{"title":"Free Market on the Freeway","authors":"S. Henry, Yuan Cheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3452840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3452840","url":null,"abstract":"his paper studies a trading mechanism allowing autonomous cars to change lanes on a freeway in congested traffic. When no room is available on the adjacent lane, the mechanism enable a car to change lanes if it pays a small fee to the car occupying the space it is moving into, compensating it for slowing down. We model the impact of this mechanism as a market for speed, which is free in the sense that it can be implemented by peer-to-peer technology without the intervention of the freeway operator. The term market is warranted by the simultaneous presence of multiple lane buyers and lane sellers. We use the term freeway to emphasize that we are not modeling toll-lanes. We develop conditions that the price system should satisfy. The presence of uncertainty in traffic density as well as price makes us model them as the solution of a system of stochastic partial differential equations. We simulate our model and perform sensitivity analysis on the parameters and initial conditions.","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126601492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Passive Balancing through Intraday Trading","authors":"C. Koch, Philipp Maskos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3399001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3399001","url":null,"abstract":"Transmission System operators actively balance the electricity system by sending a dispatch signal to suppliers of balancing reserve. When market participants take an intentional imbalance position that is opposed to the system imbalance, they can also reduce the required dispatch of balancing reserves. This is called passive balancing. The German imbalance price system incites this behavior, even though it is legally prohibited. This paper examines whether passive balancing prevails in Germany and how it affects the system stability. Our analysis indicates that market participants react on the latest published system balance by taking an intraday position that is opposed to the expected system balance. This behavior has a positive impact on system balancing. Intraday trading close to delivery reduces both the required demand of balancing energy and high system balances up to 13% without causing a critical overshoot of the system.","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127088991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"If You Can’t Sell Your Kidney, Can You Trade It? Examining the Morality of Alternative Kidney Exchange Institutions","authors":"Stephen R. Schmidt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3392619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392619","url":null,"abstract":"In the absence of kidney markets, alternative institutions for exchanging kidneys have arisen to give donors incentives to donate. I examine thirteen such institutions, and ask whether moral arguments against markets, such as commodification, apply to them or not. I find that most arguments against kidney arguments also argue against these alternative institutions, meaning those arguments are not strong enough to prevent society from using institutions to exchange kidneys. Two arguments that do explain which kidney exchange institutions are socially accepted and which are not are that institutions should not be want-regarding and should not be exploitative.Screening donors to eliminate those with socially unacceptable motives for donation and those who are in a position of being exploited could make kidney markets acceptable, since they would then only be vulnerable to arguments which have not prevented alternative exchange institutions from functioning.","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"17 10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126574230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Rationale for a Safe Asset and Fiscal Capacity for the Eurozone","authors":"Lorenzo Codogno, Paul van den Noord","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3406735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3406735","url":null,"abstract":"The only way to share common liabilities in the Eurozone is to achieve full fiscal and political union, i.e. unity of liability and control. In the pursuit of that goal, there is a need to smooth the transition, avoid unnecessary strains to macroeconomic and financial stability and lighten the burden of stabilisation policies from national sovereigns and the European Central Bank, while preserving market discipline and avoiding moral hazard. Both fiscal and monetary policy face constraints linked to the high legacy debt in some countries and the zero-lower-bound, respectively, and thus introducing Eurozone ‘safe assets’ and fiscal capacity at the centre would strengthen the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies. The paper introduces a standard Mundell-Fleming framework adapted to the features of a closed monetary union, with a two-country setting comprising a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ country, to evaluate the response of policy and the economy in case of symmetric and asymmetric demand and supply shocks in the current situation and following the introduction of safe bonds and fiscal capacity. Under the specified assumptions, it concludes that a safe asset and fiscal capacity, better if in combination, would remove the doom loop between banks and sovereigns, reduce the loss in output for both economies and improve the stabilisation properties of fiscal policy for both countries, and thus is welfare enhancing.","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124837415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
U. Weitzel, C. Huber, J. Huber, Michael Kirchler, F. Lindner, Julia Elisabeth Rose
