Regulation & Governance最新文献_第6页

The Role of Political Actors in Realizing Sustainable European Energy Markets: Insights From the Trinational Upper Rhine Region 政治行为者在实现可持续欧洲能源市场中的作用：来自莱茵河畔三国地区的见解

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-01-10 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12651

Franziska Leopold, Bianca Blum, Dominik Schröder

引用次数: 0

More Than One Agent? Authority Expansion and Delegation Dynamics in the EU 不止一个代理？欧盟的权力扩张和授权动态

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-01-07 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12652

Anastasia Ershova

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More Policies, More Work? An Epidemiological Assessment of Accumulating Implementation Stress in the Context of German Pension Policy 更多政策，更多工作？德国养老金政策背景下累积实施压力的流行病学评估

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2024-12-09 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12644

Christian Adam

引用次数: 0

Disembedded: Regulation, Crisis, and Democracy in the Age of FinanceBy Basak Kus, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, 200 pp. $29.95 (paperback). ISBN: 9780197764879 脱离：金融时代的监管、危机与民主》，牛津大学出版社，2024 年，200 页：牛津大学出版社，2024 年，200 页。29.95美元（平装本）。ISBN: 9780197764879

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2024-12-09 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12650

Jorge Díaz-Lanchas

引用次数: 0

Assessing Input Legitimacy of Occupational Pensions in Europe 评估欧洲职业养老金的投入合法性

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12647

Thomas Mayer, Tobias Wiß

引用次数: 0

Scenes From a Sociolegal Career: An Informal Memoir 社会法律职业生涯中的一幕幕：非正式回忆录

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12638

Robert A. Kagan

引用次数: 0

Analysis of Institutional Design of European Union Cyber Incident and Crisis Management as a Complex Public Good 欧盟网络事件和危机管理作为复杂公益的制度设计分析

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2024-11-09 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12640

Mazaher Kianpour, Christopher Frantz

{"title":"Analysis of Institutional Design of European Union Cyber Incident and Crisis Management as a Complex Public Good","authors":"Mazaher Kianpour, Christopher Frantz","doi":"10.1111/rego.12640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12640","url":null,"abstract":"Effective cyber incident response and crisis management increasingly relies on the coordination of relevant actors at supranational levels. A polycentric governance structure is one of the institutional arrangements that can promote active participation of involved actors, an aspect decisive for the rapid and effective response to cyber incidents and crises. This research aims to dissect whether, and to what extent, a polycentric structure is manifested within the cyber crisis management framework of the European Union (EU) and assesses the extent to which these policies signal a balance between centralization and decentralization. By employing Institutional Grammar 2.0, we examine the roles and interactions among actors delineated within four key policies to identify the structural characteristics, institutional essentials, and prerequisites indicative of a polycentric governance system. Additionally, we apply network analysis to evaluate dyadic relationships of actors, further assessing the balance between centralization and decentralization in the EU's cyber crisis management framework. Our analysis reveals that the EU has adopted a polycentric governance model for cyber crisis management, characterized by a nuanced distribution of responsibilities and authorities. The findings highlight a tendency toward centralization, especially in the roles of Member States and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), while maintaining a polycentric structure that blends centralization and decentralization. This balance can ensure structural integrity and coherence of the system, while theoretically providing the flexibility and resilience needed to adapt to the dynamic cyber threat landscape. The study contributes methodologically, offering a framework that can be applied to other domains, and provides insights into the effective coordination of cyber incident response and crisis management at supranational levels.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142596619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Political Influence of Proxy Advisors in Campaigns for Ethical Investment: Guiding the Invisible Hand 代理顾问在道德投资运动中的政治影响：引导无形之手

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2024-10-30 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12641

Ainsley Elbra, Erin O'Brien, Martijn Boersma

{"title":"The Political Influence of Proxy Advisors in Campaigns for Ethical Investment: Guiding the Invisible Hand","authors":"Ainsley Elbra, Erin O'Brien, Martijn Boersma","doi":"10.1111/rego.12641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12641","url":null,"abstract":"Large, listed companies are under increasing pressure to respond to critical issues such as climate change, modern slavery, and the protection of First Nations' heritage. Much of this pressure is exerted by civil society actors through corporate governance mechanisms, including leveraging shareholder rights to lobby firms. At the heart of this process sit largely understudied actors, proxy advisors, who advise large institutional investors on whether to support civil society's claim‐making on companies. The proxy advising industry is an influential duopoly that advises almost all institutional investors globally. This article advances our understanding of how norms are formed to become established market practices. It maps the relational power structures that govern ethical investment and reveals the capacity of proxy advisors to contribute to the cascading of ethical investment norms. In doing so, we argue that markets are not solely guided by exogenous forces but are reflective of the web of social relations between actors. We conclude that despite historically being seen as neutral experts in their role in advising institutional investors, proxy advisors should be viewed as political actors with significant influence over the outcome of social movement campaigns.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142541151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Historical Foundations of Green Developmental Policies: Divergent Trajectories in United States and France 绿色发展政策的历史基础：美国和法国的不同轨迹

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2024-10-09 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12639

Ritwick Ghosh, Stephanie Barral, Fanny Guillet

{"title":"Historical Foundations of Green Developmental Policies: Divergent Trajectories in United States and France","authors":"Ritwick Ghosh, Stephanie Barral, Fanny Guillet","doi":"10.1111/rego.12639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12639","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, many countries have adopted biodiversity offset policies to internalize the ecological impacts of land developments. Although national policies share the general principle of equalizing ecological harm with gain, there is substantial variation across programs regarding the institutional forms governing offsetting. In this paper, we compare biodiversity governance in the United States and France to reflect more broadly on the factors shaping divergent trajectories of green developmental policies. Both countries have some form of biodiversity offsetting in place, but the major fault line of difference is the more extensive use of market‐based instruments (MBI) in the United States. Using a historical lens, we argue that one important reason for this variation lies in the different legal‐institutional definitions of biodiversity. A narrower definition in the United States focused on individual species, versus a broader definition in France focused on ecosystems, has facilitated a more standardized biodiversity governance arrangement in the United States. Leveraging this standardization, biodiversity markets have expanded in the United States while similar efforts to institutionalize market mechanisms have struggled in France. The comparison allows us to draw insights into the challenges in greening economic development, particularly in showing how historical scientific, legal, and institutional structures condition policy outcomes.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142397992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Core funding and the performance of international organizations: Evidence from UNDP projects 核心资金与国际组织的绩效：开发计划署项目的证据

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12632

Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Giuseppe Zaccaria

{"title":"Core funding and the performance of international organizations: Evidence from UNDP projects","authors":"Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Giuseppe Zaccaria","doi":"10.1111/rego.12632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12632","url":null,"abstract":"Scholarship on the administration of international organizations (IOs) has extensively discussed how autonomy influences their performance. While some argue that autonomy increases performance through greater adaptability, others warn that it may increase the risk of agency slack. Authors typically distinguish between three types of performance: output, outcome, and impact performance. We focus on core funding as a key source of IO autonomy and argue that projects with more core funding show decreased output performance but an increased outcome and impact performance. Our empirical analysis relies on results from data on up to 3590 development projects run by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 128 recipient countries between 2004 and 2020. Subsequently, we test the impact of more core funding on project volumes (output performance), objectives achieved in individual projects (outcome performance), and their effects on sub-national human development in project regions (impact performance). Our findings suggest that, although reliance on core resources is associated with lower output performance (less funding), it may result in stronger outcome and impact performance, as reflected by more objectives achieved and a higher sub-national HDI where UNDP projects are implemented. Our findings have important implications for debates on the effectiveness of global governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0