2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)最新文献_第4页

Deploying Intrusion-Tolerant SCADA for the Power Grid 为电网部署抗入侵SCADA

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2019.00043

Amy Babay, John L. Schultz, Thomas Tantillo, Samuel Beckley, Eamon Jordan, Kevin T. Ruddell, Kevin Jordan, Y. Amir

引用次数: 24

Leveraging Transverse Reads to Correct Alignment Faults in Domain Wall Memories 利用横向读取来纠正域壁存储器中的对齐错误

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2019.00047

S. Ollivier, Donald Kline, Kawsher A. Roxy, R. Melhem, S. Bhanja, A. Jones

引用次数: 16

UChecker: Automatically Detecting PHP-Based Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerabilities UChecker:自动检测基于php的无限制文件上传漏洞

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2019.00064

Jin Huang, Yu Li, Junjie Zhang, Rui Dai

引用次数: 18

Controller-Oblivious Dynamic Access Control in Software-Defined Networks 软件定义网络中的控制器无关动态访问控制

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2019.00053

Steven R. Gomez, Samuel Jero, R. Skowyra, Jason Martin, Patrick Sullivan, David Bigelow, Zachary Ellenbogen, Bryan C. Ward, Hamed Okhravi, James Landry

{"title":"Controller-Oblivious Dynamic Access Control in Software-Defined Networks","authors":"Steven R. Gomez, Samuel Jero, R. Skowyra, Jason Martin, Patrick Sullivan, David Bigelow, Zachary Ellenbogen, Bryan C. Ward, Hamed Okhravi, James Landry","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2019.00053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2019.00053","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional network access control approaches are static (e.g., user roles in Active Directory), coarse-grained (e.g., 802.1x), or both (e.g., VLANs). Such systems are unable to meaningfully stop or hinder motivated attackers seeking to spread throughout an enterprise network. To address this threat, we present Dynamic Flow Isolation (DFI), a novel architecture for supporting dynamic, fine-grained access control policies enforced in a Software-Defined Network (SDN). These policies can emit and revoke specific access control rules automatically in response to network events like users logging off, letting the network adaptively reduce unnecessary reachability that could be potentially leveraged by attackers. DFI is oblivious to the SDN controller implementation and processes new packets prior to the controller, making DFI's access control resilient to a malicious or faulty controller or its applications. We implemented DFI for OpenFlow networks and demonstrated it on an enterprise SDN testbed with around 100 end hosts and servers. Finally, we evaluated the performance of DFI and how it enables a novel policy, which is otherwise difficult to enforce, that protects against a surrogate of the recent NotPetya malware in an infection scenario. We found that the threat was most limited in its ability to spread using our policy, which automatically restricted network flows over the course of the attack, compared to no access control or a static role-based policy.","PeriodicalId":271955,"journal":{"name":"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"258 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116144813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

The Strength of Weak Randomization: Easily Deployable, Efficiently Searchable Encryption with Minimal Leakage 弱随机化的强度:易于部署，有效搜索的加密与最小的泄漏

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2019.00059

D. Pouliot, Scott Griffy, C. V. Wright

引用次数: 1

BenchIoT: A Security Benchmark for the Internet of Things BenchIoT:物联网安全基准

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2019.00035

N. S. Almakhdhub, Abraham A. Clements, Mathias Payer, S. Bagchi

{"title":"BenchIoT: A Security Benchmark for the Internet of Things","authors":"N. S. Almakhdhub, Abraham A. Clements, Mathias Payer, S. Bagchi","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2019.00035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2019.00035","url":null,"abstract":"Attacks against IoT systems are increasing at an alarming pace. Many IoT systems are and will be built using low-cost micro-controllers (IoT-uCs). Different security mechanisms have been proposed for IoT-uCs with different trade-offs. To guarantee a realistic and practical evaluation, the constrained resources of IoT-uCs require that defenses must be evaluated with respect to not only security, but performance, memory, and energy as well. Evaluating security mechanisms for IoT-uCs is limited by the lack of realistic benchmarks and evaluation frameworks. This burdens researchers with the task of developing not only the proposed defenses but applications on which to evaluate them. As a result, security evaluation for IoT-uCs is limited and ad-hoc. A sound benchmarking suite is essential to enable robust and comparable evaluations of security techniques on IoT-uCs. This paper introduces BenchIoT, a benchmark suite and evaluation framework to address pressing challenges and limitations for evaluating IoT-uCs security. The evaluation framework enables automatic evaluation of 14 metrics covering security, performance, memory usage, and energy consumption. The BenchIoT benchmarks provide a curated set of five real-world IoT applications that cover both IoT-uCs with and without an OS. We demonstrate BenchIoT's ability by evaluating three defense mechanisms. All benchmarks and the evaluation framework is open sourced and available to the research community.","PeriodicalId":271955,"journal":{"name":"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126396966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

DeviceVeil: Robust Authentication for Individual USB Devices Using Physical Unclonable Functions DeviceVeil:使用物理不可克隆功能的单个USB设备的健壮认证

