Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Corporate Socially Responsible Investments: CEO Altruism, Reputation, and Shareholder Interests","authors":"Richard Borghesi, J. Houston, A. Naranjo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2171916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2171916","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate managers often invest in activities that are deemed to be socially responsible. In some instances, these investments enhance shareholder value. However, in other cases, altruistic managers or managers who privately benefit from the positive attention arising from these activities may choose to make socially responsible investments even if they are not value enhancing. Given this backdrop, we investigate the various factors that motivate firm managers to make socially responsible investments. We find that larger firms, firms with greater free cash flow, and higher advertising outlays demonstrate higher levels of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We also find that companies with stronger institutional ownership are less likely to invest in CSR — which casts doubt on the argument that these investments are designed to promote shareholder value. Consistent with the literature that explores how CEO personal attributes influence corporate decision making, we find that female CEOs, younger CEOs, and managers who donate to both Republican and Democratic parties are significantly more likely to invest in CSR. This latter result suggests that CSR investments may not be driven solely for altruistic reasons, but instead may be part of a broader strategy to create goodwill and/or help maintain good political relations. Finally, we find a strong positive connection between the level of media scrutiny surrounding the firm and its CEO, and the level of CSR investment. This finding suggests that media attention helps induce firms to make socially responsible investments.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128425320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Internal and External Governance of Cooperatives: Membership and Consistency of Values","authors":"Silvia Sacchetti, Phd, E. Tortia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2326938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326938","url":null,"abstract":"Cooperatives are characterised by mutual-benefit coordination mechanisms aimed at the fulfilment of members’ participation rights. This ideal situation may find, in practice, obstacles within the internal characteristics of the cooperative as well as in the nature of relationship with other actors in the socio-economic environment. Building on evidence from the literature, the paper systematises and highlights some of the potential problems in the governance of cooperative firms concerning the accomplishment of cooperative mutualistic aims. In exploring the internal conditions that may affect cooperative performance, we focus in particular on the role of rules and incentives towards such aims. In synergy, when analysing the external conditions that may affect cooperative performance, the paper addresses possible sources of external control, such as those related to the nature of the business relationships between the cooperative and its production network. In taking into account both internal and external conditions, we consider an extended notion of governance, whereby those who impact on strategic decision-making are not to be searched only within the internal governance bodies, typically the board of directors or managers, but also outside the cooperative, as in the extended network of production relationships in which the organisation is embedded.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130271305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Keeping Up Appearances: Reputational Threat and Impression Management after Social Movement Boycotts","authors":"M. McDonnell, Brayden G. King","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2227090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2227090","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we explore the extent to which firms targeted by consumer boycotts strategically react to defend their public image by making prosocial claims: announcements of the firm's engagement in activities that demonstrate its commitment to socially acceptable norms and values. We argue that prosocial claims operate as an impression management tactic meant to protect targeted firms by ameliorating the reputational threat caused by the boycott. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 221 boycotts reported in six major media outlets between 1990 and 2005. Results suggest that boycotted firms do significantly increase their prosocial claims activity after a boycott. Firms are likely to react with a more extensive increase in prosocial claims when the boycott represents a greater reputational threat (by attracting more media attention), when the firm has high reputational standing, and when the firm has made prosocial claims in past impression management. Our findings have broader implications for our understanding of the impression management dynamics underlying firm/social movement interaction, the indirect consequences of reputational threats for corporate social responsibility, and the organizational predictors of movement outcomes.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114322509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Women on Italian Bank Boards: Are They 'Gold Dust'?","authors":"Silvia Del Prete, M. Stefani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2297786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2297786","url":null,"abstract":"Italy ranks among EU countries with the fewest women on bank boards. Using a rich dataset on Italian banks that combines individual data on bank governance with different measures of performance and risk, this paper analyses the determinants of the gender gap in top positions. Econometric results suggest that there is a i?½second glass ceilingi?½ as they confirm a significantly lower probability of women holding top decision-making positions (Chairman, CEO, General Manager), other individual characteristics and bank features being equal. Moreover, results show that the number of women at the top is greater a) in banks belonging to the major banking groups, with larger and younger boards; and b) in banks that are more cost efficient or in those with a larger share of risky loans in the past (in need of restructuring). Preliminary evidence from performance equations suggests that the presence of women is negatively correlated with indicators of ex post riskiness, implying that credit policies are more stringent when women are on the board, possibly due to their higher risk aversion.