{"title":"Revealed Preferences for Journals: Evidence from Page Limits","authors":"David Card, Stefano DellaVigna","doi":"10.3386/W18663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W18663","url":null,"abstract":"Academic journals set a variety of policies that affect the supply of new manuscripts. We study the impact of page limit policies adopted by the American Economic Review (AER) in 2008 and the Journal of the European Economic Association (JEEA) in 2009 in response to a substantial increase in the length of articles in economics. We focus the analysis on the decision by potential authors to either shorten a longer manuscript in response to the page limit, or submit to another journal. For the AER we find little indication of a loss of longer papers - instead, authors responded by shortening the text and reformatting their papers. For JEEA, in contrast, we estimate that the page length policy led to nearly complete loss of longer manuscripts. These findings provide a revealed-preference measure of competition between journals and indicate that a top-5 journal has substantial monopoly power over submissions, unlike a journal one notch below. At both journals we find that longer papers were more likely to receive a revise and resubmit verdict prior to page limits, suggesting that the loss of longer papers may have had a detrimental effect on quality at JEEA. Despite a modest impact of the AER's policy on the average length of submissions (-5%), the policy had little or no effect on the length of final accepted manuscripts. Our results highlight the importance of evaluating editorial policies.","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124259584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Rate and Direction of Invention in the British Industrial Revolution: Incentives and Institutions","authors":"Ralf R. Meisenzahl, Joel Mokyr","doi":"10.3386/W16993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W16993","url":null,"abstract":"During the Industrial Revolution technological progress and innovation became the main drivers of economic growth. But why was Britain the technological leader? We argue that one hitherto little recognized British advantage was the supply of highly skilled, mechanically able craftsmen who were able to adapt, implement, improve, and tweak new technologies and who provided the micro inventions necessary to make macro inventions highly productive and remunerative. Using a sample of 759 of these mechanics and engineers, we study the incentives and institutions that facilitated the high rate of inventive activity during the Industrial Revolution. First, apprenticeship was the dominant form of skill formation. Formal education played only a minor role. Second, many skilled workmen relied on secrecy and first-mover advantages to reap the benefits of their innovations. Over 40 percent of the sample here never took out a patent. Third, skilled workmen in Britain often published their work and engaged in debates over contemporary technological and social questions. In short, they were affected by the Enlightenment culture. Finally, patterns differ for the textile sector; therefore, any inferences from textiles about the whole economy are likely to be misleading.","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131596685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Risk Response in Agriculture","authors":"J. LaFrance, R. Pope, Jesse Tack","doi":"10.3386/W16716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W16716","url":null,"abstract":"Crop production is subject to supply shocks, and both expected and realized outputs as well as output prices are unknown when inputs are chosen. The process by which producers form expectations is difficult to model, especially when working with aggregate data. We present a necessary and sufficient condition on cost and technology to allow variable input demand equations to be specified as functions of input prices, quasi-fixed inputs, and total variable cost. These all are observable when inputs are committed to production, so that ex ante demands can be estimated with observable data. A flexible, exactly aggregable, and economically regular model of variable input demands is derived and applied to aggregate U.S. agricultural data for the period 1960-1999. We use the empirical results of this model to aid in the specification of a dynamic life-cycle model for agricultural producers facing output and output price risk, with investment in an off-farm, conditionally risk free asset, risky financial assets, savings, consumption, and agricultural production opportunities. This framework admits a coherent, structural, econometric model of input use, output production, savings, investment, and consumption for agricul-ture. We apply this model to U.S. data for the period 1960-1999. Ongoing work focuses on updating the data set to the 21st century and applying both components of the model at the state-level.","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123540963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Which Parts of Globalization Matter for Catch-Up Growth?","authors":"P. Romer","doi":"10.1257/AER.100.2.94","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.100.2.94","url":null,"abstract":"Economists devote too much attention to international flows of goods and services and not enough to international flows of ideas. Traditional trade flows are an imperfect substitute for flows of the underlying ideas. The simplest textbook trade model shows that a welfare-enhancing move toward freer flows of ideas should be associated with a reduction in conventional trade. The large quantitative effect from the flow of ideas is evident in the second half of the 20th century as the life expectancies in poor and rich countries began to converge. Another example comes from China, where authorities dramatically reduced accident rates by adopting rules of civil aviation that were developed in the United States. All economists, including trade economists, would be better equipped to talk about international flows of technologies and rules if they adopted a consistent vocabulary based on the concepts of nonrivalry and excludability. An analysis of the interaction between rules and technologies may help explain important puzzles such as why private firms have successfully diffused some technologies (mobile telephony) but not others (safe municipal water.)","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130994507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rajkamal Iyer, A. Khwaja, Erzo F. P. Luttmer, K. Shue
