Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Public Governance, Political Connectedness, and CEO Turnover: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises","authors":"Qingbo Yuan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1911863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1911863","url":null,"abstract":"Using a sample of partially privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed in China’s A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO’s political connectedness will affect the listed firms’ hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the channels of these effects. I find that politically connected CEOs are less likely to be nominated to firms in industries with more specific knowledge, with more competition, cross-listed in overseas stock exchange, and in regions with stronger institutions. As a consequence, political connectedness of CEOs in SOEs reduces the sensitivity of their turnover to firm performance. However, the reduction on turnover performance sensitivity is mitigated by stronger institutions. The additional analysis finds evidence partially explaining why the politically connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed because of their poor performance, that is, SOEs with politically connected CEOs can get more subsidies from the governments when their performance is poor, and tend to hire more employees when the regions in which they locate suffer from severe unemployment problem.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"517 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133193417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Elevating Board Performance: The Significance of Director Mindset, Operating Context, and Other Behavioral and Functional Considerations","authors":"Simon C. Y. Wong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1832234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1832234","url":null,"abstract":"The global financial crisis has prompted debate once again on how to improve the effectiveness of the board of directors at listed companies. Despite considerable reforms over the past two decades, boards – particularly at financial institutions – have been criticized recently for failing to properly guide strategy, oversee risk management, structure executive pay, manage succession planning, and carry out other essential tasks.This article argues that the lack of attention to behavioral and functional considerations – such as director mindset, board operating context, and evolving human dynamics – has hampered the board’s effectiveness.To reach their potential, the article recommends that – alongside establishing core building blocks such as appropriate board size, well-functioning committees, proficient company secretarial support, and professionally-administered board evaluation – boards and their members focus on the following:1. Think like an owner – as boards represent the interests of owners, directors should adopt an ownership mindset. However, non-executive directors, while generally hard-working and earnest, often have a limited conception of their roles. An ownership mindset can be instilled by, among other things, recruiting directors who exhibit energy, a proactive attitude, and an independent mind, involving them meaningfully in substantive board work, strengthening their emotional bonds to the company, and employing long-term financial tools.2. Know their companies – for a board to add value, individual directors must possess a strong understanding of the company and its industry. However, getting outside directors to be functional is challenging in practice. Boards can build in-depth knowledge and expertise by, among other things, emphasizing interactive, experiential modes of information acquisition, inviting \"dissenting\" opinions from the outside, and ensuring that a meaningful proportion of non-executive directors possess sector expertise.3. Be prepared to “roll up their sleeves” – there is broad acceptance that listed company boards should operate on the basis of “noses in, fingers out.” However, to properly discharge their stewardship responsibilities, boards must engage intensively in such critical areas as strategy development and risk management. On matters where management faces severe conflicts of interest, such as CEO succession planning and executive remuneration, boards must \"roll up their sleeves\" and drive the work.4. Take charge of their priorities – the board’s responsibilities have broadened over the years, including following the global financial crisis. As most boards still meet only 8-10 times a year, they need to prioritize their activities and manage their time efficiently. Because the board and management may not always hold the same view on priority issues, boards should decide their top priorities rather than rely solely on management to determine the board's agenda. Operationally, boards should limit the","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127755379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Carmaker in Crisis","authors":"Heike Nolte, Ellen K. Wondra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1760613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1760613","url":null,"abstract":"In September 2009 General Motors' board of directors announces it would sell the majority of its European subsidiary Opel to a group led by Magna International Inc. But two months later it decides to keep Opel, upsetting German officials and workers and harming its reputation in Germany. Why did GM’s board steer such a vacillating obscure course? Why were German stakeholders angry? This article makes the argument that, due to the difficulties of humans to perform complex decision making in environments overloaded with information regarded as dangerous (noxity, Schroeder et al, 1967), the board of directors discarded GM's deliberate strategy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) when the firm was in financial distress. The deliberate strategy – which included cultural sensitivity as well as keeping Opel as an integrated, strategic relevant part of the conglomerate – was superceded by an emergent strategy derived from the routine General Motors had developed over many decades: the firm had learned to solve its problems by selling or closing units in order to increase its overall profitability. When General Motors had overcome its immediate financial emergency, it returned to its deliberate strategy.The concepts of exchange value uncertainty versus social uncertainty explain why not selling Opel after announcing it was legitimate from the point of view of General Motors but not from that of German stakeholders, such as officials and workers. They are discussed on the background of common law and civil law systems.