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115335085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Stakeholders Involvement in Performance Management in Public General Schools","authors":"K. Ploom, Toomas Haldma","doi":"10.15157/TPEP.V20I2.835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15157/TPEP.V20I2.835","url":null,"abstract":"In response to increasing concerns with the legitimacy and efficiency of public spending, performance management as a part of world-wide public sector reform, called New Public Management (NPM) has taken place. This is also the case of educational sector. In Estonian education system, legislation formally enables to design an integrated performance management system. But there is few research done to investigate how these policies and regulations ought to be put into force in order to gain the benefits considering the schools' and pupils' better performance.This study investigates how different stakeholders are involved into the performance management in Estonian general schools. The study is based on empirical survey data gathered from 303 schools providing secondary education in Estonia.The research findings have three main implications. Firstly, the paper contributes to the scarce knowledge about implementation of performance management issues in public schools. Our analysis revealed that compilation of school development plans in Estonian schools is rather a formal obligation. Therefore we propose that the analysis and discussion of the school development plans is needed to organize on regional level, involving all main stakeholders of a school. Secondly, we suggest that in the circumstances of a decentralised education system, like in Estonia, it is needed to implement, central practical performance assessment principles and guidance for the schools. Thirdly, it is highly necessary to improve schools’ cooperation with different stakeholder groups. Also the framework involving different stakeholder groups in the decentralized schools management system should be built up.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116373803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Golden Handcuffs: CEO Employment Contracts when the Firm May Benefit from Anticipated Retention","authors":"M. Goldberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2163715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163715","url":null,"abstract":"The relative performance evaluation hypothesis postulates that market-wide and industry-wide performance should not affect the likelihood of CEO involuntary turnover. However, recent academic literature has documented that following poor industry and market performance the likelihood of CEO involuntary turnover increases. This paper presents a model that explains how the lack of relative performance evaluation in CEO turnover can emerge as an efficient result. I analyze a learning model of managerial ability; the model assumes that the firm benefits from stakeholders' anticipation of the retention of its CEO. The model is consistent with several other features of the labor market for CEOs such as observations that CEO compensation correlates with both idiosyncratic firm performance and market performance; that CEOs rarely change employers; and that the value of a firm may increase following a CEO turnover announcement in which the departing CEO accepts employment at another firm. To support this last assertion, I document that in almost half of the cases in a sample of CEO moves to a larger firm the value of the old firm increases following the turnover announcement.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127335529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Directors’ & Officers’ Liability, D&O Insurance and Moral Hazard: More Control of Moral Hazard by D&O Insurers Needed to Increase the Incentives of Directors and Supervisory Board Members","authors":"W. Weterings","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2153129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2153129","url":null,"abstract":"Directors and supervisory board members (officers) are increasingly being held personally liable. Directors & Officers (D&O) liability insurance offers directors and supervisory board members ample protection against directors' and officers' liability. On the one hand, this has many advantages for the directors and supervisory board members, the company and other concerned parties. It implies, for instance, that it is easier for a company to attract good directors. With a D&O insurance policy, there are also improved means of recovery for parties that have been injured, which also positively affects the compensatory and preventive functions of liability law. On the other hand, due to the presence of D&O insurance, there are fewer financial incentives vis-a-vis directors and officers to act with due care – the moral hazard. As a result, the preventive function of liability law is, in principle, undermined, or at least negatively affected, by the D&O insurance. D&O insurers can, however, take various measures in an attempt to mitigate the moral hazard. For potential injured parties, the company, the insurer and society, those measures are of tremendous importance for ensuring the risk of damage/loss remains as low as possible. Field research shows, however, that the moral hazard is being insufficiently addressed by D&O insurers in the Netherlands. There are restrictions to the instruments that the Dutch D&O insurers are currently using to reduce the moral hazard. What is more, not all possible instruments are being used. This most likely also holds true for D&O insurers in other European countries and in the United States (in light of the research of Baker & Griffith 2010). It is, however, necessary to ensure that the moral hazard is optimally addressed and that the incentives for careful acts of management from liability law continue to be retained as much as possible. That is why it is desirable for D&O insurers to start implementing a retention for the Side A coverage for (the liability of) directors and officers.