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Inequality, Redistribution & Political Nationalism: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Analysis 不平等、再分配与政治民族主义:理论模型与实证分析
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-07-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2997306
M. Mckenna
{"title":"Inequality, Redistribution & Political Nationalism: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Analysis","authors":"M. Mckenna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2997306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997306","url":null,"abstract":"Nationalism and income inequality are two of the most pressing economic and political issues of the time. This paper establishes how these two variables are interconnected. A theoretical model combines a two-dimensional policy space with social identification to explain the optimal nationalism and tax responses for left and right political parties, respectively. The data shows that left and right parties both use nationalism when the population of people below the average wage (the poor) increases. Further evidence shows that nationalism today affects future redistribution. In countries with a high poor population, a one percentage point increase in left nationalism will reduce redistribution in four years time by 0.8-1.6%. In countries with a low poor population, right nationalism will increase redistribution in four years time by 0.8-2.9%. Some reasons are hypothesised for these surprising results.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116194972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Internet as a Global/Local Site of Contestation: The Case of Iran 互联网作为全球/本地争论的场所:以伊朗为例
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-05-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2976414
M. Alimardani, S. Milan
{"title":"The Internet as a Global/Local Site of Contestation: The Case of Iran","authors":"M. Alimardani, S. Milan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2976414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2976414","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter sheds light on the role of the Internet as a site of contestation capable of connecting the local and the global dimension of a protest in countries with a virtually closed political arena. It takes Iran as an exemplary case for the study of the technology-related protest cultures that have emerged at the fringes of a heavily controlled cyberspace. We compare the widespread use of the microblogging platform Twitter and the chat application Telegram, inserting them in a broader geopolitical analysis. We understand Telegram as an emancipatory communication technology (Milan in Social Movements and Their Technologies: Wiring Social Change. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013) and highlight its role in facilitating the exercise of a democratic agency during the 2016 Iranian Parliamentary elections. Relying on interview data and desk research, and positioned at the intersection of media, science and technology, and social movement studies, this chapter adds to our understanding of the complex relation between authoritarian regimes and their digital opposition.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130480342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Trade Openness and Political Distortions 贸易开放与政治扭曲
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-05-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2965028
D. Grechyna
{"title":"Trade Openness and Political Distortions","authors":"D. Grechyna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2965028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965028","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we explore the relationship between international trade openness and two major political distortions, political polarization and political instability. We consider the extensive and intensive margins of trade as measured by the number of trade partners and trade volume, respectively. As political distortions and trade characteristics of the country are endogenously related, we instrument political instability by the age difference between the youngest and the oldest effective political leaders of a country and the average neighbors' neighbors political instability. We find that political instability reduces trade openness at the extensive and intensive margin while political polarization negatively affects the extensive margin of trade. We propose a simple model that provides intuition on our findings.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133916691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Managing Federal Transfers in Brazil: Do Coalition Members Reap Benefits? 管理巴西的联邦转移支付:联盟成员是否受益?
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-04-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2957599
Tara Slough, Johannes Urpelainen, Joonseok Yang
{"title":"Managing Federal Transfers in Brazil: Do Coalition Members Reap Benefits?","authors":"Tara Slough, Johannes Urpelainen, Joonseok Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2957599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2957599","url":null,"abstract":"Coalitions led by the president play an important role in the Brazilian legislature, but what do members of the president’s coalition gain from joining? We conduct a regression discontinuity analysis of discretionary, politically motivated federal transfers to Brazilian municipalities. Our innovation is to distinguish between the president’s co-partisan mayors and mayors aligned with other coalition members. We find that the president channels pre-election discretionary transfers to co-partisan mayors but does not target coalition members in municipalities. However, the president does not use these transfers to support co-partisan mayors against mayors aligned with coalition members. In other words, the president favors co-partisan mayors over opposition mayors in the two years preceding municipal elections, but not over mayors aligned with other coalition members. Consistent with a model in which coalition members have little agenda-setting power but can veto the president’s proposals, coalition members receive defensive benefits from joining the president’s coalition.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116575386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Electoral Incentives and the Costs of Indiscipline in the Ukrainian Rada 选举动机和乌克兰议会不守纪律的代价
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2928223
F. Thames
{"title":"Electoral Incentives and the Costs of Indiscipline in the Ukrainian Rada","authors":"F. Thames","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2928223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2928223","url":null,"abstract":"Does indiscipline hurt the electoral prospects of legislators? Using electoral and roll-call data from the Ukrainian Rada between 1994 to 2014, I test whether shirking affects the likelihood of Rada deputies running as partisan candidates and winning seats in the next election. I argue that the costs of indiscipline vary by electoral systems. I analyze the impact of ill-discipline on the electoral prospects of both single-member district (SMD) and proportional-representation (PR) deputies. The analysis shows that indiscipline has little cost for SMD deputies and modest costs for PR deputies.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"275 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122811497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Mass Immigration Destroy Institutions? 1990s Israel As a Natural Experiment 大规模移民会破坏制度吗?20世纪90年代以色列的自然实验
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2919469
Benjamin Powell, Jeff R. Clark, Alex Nowrasteh
{"title":"Does Mass Immigration Destroy Institutions? 1990s Israel As a Natural Experiment","authors":"Benjamin Powell, Jeff R. Clark, Alex Nowrasteh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2919469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2919469","url":null,"abstract":"The relaxation of emigration restrictions in the Soviet Union and the State’s subsequent collapse led to a large exogenous shock to Israel’s immigrant flows because Israel allows unrestricted immigration for world-wide Jews. Israel’s population increased by 20% in the 1990s due to immigration from the former Soviet Union. These immigrants did not bring social capital that eroded the quality of Israel’s institutional environment. We find that economic institutions’ improved substantially over the decade. Our synthetic control methodology indicates that it is likely that the institutions improvement would not have occurred to the same degree without the mass migration. Our case study indicates that immigrant participation in the political process is the main mechanism through which the migration caused institutional change.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"741 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122956875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 54
Кормит ли либерал реднека? (The Enlightened Liberal Provides for Ignorant Redneck... Really?) Кормит ли либерал реднека?开明的自由主义者为无知的乡巴佬提供……真的吗?)