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127816094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Accountability in a Global Economy: The Emergence of International Accountability Standards","authors":"D. Gilbert, A. Rasche, S. Waddock","doi":"10.5840/BEQ20112112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/BEQ20112112","url":null,"abstract":"This article assesses the proliferation of international accountability standards (IAS) in the recent past. We provide a comprehensive overview about the different types of standards and discuss their role as part of a new institutional infrastructure for corporate responsibility. Based on this, it is argued that IAS can advance corporate responsibility on a global level because they contribute to the closure of some omnipresent governance gaps. IAS also improve the preparedness of an organization to give an explanation and a justification to relevant stakeholders for its judgments, intentions, acts and omissions when appropriately called upon to do so. However, IAS also face a variety of problems impeding their potential to help address social and environmental issues. The contribution of the four articles in this special section is discussed in the context of standards’ problems and opportunities. The article closes by outlining a research agenda to further develop and extend the scholarly debate around IAS.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131574591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mission, Strategies and Performance Evaluation in Nonprofit Organisations From a Stakeholder Management Approach","authors":"Ericka Costa, Tommaso Ramus","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1655655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1655655","url":null,"abstract":"Nonprofit organisations (NPOs) have emerged as important not-for-profit private actors providing goods or services directly related to their explicit aim to create social value for the community in which they work. In order to maximize its social value creation, an NPO firstly has to define its mission according to stakeholders’ expectations, then it has to carry it out considering how it is defined by stakeholders, and finally it has to measure its performance and account for it related to how their stakeholders evaluate performance achievement. Since the mission achievement and effectiveness of NPOs are not easy to estimate and to assess, it follows that NPO effectiveness is always a matter of comparison, and that NPO effectiveness is a social construction, which depends on the evaluation given by the stakeholders who have an impact on and are impacted by the mission of the organisation. For these reasons, in the present working paper we assert that managers of NPOs have to use strategic stakeholder relationships, and not only adaptive or reactive approaches, in order to negotiate outcomes which reflect win-win situations for different stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130919679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Exploration of Boards of Directors' Quality: The Development of an Index for Directors Attributes and the Relation with Firm Value and Performance","authors":"José Elias Feres de Almeida","doi":"10.22495/CBV7I2ART4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/CBV7I2ART4","url":null,"abstract":"In an environment with poor quality of Corporate Governance Mechanisms, the quality of directors’ attributes might exert an important role to improve firm’s value and performance. I developed an index to explore the quality of Board of Directors based on Brazilian and international corporate governance codes to measure directors qualitative attributes. The sample consist in 24 Brazilian firms that traded at NYSE in the period over 1999-2006. The results show us that board of directors with high types of attributes can improve value measured individually and by the quality index. The main results indicate that firm value improved with high types of professionals, accountants seated in boards, directors with high level of education and that participated in executive training.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"193 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131724007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Analyzing Ineffective Corporate Governance: Director Busyness and Board Committee Memberships","authors":"P. Jiraporn, Manohar Singh, Chun I. Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1133584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133584","url":null,"abstract":"The benefits and costs of directors holding multiple board seats continue to be debated in the literature. We contribute to the debate by examining whether holding multiple outside board seats compromises directors' ability to effectively perform their monitoring duties. Analyzing over 40,000 observations of individual director data across more than 1,400 firms, we report that, by and large, individuals holding more outside directorships serve on fewer board committees. The relation, however, appears to be non-linear and U-shaped indicating some support for both the busyness and the reputation hypotheses. In addition, we find that holding more outside board seats decreases the likelihood of a board member being on a greater number of work-heavy and specialized committees such as compensation and audit committees. The findings substantiate evidence (Akhigbe and Martin 2006) on value relevance of board committee structures. Additional analysis of committee memberships suggests that women and ethnic minorities are placed on more board committees. In addition, directors on smaller and independent boards serve on more committees. Finally, it appears that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had material impact on the association between the number of multiple board seats and the committee memberships.","PeriodicalId":273366,"journal":{"name":"Organizational Behavior & Key Stakeholders eJournal","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123476776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}