{"title":"European artificial intelligence “trusted throughout the world”: Risk-based regulation and the fashioning of a competitive common AI market","authors":"Regine Paul","doi":"10.1111/rego.12563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12563","url":null,"abstract":"The European Commission has pioneered the coercive regulation of artificial intelligence (AI), including a proposal of banning some applications altogether on moral grounds. Core to its regulatory strategy is a nominally “risk-based” approach with interventions that are proportionate to risk levels. Yet, neither standard accounts of risk-based regulation as rational problem-solving endeavor nor theories of organizational legitimacy-seeking, both prominently discussed in <i>Regulation & Governance</i>, fully explain the Commission's attraction to the risk heuristic. This article responds to this impasse with three contributions. First, it enrichens risk-based regulation scholarship—beyond AI—with a firm foundation in constructivist and critical political economy accounts of emerging tech regulation to capture the performative politics of defining and enacting risk vis-à-vis global economic competitiveness. Second, it conceptualizes the role of risk analysis within a <i>Cultural Political Economy</i> framework: as a powerful epistemic tool for the discursive and regulatory differentiation of an uncertain regulatory terrain (semiosis and structuration) which the Commission wields in its pursuit of a future common European AI market. Thirdly, the paper offers an in-depth empirical reconstruction of the Commission's risk-based semiosis and structuration in AI regulation through qualitative analysis of a substantive sample of documents and expert interviews. This finds that the Commission's use of risk analysis, outlawing some AI uses as matters of deep value conflicts and tightly controlling (at least discursively) so-called high-risk AI systems, enables Brussels to fashion its desired trademark of European “cutting-edge AI … trusted throughout the world” in the first place.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138714208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Brandeis in Brussels? Bureaucratic discretion, social learning, and the development of regulated competition in the European Union","authors":"Chase Foster, Kathleen Thelen","doi":"10.1111/rego.12570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12570","url":null,"abstract":"Neo-Brandeisian legal scholars have recently revived the ideas of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who championed state regulation that preserved market competition and economic liberty in the face of concentrated private power. Yet ultimately and perhaps paradoxically, it has been Europe and not the United States that has proved more hospitable to accommodating key features of the Brandeisian approach. We explain this outcome by tracing the evolution of EU competition law to gain insight into the social learning processes through which such regimes change over time. We argue that the EU's administrative system, which provides the European Commission with significant bureaucratic discretion, has facilitated processes of ongoing deliberative adjustment to policy and practice, which over time has resulted in a system of “regulated competition” with striking similarities to the Brandeisian vision. The analysis highlights how administrative law institutions condition how regulatory regimes evolve in response to acquired experience and knowledge.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138565249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andreas Öjehag-Pettersson, Vanja Carlssson, Malin Rönnblom
{"title":"Political studies of automated governing: A bird's eye (re)view","authors":"Andreas Öjehag-Pettersson, Vanja Carlssson, Malin Rönnblom","doi":"10.1111/rego.12569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12569","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we develop an approach for analyzing the increasingly important strand of research that deals with automated systems of governing. Such systems, which figure prominently in public policy and regulation, are designed to utilize the rapid advancement in computer technology, like artificial intelligence, with the purpose of governing something or someone. Drawing on a large sample of articles we present a comprehensive analysis of scholarly works where these systems are studied as political, rather than neutral, instruments of governing. We find that the current state of the art articulates the politics of automated systems of governing in three ways. Namely, as part of ontological, epistemological and ideological questions. We conclude that future research should investigate the complex forms of marketization nested in these systems, that it should move from theoretical examples to detailed empirical studies and that political science should get more involved with the issue.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138492147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux, Clement Guitton, Simon Mayer, Christoph Lutz
{"title":"Regulating for trust: Can law establish trust in artificial intelligence?","authors":"Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux, Clement Guitton, Simon Mayer, Christoph Lutz","doi":"10.1111/rego.12568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12568","url":null,"abstract":"The current political and regulatory discourse frequently references the term “trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI).” In Europe, the attempts to ensure trustworthy AI started already with the High-Level Expert Group Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI and have now merged into the regulatory discourse on the EU AI Act. Around the globe, policymakers are actively pursuing initiatives—as the US Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI, or the Bletchley Declaration on AI showcase—based on the premise that the right regulatory strategy can shape trust in AI. To analyze the validity of this premise, we propose to consider the broader literature on trust in automation. On this basis, we constructed a framework to analyze 16 factors that impact trust in AI and automation more broadly. We analyze the interplay between these factors and disentangle them to determine the impact regulation can have on each. The article thus provides policymakers and legal scholars with a foundation to gauge different regulatory strategies, notably by differentiating between those strategies where regulation is more likely to also influence trust on AI (e.g., regulating the types of tasks that AI may fulfill) and those where its influence on trust is more limited (e.g., measures that increase awareness of complacency and automation biases). Our analysis underscores the critical role of nuanced regulation in shaping the human-automation relationship and offers a targeted approach to policymakers to debate how to streamline regulatory efforts for future AI governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138475732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional sources of legitimacy in multistakeholder global governance at ICANN","authors":"Hortense Jongen, Jan Aart Scholte","doi":"10.1111/rego.12565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12565","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides a novel systematic exploration of ways and extents that institutional characteristics shape legitimacy beliefs toward multistakeholder global governance. Multistakeholderism is often argued to offer institutional advantages over intergovernmental multilateralism in handling global problems. This study examines whether, in practice, perceptions of institutional purpose, procedure, and performance affect legitimacy assessments regarding this form of global governance. The analysis focuses on the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), one of the largest and most institutionally developed global multistakeholder arrangements. Evidence comes from a mixed-methods survey of 467 participants in ICANN. We find that this representative sample accords high importance in principle to many institutional features, and also rates the actual institutional operations of ICANN quite highly on various counts. Moreover, many institutional characteristics associate significantly with participants' legitimacy beliefs toward ICANN. However, not all institutional qualities have this significance, and the relevance of individual- and societal-level circumstances indicates that institutional sources do not provide a full explanation of legitimacy. The article contributes refinements to theory of legitimacy in global governance; demonstrates the value of mixed-methods survey work in this field; supplies unique original data and analysis; and identifies implications for the politics of (de)legitimation around multistakeholderism.