Progressive Era Conceptions of the Corporation and the Failure of the Federal Chartering Movement

Camden Hutchison
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Despite the economic integration of the several states and the broad regulatory authority of the federal government, the internal affairs of business corporations remain primarily governed by state law. The origins of this system are closely tied to the decentralized history of the United States, but the reasons for its continued persistence—in the face of significant federalization pressures—are not obvious. Indeed, federalization of corporate law was a major political goal during the Progressive Era, a period which witnessed significant expansion of federal involvement in the national economy. By examining the historical record of Progressive Era policy debates, this Article bridges the analytical gap between historical and corporate legal scholarship, bringing to light the specific reasons why a federal corporation law was never enacted. Drawing on primary source evidence, the conclusions of this Article are as follows. First, proponents of federal chartering were deeply divided in their attitudes toward corporations, some viewing them as a dangerous threat, others viewing them as central to economic progress. These divisions led to conflicting views on the very purpose of corporate regulation, making agreement on the content of a federal corporation act unlikely. Second, notwithstanding these divisions, many reformers viewed corporations as directly accountable to the public interest. Legislative proposals were therefore framed in terms of benefiting the public, and only secondarily addressed the shareholder interests that dominate corporate law today. Finally, it was the conflicted nature of the political support for federal chartering legislation—not any specific policy preference for maintaining corporate law federalism—that led to the persistence of state-based corporate law. Ultimately, the absence of federal corporate law was a product of historical circumstance, rather than any conscious determination of legal or economic policy.
进步时代的公司观念与联邦包租运动的失败
尽管几个州的经济一体化和联邦政府广泛的监管权力,商业公司的内部事务仍然主要由州法律管辖。这一制度的起源与美国去中心化的历史密切相关,但其持续存在的原因——面对巨大的联邦化压力——并不明显。事实上,公司法的联邦化是进步时代的一个主要政治目标,在这一时期,联邦政府对国民经济的参与显著扩大。通过研究进步时代政策辩论的历史记录,本文弥合了历史与公司法学术之间的分析差距,揭示了联邦公司法从未颁布的具体原因。根据第一手来源的证据,本文的结论如下。首先,联邦特许的支持者对公司的态度存在严重分歧,一些人认为它们是危险的威胁,另一些人则认为它们是经济发展的核心。这些分歧导致了对公司监管目的的相互矛盾的观点,使得就联邦公司法案的内容达成一致的可能性不大。其次,尽管存在这些分歧,但许多改革者认为企业对公众利益负有直接责任。因此,立法提案是以公众利益为基础的,而对股东利益的处理只是次要的,而股东利益在今天的公司法中占主导地位。最后,正是对联邦特许立法的政治支持的矛盾性质——而不是任何维护公司法联邦制的具体政策偏好——导致了以州为基础的公司法的持续存在。最终,联邦公司法的缺失是历史环境的产物,而不是法律或经济政策的有意识决定。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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