{"title":"Monopolizing War: Codifying the Laws of War to Reassert Governmental Authority, 1856–1874","authors":"Eyal Benvenisti, Doreen Lustig","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2985781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2985781","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, we challenge the canonical narrative about civil society’s efforts to discipline warfare during the mid-19th century – a narrative of progressive evolution of Enlightenment-inspired laws of war, later to be termed international humanitarian law. Conversely, our historical account shows how the debate over participation in international law-making and the content of the law reflected social and political tensions within and between European states. While the multifaceted influence of civil society was an important catalyst for the inter-governmental codification of the laws of war, the content of that codification did not simply reflect humanitarian sensibilities. Rather, as civil society posed a threat to the governmental monopoly over the regulation of war, the turn to inter-state codification of IHL also assisted governments in securing their authority as the sole regulators in the international terrain. We argue that, in codifying the laws of war, the main concern of key European governments was not to protect civilians from combatants’ fire, but rather to protect combatants from civilians eager to take up arms to defend their nation – even against their own governments’ wishes. We further argue that the concern with placing ‘a gun on the shoulder of every socialist’ extended far beyond the battlefield. Monarchs and emperors turned to international law to put the dreaded nationalist and revolutionary genies back in the bottle. These concerns were brought to the fore most forcefully in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and the subsequent short-lived, but violent, rise of the Paris Commune. These events formed the backdrop to the Brussels Declaration of 1874, the first comprehensive text on the laws of war. This Declaration exposed civilians to war’s harms and supported the growing capitalist economy by ensuring that market interests would be protected from the scourge of war and the consequences of defeat.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116419604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Progressive Era Conceptions of the Corporation and the Failure of the Federal Chartering Movement","authors":"Camden Hutchison","doi":"10.7916/CBLR.V2017I3.1727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/CBLR.V2017I3.1727","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the economic integration of the several states and the broad regulatory authority of the federal government, the internal affairs of business corporations remain primarily governed by state law. The origins of this system are closely tied to the decentralized history of the United States, but the reasons for its continued persistence—in the face of significant federalization pressures—are not obvious. Indeed, federalization of corporate law was a major political goal during the Progressive Era, a period which witnessed significant expansion of federal involvement in the national economy. By examining the historical record of Progressive Era policy debates, this Article bridges the analytical gap between historical and corporate legal scholarship, bringing to light the specific reasons why a federal corporation law was never enacted. \u0000 \u0000Drawing on primary source evidence, the conclusions of this Article are as follows. First, proponents of federal chartering were deeply divided in their attitudes toward corporations, some viewing them as a dangerous threat, others viewing them as central to economic progress. These divisions led to conflicting views on the very purpose of corporate regulation, making agreement on the content of a federal corporation act unlikely. Second, notwithstanding these divisions, many reformers viewed corporations as directly accountable to the public interest. Legislative proposals were therefore framed in terms of benefiting the public, and only secondarily addressed the shareholder interests that dominate corporate law today. Finally, it was the conflicted nature of the political support for federal chartering legislation—not any specific policy preference for maintaining corporate law federalism—that led to the persistence of state-based corporate law. Ultimately, the absence of federal corporate law was a product of historical circumstance, rather than any conscious determination of legal or economic policy.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127129031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Constraining Elites: The Self-Enforcing Constitution of the Patricians of Venice","authors":"D. Smith, R. Al-Bawwab","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2851157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2851157","url":null,"abstract":"Historians often attribute the prosperity of medieval and Renaissance Venice – situated in a brackish lagoon with a lack of most basic resources – to the virtuous and wise leadership of the Venetian patriciate. Rather, this paper argues that the origins of Venetian prosperity are institutional. In particular, unique formal and informal constitutional constraints, including the dispersion of power through overlapping committees, complex – and anonymous – election procedures, strict term limits, and ducal oaths of office, operated to check the ambition of the patriciate qua patriciate. We detail these constraints and provide examples of their effectiveness in the provision of the rule of law and a sound currency.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133684866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"‘Value is Not a Fact’: Reproduction Cost and the Transition from Classical to Neoclassical Regulation","authors":"N. Giocoli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2735016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2735016","url":null,"abstract":"The paper draws on Siegel (1984) to argue that, while paving the way for constitutionalizing the free market in Lochner v. New York (1905), the reproduction cost method that the Supreme Court established in Smyth v. Ames (1898) as the preferred technique for assessing the “fair value” of a business for regulatory purposes, also exposed the conventional character of any valuation exercise, against the claim of objectivity made by classical economists and traditional jurists. The inconsistency between the method and the classical laissez faire philosophy underlying the Court’s jurisprudence did not escape progressive critics of the Smyth doctrine who could argue that if “value is not a fact”, then government could legitimately use it as a policy variable to pursue different kinds of socio-economic goals.