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138455894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Performing central bank independence: The Bank of England's communicative financial stability strategy","authors":"Andrew Baker, Andrew Hindmoor, Sean McDaniel","doi":"10.1111/rego.12564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12564","url":null,"abstract":"Central bank independence (CBI) has been one of the most significant regulatory state developments of the last three decades. Following the 2008 financial crisis, many central bank mandates were extended to include a responsibility for financial stability. Some commentators claim this jeopardizes CBI by drawing central banks into contested political issues that can impact financial stability, in what we term an independence in decline thesis. Through a detailed study of the Bank of England's financial stability communications employing the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) codebook, we subject this independence in decline thesis to scrutiny. We show that since the extension of the Bank's mandate in 2011, Bank officials have discussed a wider range of more contentious policy issues. However, these communications appear to date to have largely reinforced the Bank's reputation for technical competence and political neutrality. In this sense, central bank “communicative agency” can be deployed to protect CBI performatively, while CBI can in turn be studied and understood as an ongoing communicative performance act. We find that repoliticization is a more contingent process than much central banking literature has allowed for, while financial stability communications are a potentially powerful regulatory instrument deserving of more scholarly attention.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138455893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mitigating microtargeting: Political microtargeting law in Australia and New Zealand","authors":"Melissa-Ellen Dowling","doi":"10.1111/rego.12566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12566","url":null,"abstract":"To the detriment of liberal democracy, governments have struggled to prevent the exploitation of personal data for voter manipulation in the digital era. Laws pertaining to political microtargeting are often piecemeal and tend to derive from a combination of laws on electoral advertising and privacy. Evidence indicates that this approach is insufficient to curtail microtargeting. However, little is known about the regulation of microtargeting outside of the European and US contexts within which the bulk of anti-microtargeting research has been undertaken. Accordingly, this paper aims to shed light on the preparedness of the law in Australia and New Zealand to mitigate the potential harms of political microtargeting. A comparative analysis of legislation pertaining to microtargeting is therefore undertaken using a blended approach of comparative law and content analysis. This paper: (1) identifies current legislation relevant to microtargeting in Australia and New Zealand; (2) assesses patterns of similarity and difference between each country's laws in relation to microtargeting; and (3) evaluates the preparedness of current legislation to curtail microtargeting in an evolving social media landscape. It finds that in both countries, legislation is sufficiently robust to mitigate microtargeting in some limited circumstances, but a cohesive regulatory approach is needed to constrain the most insidious microtargeting operations.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138455892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Global contagion risk and <scp>IMF</scp> credit cycles: Emergency exits and revolving doors","authors":"Stephen B. Kaplan, Sujeong Shim","doi":"10.1111/rego.12562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12562","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exit its lending relationships before member states have resolved their financial crises? It is particularly surprising given that the IMF often resumes its lending shortly after its withdrawal. We argue that IMF withdrawals are conditioned by global contagion risk. The tension between the IMF's mandate of global financial stability and its limited financial resources compels the IMF's early exit from its lending relationships. During periods of high global contagion, the IMF prioritizes its mandate by continuing its lending despite noncompliance. However, when the IMF perceives minimal contagion risk, it focuses on moral hazard, and willingly cuts its lending ties to preserve its reputation and resources for future crises. Employing a comparative analysis of IMF decision‐making in two of its largest borrowers, Argentina and Greece, we find supportive evidence for our claims.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134953920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Distributive politics and electoral advantage in the 2022 Australian election","authors":"Ian McAllister, Nicholas Biddle","doi":"10.1111/rego.12561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12561","url":null,"abstract":"Distributive politics—or pork barreling—is prevalent across many political systems. It aims to influence the vote by directing discretionary spending to constituencies and/or groups of voters that are important for their re-election. We term this the objective dimension to pork barreling. However, we argue that for pork barreling to deliver rewards, voters must also be <i>aware</i> that they are gaining a special benefit from government—the subjective dimension. Using a unique Australian dataset that matches spending on electoral areas with a large scale national survey that asked voters if their area had received special benefits, we clarify the mechanisms behind pork barreling. Our results show that about one in five voters believed that their electorate had received additional benefits. Objectively, spending was disproportionately directed to government-held seats. Despite this largesse, we find that pork barreling had little or no effect on the vote in the 2022 Australian election.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71417904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Affidavit aversion: Public preferences for trust-based policy instruments","authors":"Rinat Hilo-Merkovich, Eyal Peer, Yuval Feldman","doi":"10.1111/rego.12560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12560","url":null,"abstract":"Regulators who aim to reduce administrative burdens often promote trust-based policy instruments, such as legal affidavits or honesty pledges, as substitutes to traditional bureaucratic procedures. However, little is known on how the general public view such instruments, and whether people would actually comply with them, and under what circumstances. Using a series of experimental vignettes, we examine public preferences toward these instruments under different conditions and contexts. We find that overall, people exhibit an aversion to using affidavits, even when they are inexpensive and can save a considerable amount of time compared to the traditional bureaucratic procedure. In contrast, honesty pledges are largely preferred over both the standard procedure and signing an affidavit. We discuss factors influencing the public choice of trust-based instruments and offer recommendations to help policymakers promote public compliance using behaviorally informed policy instruments.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71417573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}