{"title":"Bubbles and Financial Professionals","authors":"U. Weitzel, C. Huber, J. Huber, Michael Kirchler, F. Lindner, Julia Elisabeth Rose","doi":"10.1093/RFS/HHZ093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/RFS/HHZ093","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The efficiency of financial markets and their potential to produce bubbles are central topics in academic and professional debates. Yet, little is known about the contribution of financial professionals to price efficiency. We run 116 experimental markets with 412 professionals and 502 students. We find that professional markets with bubble drivers – capital inflows or high initial capital supply – are susceptible to bubbles, although they are more efficient than student markets. In mixed markets with students, bubbles also occur, but professionals act as price stabilizers. We show that heterogeneous price beliefs drive overpricing, especially in bubble-prone market environments.\u0000 Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130567497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Islamic (Sukuk) vs. Conventional Financing: Analysis of Profitability","authors":"F. Athar, D. Siddiqui","doi":"10.22555/IJELCS.V3I2.2490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22555/IJELCS.V3I2.2490","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last decade, Islamic Financials (Sukuk) emerged as a pioneering capital market instrument. One of the fundamental reasons for the emerging demand of Islamic Financing (Sukuk) includes its adherence to the finance in accordance to the Islamic values, avoiding Riba, which is the generation of money from money such as usury or interest. Sukuk issues have notably proliferated, which fuels the debate regarding the between the conventional and the Islamic finance. To investigate the impact of Islamic and Conventional Financials on shareholders’ wealth, this study takes the profitability ratios (including ROA, ROE, ROCE, and NPM) of 11 companies issuing Islamic Financials and 11 companies issuing Conventional Financials from the period between 2010 and 2015 and compares the profitability of both financials. The findings reveal the Islamic Financials (Sukuk) to be a significantly high source of profitability for a company along with the other clients’ catchy determinants such as religious principles, sharia-compliant instruments, and interest (Riba) free financing.","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"527 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124495719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does the Free Market Facilitate Moral Corruption? Responses and Criticisms","authors":"C. Boudreaux, Shawn P. Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2840239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2840239","url":null,"abstract":"The free market is often subject to scrutiny from both politicians and the press, and because the free market promotes self-interested behavior, recent dialogues have asked if the free market also promotes moral corruption. While the market process cannot prevent all occurrences of moral corruption, we argue that the market system does operate as a corrective mechanism in many instances. In the cases where market responses fail to curb moral corruption, we argue that tolerating some moral corruption is a second best solution that might be necessary to prevent further bad outcomes from occurring (e.g., mass poverty).","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124590736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exclusive Intermediation","authors":"Itay P. Fainmesser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2410408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2410408","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we argue that an important function fulfilled by intermediaries is to facilitate trust by enabling social pressure towards the enforcement of informal agreements. To that end, we develop a new model that uses network theory to show that intermediaries who have exclusivity over a large enough number of interaction opportunities are able to exploit their position in the chains of interactions in the market to overcome incentive problems that would otherwise shut down the market. We derive conditions on the network structure under which intermediaries fulfill this function. Finally, we analyze two applications: (1) the market for short term apartment rentals; and (2) a financial market with investors and entrepreneurs. We provide additional examples suggesting that this paper uncovers an important channel through which intermediaries operate.","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133632498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outlook of China’s State-Owned Enterprises Transformation","authors":"Yi Hu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2154909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2154909","url":null,"abstract":"This paper created a framework for a dynamic institutional analysis. (1) Reduction of the conviction and motivation inside economic factors (We think that this is the inducing factors of system changes ), (2) system changes will be ultimately beneficial to the efficiently allocation of resources, (3) the typical economic factors. This is from the old institutional analysis framework, Mr. Frank Knight's economic thought and historical materialism. Based on this analytical framework, we researched Transformation of China's state-owned enterprises, we come to conclusion that it is the time for the market forces play an basic role in the allocation of resources.","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114220137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Organizational Learning","authors":"Christina Fang","doi":"10.4135/9781452276090.n178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452276090.n178","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of organizational learning can be traced to a seminal book titled ‘The Behavioral Theory of the Firm’. In contrast to rational conceptions of organizations as entities solving maximization problems, this behavioral view depicts organizational learning as a function of experience and an organization’s success and failure in meeting performance targets. In the decades since, the topic of organization learning has generated volumes of subsequent work spanning disciplines, levels of analysis, and theoretical perspectives. It is not possible to review the entire field in this entry. Instead, I focus on theoretical models on organizational learning which have built on the original 'The Behavioral Theory of the Firm'.","PeriodicalId":245985,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions in Markets (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132004119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}