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2019.00041

K. Suzaki, Y. Hori, K. Kobara, Mohammad Mannan

{"title":"DeviceVeil: Robust Authentication for Individual USB Devices Using Physical Unclonable Functions","authors":"K. Suzaki, Y. Hori, K. Kobara, Mohammad Mannan","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2019.00041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2019.00041","url":null,"abstract":"The Universal Serial Bus (USB) supports a diverse and wide-ranging set of device types. To enable ease of use, USB devices are automatically detected and classified by common operating systems, without any authentication. This trust-by-default design principle can be easily exploited, and led to numerous attacks in the past (e.g., Stuxnet, BadUSB, BadAndroid), specifically targeting high-value organizations. Administrators' efforts to prevent these attacks may also be threatened by unscrupulous users who may insert any USB device, or malicious users (inside attackers) who may try to circumvent OS/kernel-enforced protection mechanisms (e.g., via OS replacement). The root causes of USB attacks appear to be the lack of robust authentication of individual USB devices and inadequate tamper-proofing of the solution mechanism itself. We propose DeviceVeil to address these limitations. To authenticate individual USB devices, we utilize the tamper-proof feature of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs); PUFs extract unique features from physical characteristics of an integrated circuit (IC) at a reasonable cost (less than 1 USD). To make our authentication mechanism robust, we implement it as a small hypervisor, and protect it by a novel combination of security technologies available in commodity PCs, e.g., Trusted Platform Module (TPM), customized secure boot, and virtualization support. The OS disk image with all user data is encrypted by a key sealed in TPM and can be decrypted by the hypervisor only. Customized secure boot allows the loading of the legitimate hypervisor and OS kernel only. The hypervisor enables pre-OS authentication to protect the trust-by-default OS from USB attacks. The chain of trust continues from power-on to the insertion of a USB device and disallows all illegitimate USB devices. DeviceVeil's PUF authentication takes about 1.7 seconds during device insertion.","PeriodicalId":271955,"journal":{"name":"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128045560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Test-of-Time Award 时间的考验奖

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/dsn.2019.00013

引用次数: 0

Tell Me More Than Just Assembly! Reversing Cyber-Physical Execution Semantics of Embedded IoT Controller Software Binaries 告诉我不仅仅是组装!反转嵌入式物联网控制器软件二进制文件的网络物理执行语义

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2019.00045

Pengfei Sun, Luis Garcia, S. Zonouz

{"title":"Tell Me More Than Just Assembly! Reversing Cyber-Physical Execution Semantics of Embedded IoT Controller Software Binaries","authors":"Pengfei Sun, Luis Garcia, S. Zonouz","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2019.00045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2019.00045","url":null,"abstract":"The safety of critical cyber-physical IoT devices hinges on the security of their embedded software that implements control algorithms for monitoring and control of the associated physical processes, e.g., robotics and drones. Reverse engineering of the corresponding embedded controller software binaries enables their security analysis by extracting high-level, domain-specific, and cyber-physical execution semantic information from executables. We present MISMO, a domain-specific reverse engineering framework for embedded binary code in emerging cyber-physical IoT control application domains. The reverse engineering outcomes can be used for firmware vulnerability assessment, memory forensics analysis, targeted memory data attacks, or binary patching for dynamic selective memory protection (e.g., important control algorithm parameters). MISMO performs semantic-matching at an algorithmic level that can help with the understanding of any possible cyber-physical security flaws. MISMO compares low-level binary symbolic values and high-level algorithmic expressions to extract domain-specific semantic information for the binary's code and data. MISMO enables a finer-grained understanding of the controller by identifying the specific control and state estimation algorithms used. We evaluated MISMO on 2,263 popular firmware binaries by 30 commercial vendors from 6 application domains including drones, self-driving cars, smart homes, robotics, 3D printers, and the Linux kernel controllers. The results show that MISMO can accurately extract the algorithm-level semantics of the embedded binary code and data regions. We discovered a zero-day vulnerability in the Linux kernel controllers versions 3.13 and above.","PeriodicalId":271955,"journal":{"name":"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116254789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17

HeapTherapy+: Efficient Handling of (Almost) All Heap Vulnerabilities Using Targeted Calling-Context Encoding HeapTherapy+:使用目标调用上下文编码有效处理(几乎)所有堆漏洞

2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2019.00060

Qiang Zeng, Golam Kayas, Emil Mohammed, Lannan Luo, Xiaojiang Du, J. Rhee

{"title":"HeapTherapy+: Efficient Handling of (Almost) All Heap Vulnerabilities Using Targeted Calling-Context Encoding","authors":"Qiang Zeng, Golam Kayas, Emil Mohammed, Lannan Luo, Xiaojiang Du, J. Rhee","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2019.00060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2019.00060","url":null,"abstract":"Exploitation of heap vulnerabilities has been on the rise, leading to many devastating attacks. Conventional heap patch generation is a lengthy procedure requiring intensive manual efforts. Worse, fresh patches tend to harm system dependability, hence deterring users from deploying them. We propose a heap patching system HEAPTHERAPY+ that simultaneously has the following prominent advantages: (1) generating patches without manual efforts; (2) installing patches without altering the code (so called code-less patching); (3) handling various heap vulnerability types; (4) imposing a very low overhead; and (5) no dependency on specific heap allocators. As a separate contribution, we propose targeted calling context encoding, which is a suite of algorithms for optimizing calling context encoding, an important technique with applications in many areas. The system properly combines heavyweight offline attack analysis with lightweight online defense generation, and provides a new countermeasure against heap attacks. The evaluation shows that the system is effective and efficient.","PeriodicalId":271955,"journal":{"name":"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122798730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5