{"title":"Screening Peers Softly: Inferring the Quality of Small Borrowers","authors":"Rajkamal Iyer, A. Khwaja, Erzo F. P. Luttmer, K. Shue","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2015.2181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2181","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the performance of new online lending markets that rely on nonexpert individuals to screen their peers' creditworthiness. We find that these peer lenders predict an individual's likelihood of defaulting on a loan with 45% greater accuracy than the borrower's exact credit score unobserved by the lenders, who only see a credit category. Moreover, peer lenders achieve 87% of the predictive power of an econometrician who observes all standard financial information about borrowers. Screening through soft or nonstandard information is relatively more important when evaluating lower-quality borrowers. Our results highlight how aggregating over the views of peers and leveraging nonstandard information can enhance lending efficiency. \u0000 \u0000This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121783944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Task Trade between Similar Countries","authors":"G. Grossman, E. Rossi-Hansberg","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-5819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5819","url":null,"abstract":"The authors propose a theory of task trade between countries that have similar relative factor endowments and technological capabilities but may differ in size. Firms produce differentiated goods by performing a continuum of tasks, each of which generates local spillovers. Tasks can be performed at home or abroad, but offshoring entails costs that vary by task. In equilibrium, the tasks with the highest offshoring costs may not be traded. Among the remainder, those with the relatively higher offshoring costs are performed in the country that has the higher wage and higher aggregate output. The paper discusses the relationship between equilibrium wages, equilibrium outputs, and relative country size and examines how the pattern of specialization reflects the key parameters of the model.","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131386809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outsourcing When Investments are Specific and Complementary","authors":"Alla Lileeva, Johannes Van Biesebroeck","doi":"10.3386/W14477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W14477","url":null,"abstract":"Using the universe of large Canadian manufacturing firms in 1988 and 1996, we investigate to what extent outsourcing decision can be explained by a simple property rights model. The unique availability of disaggregate information on outputs as well as inputs permits the construction of a very detailed measure of vertical integration. We also construct five different measures of technological intensity to proxy for investments that are likely to be specific to a buyer-seller relationship. A theoretical model that allows for varying degrees of investment specificity and for complementarities---an externality between buyer and supplier investments---guides the analysis. Our main findings are that (i) greater specificity makes outsourcing less likely; (ii) complementarities between the investments of the buyer and the seller are also associated with less outsourcing; (iii) property rights predictions on the link between investment intensities and optimal ownership are only supported for transactions with low complementarities. High specificity and a low risk of appropriation strengthen the predictions in the model and in the data.","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123164353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency","authors":"E. Farhi, J. Lerner, J. Tirole","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12033","url":null,"abstract":"The sub-prime crisis has shown a harsh spotlight on the practices of securities underwriters, which provided too many complex securities that proved to ultimately have little value. This uproar calls attention to the fact that the literature on intermediaries has carefully analyzed their incentives, but that we know little about the broader strategic dimensions of this market. The paper explores three related strategic dimensions of the certification market: the publicity given to applications, the coarseness of rating patterns and the sellers' dynamic certification strategies. In the model, certifiers respond to the sellers' desire to get a chance to be highly rated and to limit the stigma from rejection. We find conditions under which sellers opt for an ambitious certification strategy, in which they apply to a demanding, but non-transparent certifier and lower their ambitions when rejected. We derive the comparative statics with respect to the sellers' initial reputation, the probability of fortuitous disclosure, the sellers' self-knowledge and impatience, and the concentration of the certification industry. We also analyze the possibility that certifiers opt for a quick turnaround time at the expense of a lower accuracy. Finally, we investigate the opportunity of regulating transparency.","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124370664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Opportunity Cost of Capital of Us Buyouts","authors":"Alexander Groh, Oliver Gottschalg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.876273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.876273","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the problem of accurately determining buyout opportunity cost of capital for performance analyses. It draws on a unique and proprietary set of data on 133 United States buyouts between 1984 and 2004. For each buyout, we determine a public market equivalent that matches the buyout in timing and systematic risk. We show that under realistic mimicking conditions, the average opportunity cost of capital is below the commonly used benchmark S&P 500. The surprising result has a simple explanation: ex post, many of the transactions mimicking the buyouts would have defaulted in the public market. Only under relaxed assumptions, is the average opportunity cost of capital close to the average index return. Our sensitivity analyses highlight the need for a comprehensive risk adjustment that considers both operating risk and leverage risk for an accurate assessment of buyout performance. This finding is particularly important as existing literature on this topic tends to rely on benchmarks without a proper risk adjustment.","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127962895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government Sponsored Versus Private Venture Capital: Canadian Evidence","authors":"James A. Brander, Edward J. Egan, Thomas Hellmann","doi":"10.3386/W14029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W14029","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the relative performance of enterprises backed by government-sponsored venture capitalists and private venture capitalists. While previous studies focus mainly on investor returns, this paper focuses on a broader set of public policy objectives, including value-creation, innovation, and competition. A number of novel data-collection methods, including web-crawlers, are used to assemble a near-comprehensive data set of Canadian venture-capital backed enterprises. The results indicate that enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a variety of criteria, including value-creation, as measured by the likelihood and size of IPOs and M&As, and innovation, as measured by patents. It is important to understand whether such underperformance arises from a selection effect in which private venture capitalists have a higher quality threshold for investment than subsidized venture capitalists, or whether it arises from a treatment effect in which subsidized venture capitalists crowd out private investment and, in addition, provide less effective mentoring and other value-added skills. We find suggestive evidence that crowding out and less effective treatment are problems associated with government-backed venture capital. While the data does not allow for a definitive welfare analysis, the results cast some doubt on the desirability of certain government interventions in the venture capital market.","PeriodicalId":276603,"journal":{"name":"Kauffman: Conferences & Seminars (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123386641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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