{"title":"Contact PUF: Highly Stable Physical Unclonable Functions Based on Contact Failure Probability in 180 nm, 130 nm, and 28 nm CMOS Processes","authors":"Duhyun Jeon, Dongmin Lee, Dong Kyue Kim, B. Choi","doi":"10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9839746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9839746","url":null,"abstract":"This study proposes a physical unclonable function (PUF) based on contact failure probability referred to as contact PUF, which has a sufficiently high native stability to achieve mass production without any postprocessing such as error-correction code. The contact is designed to cause stochastic contact failure that is used as the entropy source of the contact PUF. Contact failure can occur in three contact fabrication steps: photolithography, etching, and deposition. We investigated how contact failure occurs in each contact fabrication step in 180 nm, 130 nm, and 28 nm CMOS processes. After the preselection method that discarded unstable bitcells in 180 nm, 130 nm, and 28 nm CMOS processes, no PUF bitcell responses were flipped during 2000 repeated measurements following nine operating conditions, wherein there are three temperatures (−40°C, 25°C, and 125°C) and three supply voltages (nominal, and ±10%). This means that the contact PUFs have bit error rates $< 1.03times 10^{-8}, < 2.3times 10^{-8}$, and $< 2.3times 10^{-7}$ in the cases of the 180 nm, 130 nm, and 28 nm CMOS processes, respectively. The discard ratios of the contact PUFs are $< 1.03times 10^{-8}$, 0.0054%, and 0.949% in the respective cases of 180 nm, 130 nm, and 28 nm CMOS processes. The uniqueness of the contact PUFs are respectively equal to 0.4996, 0.49994, and 0.4964 in the 180 nm, 130 nm, and 28 nm CMOS processes.","PeriodicalId":222250,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124898050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
K. Z. Azar, Hadi Mardani Kamali, Farimah Farahmandi, M. Tehranipoor
{"title":"Warm Up before Circuit De-obfuscation? An Exploration through Bounded-Model-Checkers","authors":"K. Z. Azar, Hadi Mardani Kamali, Farimah Farahmandi, M. Tehranipoor","doi":"10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840134","url":null,"abstract":"With the emergence of numerous circuit de-obfuscation attacks, the strength of logic locking has been jeopardized in recent years. Amongst them, bounded-model-checker (BMC)-based attack on locked circuits with limited design-for-testability (DFT) access received significant attention in recent years. However, scalability is a crucial challenge in such an attack due to having two unrolling factors, namely sequential unrolling and miter duplication. This paper will explore some techniques for warming up the BMC before its main invocation to expedite the attack procedure. Our experimental results reflect that the efficacy of BMC-based attacks can be enhanced once the BM C is initiated meticulously through the studied methodologies.","PeriodicalId":222250,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130821910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anita Aghaie, A. Moradi, Johannes Tobisch, Nils Wisiol
{"title":"Security Analysis of Delay-Based Strong PUFs with Multiple Delay Lines","authors":"Anita Aghaie, A. Moradi, Johannes Tobisch, Nils Wisiol","doi":"10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840099","url":null,"abstract":"Using a novel circuit design, we investigate if the modeling- resistance of delay-based, CMOS-compatible strong PUFs can be increased by the usage of multiple delay lines. Studying a circuit inspired by the Arbiter PUF, but using four instead of merely two delay lines, we obtain evidence showing that the usage of many delay lines does not significantly increase the security of the strong PUF circuit. Based on our findings, we suggest future research directions.","PeriodicalId":222250,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116430525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Chosen-Plaintext Attack on Energy-Efficient Hardware Implementation of GIFT-COFB","authors":"Yadi Zhong, Ujjwal Guin","doi":"10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840293","url":null,"abstract":"Electronic devices are connected now more than ever with the prevalence of the Internet of Things. The ever-increasing communication between these lightweight devices presses for the need to embed a cryptographic mechanism to ensure the confidentiality and authentication of data. Lightweight cryptography nicely supports the need for encryption mechanisms on IoT devices with limited memory, storage, and computing capability. This paper focuses on breaking the hardware implementation of GIFT-COFB, one of NIST's Lightweight Cryptography finalists. The 2-round partial unrolled design of GIFT-COFB is shown to be the most energy-efficient among all other $r$-round partial unrolling and fully unrolled settings [1]. In this paper, we propose a chosen-plaintext attack to retrieve the master key $K$ effectively and demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed attack on the 2-round partial unrolled GIFT-COFB. Our efficient attack can derive the secret key by exploiting the nonlinearity of the Sboxes with a worst-case complexity of $O(2^{4})$.","PeriodicalId":222250,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126928806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hardening Hardware Accelerartor Based CNN Inference Phase Against Adversarial Noises","authors":"Tolulope A. Odetola, Adewale Adeyemo, S. R. Hasan","doi":"10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840017","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research has shown that Convolution Neu-ral Networks (CNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Many defense techniques like gradient masking etc have been proposed against adversarial attacks. However, these techniques are limited to training methods and do not offer generalizability. Similarly, in a Horizontal Collaborative Environment (HCE) where trained CNN models are partitioned into different layers, models deployed are also subjected to attacks by adversarial inputs. In this work, we develop a defense strategy to harden CNNs in an HCE against adversarial examples through the detection of adversarial inputs. We propose the notion that by obtaining model prediction at different layers of the CNN and noting the prediction inconsistency, an adversarial noise could be detected. In this work, adversarial noises are generated using the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Salt and Pepper (S&P), and Gaussian Noise perturbation (GNP) methodologies. We compare predictions at different layers of a CNN and obtain final prediction via coherence in predicted class of the CNN model. The hardware synthesis results on FPGA, validated proposed method showing that obtaining such accuracy inconsistency require reasonable hardware overhead.","PeriodicalId":222250,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124631496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Deshpande, Chuan Xu, Theodoros Trochatos, Yongshan Ding, Jakub Szefer
{"title":"Towards an Antivirus for Quantum Computers","authors":"S. Deshpande, Chuan Xu, Theodoros Trochatos, Yongshan Ding, Jakub Szefer","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2203.02649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2203.02649","url":null,"abstract":"Researchers are today exploring models for cloud-based usage of quantum computers where multi-tenancy can be used to share quantum computer hard-ware among multiple users. Multi-tenancy has a promise of allowing better utilization of the quantum computer hardware, but also opens up the quantum computer to new types of security attacks. As this and other recent research shows, it is possible to perform a fault injection attack using crosstalk on quantum computers when a victim and attacker circuits are instantiated as co-tenants on the same quantum computer. To ensure such attacks do not happen, this paper proposes that new techniques should be developed to help catch malicious circuits before they are loaded onto quantum computer hardware. Following ideas from classical computers, a compile-time technique can be designed to scan quantum computer programs for mali-cious or suspicious code patterns before they are compiled into quantum circuits that run on a quantum computer. This paper presents ongoing work which demonstrates how crosstalk can affect Grover's algorithm, and then presents suggestions of how quantum programs could be analyzed to catch circuits that generate large amounts of crosstalk with malicious intent.","PeriodicalId":222250,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124557038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Elmira Moussavi, Dominik Sisejkovic, Fabian Brings, Daniyar Kizatov, Animesh Singh, X. Vu, S. Ingebrandt, R. Leupers, V. Pachauri, Farhad Merchant
{"title":"pHGen: A pH-Based Key Generation Mechanism Using ISFETs","authors":"Elmira Moussavi, Dominik Sisejkovic, Fabian Brings, Daniyar Kizatov, Animesh Singh, X. Vu, S. Ingebrandt, R. Leupers, V. Pachauri, Farhad Merchant","doi":"10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HOST54066.2022.9840282","url":null,"abstract":"Digital keys are a fundamental component of many hardware- and software-based security mechanisms. However, digital keys are limited to binary values and easily exploitable when stored in standard memories. In this paper, based on emerging technologies, we introduce pHGen, a potential-of-hydrogen (pH)-based key generation mechanism that leverages chemical reactions in the form of a potential change in ion-sensitive field-effect transistors (ISFETs). The threshold voltage of ISFETs is manipulated corresponding to a known pH buffer solution (key) in which the transistors are immersed. To read the chemical information effectively via ISFETs, we designed a readout circuit for stable operation and detection of voltage thresholds. To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed key generation, we utilize pHGen for logic locking-a hardware integrity protection scheme. The proposed key-generation method breaks the limits of binary values and provides the first steps toward the utilization of multi-valued voltage thresholds of ISFETs controlled by chemical information. The pHGen approach is expected to be a turning point for using more sophisticated bio- based analog keys for securing next-generation electronics.","PeriodicalId":222250,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125467012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}