in waves followed by periods of stasis and why dictators, concerned only to entrench themselves in power, end up preparing their countries to leap to a higher level of democracy when they are eventually overthrown.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133334550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"'How Does Colonial Origin Matter for Economic Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa'","authors":"J. Fedderke, N. Viegi, J. Agbor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1527355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1527355","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates some of the existing hypotheses regarding the transmission of different colonial legacies to modern day economic growth. The fact that different colonial strategies were pursued by different colonizers in various territories suggests possible ramifications for current development paths. This paper attempts to understand why economic growth performance is different even among African countries, where former British colonies appear to do marginally better. It focuses on two key channels of transmission, namely education and trade. Thirty-six Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 1960–2000 are considered using Hausman-Taylor estimation techniquein an annualized panel data framework. In contrast with the methodology of previous studieswhere only the initial conditions at independence were held to influence the post-colonialgrowth path, this study attempts to distinguish the direct …/","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132294282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"China as a Regulatory State","authors":"Julan Du, Yi Lu, Z. Tao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1489412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1489412","url":null,"abstract":"Market economy models differ in the degree of the power of the government vis-a-vis the market in the economy. Under the classications set forth by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003), and Djankov et al. (2003), these market models range from those emphasizing low government intervention in the market (private orderings and private litigation through courts) to those where the state is an active participant (regulatory state). This paper, using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of the government vis-a-vis the market. Regional government power is found to vary considerably across China's regions. Notably, enterprises located in regions where government exerts more power in the market perform better, suggesting that the regulatory state model of the market economy is appropriate for China.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122259791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}