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-10-27 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2859949
K. Yanovskiy, S. Zhavoronkov
{"title":"Кормит ли либерал реднека? (The Enlightened Liberal Provides for Ignorant Redneck... Really?)","authors":"K. Yanovskiy, S. Zhavoronkov","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2859949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2859949","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: В СМИ со ссылками на научные данные приводятся утверждения о зависимости консерваторов от правительственных социальных программ, оплаченных налогами собранными с производительных и щедрых либералов. В данной записке показана фактическая несостоятельность подобного утверждения, смысл которого – политические нужды а не вклад в научную дискуссию.English Abstract: Mass media often asserts the conservative voter are generally socially dependent and eventually his incomes are provided by tax dollar paid by industrious liberal voters. Some people affiliated with scientific activities provide their credential to support this allegation. The paper provide references proving factual unfoundedness of above mentioned statement. The latter belongs to the politics, not to the scientific discussion.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127074286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Income Inequality and Political Nationalism 收入不平等与政治民族主义
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-10-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2994583
M. Mckenna
{"title":"Income Inequality and Political Nationalism","authors":"M. Mckenna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2994583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2994583","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how the political elite uses nationalism as a tool for altering the preferences of the voting public. A model is designed to explain how a change in income inequality motivates political parties to use nationalism. The model concludes that increased income inequality incentivises political nationalism through increased voter polarization. An empirical analysis is undertaken using information from political party manifestos as a proxy for political nationalism. Results show that wealthy countries respond to increased income inequality by increasing their level of nationalist rhetoric. When a broader country set of poor countries is used, this relationship breaks down.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132234991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Elites, Institutional Change, Institutional Persistence and Economic Development: Lessons for Africa 精英、制度变迁、制度持久性与经济发展:非洲的经验教训
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2838131
Adewole Musiliu Adeolu
{"title":"Elites, Institutional Change, Institutional Persistence and Economic Development: Lessons for Africa","authors":"Adewole Musiliu Adeolu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2838131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2838131","url":null,"abstract":"In the essay, we show how the preference of political elites for special status and power translates to an institutional structure that not only maximizes their relative share of social wealth through predation but ensure they keep as wide as possible the gap between actual development and potential development. In exchange for de facto power, their choice of institution is one which yields them less rather than more wealth. Though developmental institutions will yield them more wealth, political elites still avoid choosing the socially optimal institution because the resulting political configuration will turn them into elites with merely de jure political power. We draw on a number of historical and contemporary examples to which our model applies. Drawing on the experiences of nations which have successfully transited from growth-inhibiting to developmental institutions, we isolated factors critical to the attainment of this transition. Factors considered included revolution or the threat of revolution, religion through it impact on human capital, international trade and entrepreneurship, external wars and political competition between countries. In examining barriers in the way of countries yet to transit, we identified ethnic diversity and natural resource endowment. Both have prevented to a large extent the emergence of common constitutional pact across elites belonging to groups with different complexities. The challenge remains overcoming these barriers. New pro-development elites are required to make the initial investments in efforts and organization required to upset the status quo. Only when they start would the larger society follow in their steps to sustain and implement the desired institutional change.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115184866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
We Asked You: Public Opinion and Consultation in China 《问你:中国的民意与协商
ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-08-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2941699
Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, Sinan Chu
{"title":"We Asked You: Public Opinion and Consultation in China","authors":"Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, Sinan Chu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2941699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2941699","url":null,"abstract":"China’s leaders describe their system of rule as “consultative democracy”, whereby the public, forbidden from organizing on matters of politics, is encouraged to participate on issues of policy. In particular, citizens are routinely solicited for input on upcoming policy debates. But are public inputs incorporated into policy outputs or is it all ‘window-dressing’? In pursuit of an answer, we employ an online survey designed to measure public preferences on a range of policies recently debated by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC). Next, we compare final policy decisions, based on whether or not they were opened for public consultation, for evidence of convergence between public opinion and policy choices. Our findings suggest that consultation is associated with more popular policy choices. To check for robustness, we pair our measures of policy preference with latent measures of ideology from our survey, and outside surveys, to extrapolate a predicted ’public opinion’ for the broader Chinese constituency. While we cannot discount the possibility that topics were selectively opened to public input, closer examination of public opinion distributions does not support this interpretation.","PeriodicalId":285469,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Political Power in Transitional Economies (Topic)","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127671691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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