为电网部署抗入侵SCADA

Amy Babay, John L. Schultz, Thomas Tantillo, Samuel Beckley, Eamon Jordan, Kevin T. Ruddell, Kevin Jordan, Y. Amir
{"title":"为电网部署抗入侵SCADA","authors":"Amy Babay, John L. Schultz, Thomas Tantillo, Samuel Beckley, Eamon Jordan, Kevin T. Ruddell, Kevin Jordan, Y. Amir","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2019.00043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While there has been considerable research on making power grid Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems resilient to attacks, the problem of transitioning these technologies into deployed SCADA systems remains largely unaddressed. We describe our experience and lessons learned in deploying an intrusion-tolerant SCADA system in two realistic environments: a red team experiment in 2017 and a power plant test deployment in 2018. These experiences resulted in technical lessons related to developing an intrusion-tolerant system with a real deployable application, preparing a system for deployment in a hostile environment, and supporting protocol assumptions in that hostile environment. We also discuss some meta-lessons regarding the cultural aspects of transitioning academic research into practice in the power industry.","PeriodicalId":271955,"journal":{"name":"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"24","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Deploying Intrusion-Tolerant SCADA for the Power Grid\",\"authors\":\"Amy Babay, John L. Schultz, Thomas Tantillo, Samuel Beckley, Eamon Jordan, Kevin T. Ruddell, Kevin Jordan, Y. Amir\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/DSN.2019.00043\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"While there has been considerable research on making power grid Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems resilient to attacks, the problem of transitioning these technologies into deployed SCADA systems remains largely unaddressed. We describe our experience and lessons learned in deploying an intrusion-tolerant SCADA system in two realistic environments: a red team experiment in 2017 and a power plant test deployment in 2018. These experiences resulted in technical lessons related to developing an intrusion-tolerant system with a real deployable application, preparing a system for deployment in a hostile environment, and supporting protocol assumptions in that hostile environment. We also discuss some meta-lessons regarding the cultural aspects of transitioning academic research into practice in the power industry.\",\"PeriodicalId\":271955,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"24\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2019.00043\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2019.00043","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24

摘要

虽然已经有相当多的研究使电网监控和数据采集(SCADA)系统抵御攻击,但将这些技术过渡到部署的SCADA系统的问题在很大程度上仍未得到解决。我们描述了在两个现实环境中部署抗入侵SCADA系统的经验和教训:2017年的红队实验和2018年的发电厂测试部署。这些经验导致了与开发具有实际可部署应用程序的入侵容忍系统,准备在敌对环境中部署的系统以及在该敌对环境中支持协议假设相关的技术课程。我们还讨论了一些关于将学术研究转化为电力行业实践的文化方面的元教训。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Deploying Intrusion-Tolerant SCADA for the Power Grid
While there has been considerable research on making power grid Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems resilient to attacks, the problem of transitioning these technologies into deployed SCADA systems remains largely unaddressed. We describe our experience and lessons learned in deploying an intrusion-tolerant SCADA system in two realistic environments: a red team experiment in 2017 and a power plant test deployment in 2018. These experiences resulted in technical lessons related to developing an intrusion-tolerant system with a real deployable application, preparing a system for deployment in a hostile environment, and supporting protocol assumptions in that hostile environment. We also discuss some meta-lessons regarding the cultural aspects of transitioning academic research into practice in the power industry.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信