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125406625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What Makes Better Boards?: A Closer Look at Diversity and Ownership","authors":"Claude Francoeur, W. Ben‐Amar, T. Hafsi, R. Labelle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2030945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2030945","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the joint effect of corporate ownership and board of directors’ diversity configurations on the success of strategic mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions. Board diversity is defined as the extent to which its demographic diversity as measured by the culture, nationality, gender and experience of its directors complements its statutory diversity. A theoretical framework linking ownership, board diversity and M&A strategic decision making is proposed and tested. Based on a sample of 289 M&A decisions undertaken by Canadian firms over the period 2000-2007, demographic diversity is found to have a clear and non linear effect on M&A performance while statutory diversity is of limited influence. Ownership is found to influence the effect of diversity, making the relation finer and more precise. This has practical implications. First, statutory diversity is not sufficient for well-performing boards. Also, ownership is an important factor. The mostly advocated board diversity aimed at insuring the board’s independence is not valid across all ownership configurations. From a public policy perspective, results provide support for the principles-based approach in governance. Governance regimes should encourage the search for a balance between board diversity and the need for cohesion that best serves the firm’s purpose and obligations.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"214 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133734641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Common Sense and Sensibility: Seeking New Values for the Innovative Corporation","authors":"Derrick V. McKoy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2028780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2028780","url":null,"abstract":"We have got in the habit of thinking of corporate governance as a collection of rules and it is very easy to become seduced by this rule oriented approach. However, this mechanical approach should not distract us from the reality that a corporate governance regime should seek to address and realise some critical operational objectives. Stakeholder theory can help, but it cannot tell us with precision who are or should be stakeholders. The Johnson & Johnson Credo may be helpful because it set out a hierarchy of the company’s stake holding. While we should be careful not to build general theories on limited studies, the indication is that some of the assumptions we have made about the value stakeholders of the modern corporation, such as the relative value of its executives, may have been exaggerated. New opportunities are being presented to the innovative corporation to rethink the relative ranking of its corporate stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"91 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126217726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Twitter and its Usage for Dialogic Stakeholder Communication by MNCs and NGOs","authors":"Sarah Inauen, Dennis Schoeneborn, A. Scherer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1975794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1975794","url":null,"abstract":"PurposeCurrent processes of globalization have increased the challenge for multi-national corporations (MNCs) to retain legitimacy. In order to (re-)gain moral legitimacy, recent studies suggest that MNCs should engage in deliberative dialog processes with their various stakeholders, e.g., non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, the era of globalization and the parallel rise of the Internet and related digital technologies have also dramatically widened the range of options for such dialog processes. NGOs in particular make use of so-called “social media” (e.g., Facebook, Weblogs, Twitter) which enable them to quickly generate attention for socially and environmentally harmful business practices by MNCs. In response, MNCs have themselves started to embrace social media technologies for corporate communication purposes. However, given the novelty of these activities, there is a void of research on to what extent MNCs use these social media for moral legitimation in stakeholder dialogs). Therefore, it is the objective of this study to examine how MNCs and NGOs make use of one particular social media technology, i.e., Twitter, and its possibilities for dialog-like, synchronous communication. Design/methodology/approachIn our empirical study, we examine current practices of Twitter usage by MNCs and NGOs. We generate a dataset of more than 3,000 Twitter articles (“Tweets”) from 30 MNCs and 30 NGOs in the German-speaking realm. We analyze these Tweets by drawing on the scale on the “conceptual orality or literality” by Koch and Oesterreicher (1994). The scale allows for cross-comparing to what extent MNCs and NGOs make use of Twitter’s possibilities for dialog-like and synchronous communication.FindingsThe comparative analysis shows that on average both groups, MNCs and NGOs, exhibit a surprisingly similar profile regarding the scale of “conceptual orality or literality” in Twitter. Both of them tend to lean towards conceptual literality. However, the analysis of tweets per organization reveals a much larger variance. On the extreme poles, while some NGOs (like Greenpeace Youth) strongly make use of the medium’s potential for conceptual orality, some MNCs (like the German Stock Exchange, Deutsche Borse) nearly entirely stick to a communication style of literality. In other words, these MNCs put forth a classical one-way model of communication and fail to make use of the dialog-like qualities of the medium.Research limitations We were only able to analyze a comparatively low number of organizations and we restricted our study to MNCs and NGOs in the German-speaking realm. Hence, further research would need to expand this range particularly regarding international Twitter usage. Furthermore, Twitter only allows for short messages with a maximum of 140 letters or signs. This, in turn, renders questionable whether the medium is suited to establish deliberative dialogs between MNCs and NGOs that are based on more elaborate arguments than expressibl","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126906134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}