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"54 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117314450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conceptions of State Identity and Continuity in Contemporary International Legal Scholarship","authors":"Anna Østrup","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2715701","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2715701","url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers an examination of the substantive conceptions of state identity/continuity advanced in contemporary international legal scholarship. It first outlines in a historical perspective the core theoretical debate concerning the nature of state succession and examines the meaning of the concept of state identity/continuity in this context. Having dismissed a general concept of legal personality as a point of differentiation between state identity/continuity and state succession, the paper identifies four main substantive conceptions of state identity/continuity in contemporary legal scholarship: a ‘formal’ conception, a ‘material’ conception, a ‘procedural’ conception, and finally a ‘relativist’ or ‘deconstructivist’ approach to the concept of identity/continuity. The paper then explores the strengths and weaknesses of each of these conceptions in terms of both their theoretical underpinnings; their conformity with state practice and their implications for the legal concept of statehood. The paper argues that both the formal and material conceptions of state identity/continuity suffer from serious theoretical shortcomings. The procedural conception is generally more consistent, although it may not – as pointed out by proponents of the deconstructivist approach – entirely encompass the many variations of state practice. In particular, the procedural conception of identity/continuity stands out by maintaining the aspiration of a normative approach to the question of state identity/continuity, and thus to the problem of statehood in international law, even if there is a certain gap between theory and practice.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115407960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Squeaky Wheels Need Greasing: Corruption and the Construction of the Pacific Railroad","authors":"Benjamin Lo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2784302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2784302","url":null,"abstract":"The construction of the Pacific Railroad is commonly thought to be a prime example of corruption in the Gilded Era. However, a close analysis of three infamous instances of \"corruption\" show that the Robber Barons' actions may have been less harmful and less profitable than previously considered.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132077228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Professor Alan R. Bromberg's Rule 10b-5","authors":"Marc I. Steinberg","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2622666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2622666","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Alan Bromberg was the foremost authority in the law of Rule 10b-5. In this article, the author Professor Marc Steinberg, Professor Bromberg's colleague for 25 years, highlights Professor Bromberg's scholarship in this area. Focusing on key U.S. Supreme Court decisions and congressional legislation, Professor Steinberg reflects on the dialogue that he had with Professor Bromberg through the years on these developments. As this article illustrates, Professor Bromberg enjoyed a truly impressive academic career.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122289145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"State 'Competitor's Veto' Laws and the Right to Earn a Living: Some Paths to Federal Reform","authors":"Timothy Sandefur","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3191388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3191388","url":null,"abstract":"Imagine what would have happened if, in 1992, the owners of then-little-known Starbucks had been required to prove that the United States “needed” a new chain of coffee shops. At that time the nation had millions of coffee shops serving tens of millions of customers daily, and these coffee shops would have argued that they could cover any foreseeable increase in demand. Yet the nation did need a new chain of coffee shops, as Starbucks’ dramatic success proves. Only through the experiment could the company’s owners prove that America needed a new coffee chain.Silly as this example might seem, many states and cities actually do enforce laws that prevent new businesses from entering the market unless they can prove — without running the experiment — that there is a “public need” for new competition. These laws, called “certificate of public convenience and necessity” (CPCN) laws, govern a wide variety of businesses, from taxicab and limousine services to car dealerships, ambulance companies, hospitals, moving companies, and so on. This article explores the history, theory, and operation of CPCN laws, also known as “Competitor Veto” laws, focusing on evidence uncovered as part of litigation challenging such laws in Missouri and Kentucky. The article concludes that because these laws are designed to protect incumbent businesses, there must be reforms on the federal level to abolish them. Several possible reforms are considered, along with objections.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125298164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Niccolò Machiavelli: Father of Modern Constitutionalism","authors":"M. Sellers","doi":"10.1111/RAJU.12077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/RAJU.12077","url":null,"abstract":"Niccolo Machiavelli is the father of modern constitutionalism. Constitutionalism began anew in the modern world with the study of the ancient republics and it was Machiavelli who inaugurated this revived science of politics. Five hundred years after the composition of Il Principe and the Discorsi we are still working out the implications of applying reason to the structures of law and government in pursuit of justice and the common good. Modern constitutionalism and ancient republicanism share three central beliefs: first, that government should serve justice and the common good; second, that government should do so through known and stable laws; third, that these will best be secured through the checks and balances of a well‐designed constitution. Machiavelli took the theories and experiences of republican Rome and applied them to his own era. This application of reason to constitutional design transformed the politics of emergent modernity and reconfigured government throughout the world.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125173169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Mythology of Salomon's Case and the Law Dealing with the Tort Liabilities of Corporate Groups: An Historical Perspective","authors":"P. Lipton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2605733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2605733","url":null,"abstract":"Salomon’s case has for a long time been widely seen as a landmark case that is the keystone of modern company law. A mythology has developed around the case that has resulted in the Salomon principle exercising an iron grip on company law. The rigid application of the principle in Salomon’s case to corporate groups has enabled corporate groups to structure themselves in ways that limit the tort liabilities of the group as a whole and so raises important social, economic and ethical questions regarding the allocation of risk that are not addressed by the application of the Salomon principle. This article suggests that given the importance of the social, economic and ethical issues raised in cases of mass torts that invariably involve corporate groups, it is preferable that these issues are resolved by tort law, which is concerned with the allocation of risk, thereby circumventing the dead hand of Salomon.","PeriodicalId":254768,"journal":{"name":"Legal History eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132044310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}