M. Neugschwandtner, P. M. Comparetti, I. Haller, H. Bos
{"title":"The BORG: Nanoprobing Binaries for Buffer Overreads","authors":"M. Neugschwandtner, P. M. Comparetti, I. Haller, H. Bos","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699098","url":null,"abstract":"Automated program testing tools typically try to explore, and cover, as much of a tested program as possible, while attempting to trigger and detect bugs. An alternative and complementary approach can be to first select a specific part of a program that may be subject to a specific class of bug, and then narrowly focus exploration towards program paths that could trigger such a bug. In this work, we introduce the BORG (Buffer Over-Read Guard), a testing tool that uses static and dynamic program analysis, taint propagation and symbolic execution to detect buffer overread bugs in real-world programs. BORG works by first selecting buffer accesses that could lead to an overread and then guiding symbolic execution towards those accesses along program paths that could actually lead to an overread. BORG operates on binaries and does not require source code. To demonstrate BORG's effectiveness, we use it to detect overreads in six complex server applications and libraries, including lighttpd, FFmpeg and ClamAV.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124128593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Combining ORAM with PIR to Minimize Bandwidth Costs","authors":"Jonathan L. Dautrich, C. Ravishankar","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699117","url":null,"abstract":"Cloud computing allows customers to outsource the burden of data management and benefit from economy of scale, but privacy concerns limit its reach. Even if the stored data are encrypted, access patterns may leak valuable information. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) protocols guarantee full access pattern privacy, but even the most efficient ORAMs proposed to date incur large bandwidth costs. We combine Private Information Retrieval (PIR) techniques with the most bandwidth-efficient existing ORAM scheme known to date (ObliviStore), to create OS+PIR, a new ORAM with bandwidth costs only half those of ObliviStore. For data block counts ranging from 2^20 to 2^30, OS+PIR achieves a total bandwidth cost of only 11X-13X blocks transferred per client block read+write, down from ObliviStore's 18X-26X. OS+PIR introduces several enhancements in addition to PIR in order to achieve its lower costs, including mechanisms for eliminating unused dummy blocks.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130538393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Dynamic Approach to Detect Anomalous Queries on Relational Databases","authors":"M. S. Islam, Mehmet Kuzu, Murat Kantarcioglu","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699120","url":null,"abstract":"Protecting sensitive datasets from insider and outsider attacks has been a major concern over the years. Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) has been the de facto standard to store, retrieve and manage large datasets efficiently in the last few years. However, as surprising as it seems, not a lot of works can be found in the literature which protect databases from anomalous accesses. In this paper, we present a novel Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for relational databases. Our primary objective is to protect databases from both insider and outsider threats by detecting anomalous access patterns using Hidden Markov Model (HMM). While most of the previous notable works in this area focus on query syntax to detect anomalous access, our approach takes into account the amount of sensitive information a query result contains to detect a potential intrusion. Finally, our empirical evaluation on the publicly available TPC-H dataset shows that our IDS can detect anomalous query access with a high degree of accuracy.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132220970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Novel Techniques for Data Security","authors":"Adam J. Lee","doi":"10.1145/3257824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3257824","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132615859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Distributed Search over Encrypted Big Data","authors":"Mehmet Kuzu, M. S. Islam, Murat Kantarcioglu","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699116","url":null,"abstract":"Nowadays, huge amount of documents are increasingly transferred to the remote servers due to the appealing features of cloud computing. On the other hand, privacy and security of the sensitive information in untrusted cloud environment is a big concern. To alleviate such concerns, encryption of sensitive data before its transfer to the cloud has become an important risk mitigation option. Encrypted storage provides protection at the expense of a significant increase in the data management complexity. For effective management, it is critical to provide efficient selective document retrieval capability on the encrypted collection. In fact, considerable amount of searchable symmetric encryption schemes have been designed in the literature to achieve this task. However, with the emergence of big data everywhere, available approaches are insufficient to address some crucial real-world problems such as scalability. In this study, we focus on practical aspects of a secure keyword search mechanism over encrypted data. First, we propose a provably secure distributed index along with a parallelizable retrieval technique that can easily scale to big data. Second, we integrate authorization into the search scheme to limit the information leakage in multi-user setting where users are allowed to access only particular documents. Third, we offer efficient updates on the distributed secure index. In addition, we conduct extensive empirical analysis on a real dataset to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed practical techniques.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130605679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aligning Security and Business Objectives for Process-Aware Information Systems","authors":"G. Karjoth","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699028","url":null,"abstract":"Enterprises are increasingly subject to compliance rules that originate from corporate guidelines, industry sector standards, and laws. The goal of access control is to protect against unauthorized users. However, threats also often reside within organizations where authorized users may misuse system resources. Although access control is fundamental in protecting information systems, it can pose an obstacle to achieving business objectives. Today, security policies have to be aligned with the business goals and are not anymore a purely technical issue. Business processes are therefore of special interest. When described by workflows, they define the causal dependencies between a set of tasks, whose execution constitutes a business objective. Already in 1999, Bertino, Ferrari and Atluri showed how to specify and enforce authorization constraints in workflow management systems [1]. But only in recent years, triggered by the raise of high-level modeling languages such as the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), business processes were enhanced with compliance requirements in terms of process annotations, tying the control objectives into the execution flow. This talk will look at recent research results in this area, including approaches to scope authorization constraints within workflows with loops and conditional execution [2], to capture the effects of enforcement on business objectives [3], and to select the optimal between multiple authorization policies satisfying the given constraints [4]. This work was mainly done in collaboration with Samuel Burri, when we both were at IBM Research -- Zurich, and David Basin from ETH Zurich.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"141 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116631406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Robust Fingerprinting for Relocatable Code","authors":"Irfan Ahmed, Vassil Roussev, Aisha I. Ali-Gombe","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699104","url":null,"abstract":"Robust fingerprinting of executable code contained in a memory image is a prerequisite for a large number of security and forensic applications, especially in a cloud environment. Prior state of the art has focused specifically on identifying kernel versions by means of complex differential analysis of several aspects of the kernel code implementation. In this work, we present a novel technique that can identify any relocatable code, including the kernel, based on inherent patterns present in relocation tables. We show that such patterns are very distinct and can be used to accurately and efficiently identify known executables in a memory snapshot, including remnants of prior executions. We develop a research prototype, codeid, and evaluate its efficacy on more than 50,000 sample executables containing kernels, kernel modules, applications, dynamic link libraries, and malware. The empirical results show that our method achieves almost 100% accuracy with zero false negatives.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129230731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Content Level Access Control for OpenStack Swift Storage","authors":"P. Biswas, Farhan Patwa, R. Sandhu","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699124","url":null,"abstract":"Swift, the object storage service from OpenStack cloud computing platform is used for storing, managing and retrieving large amounts of data. Inside Swift, uploaded files, also known as objects, are organized in containers. Objects inside a container are managed to be accessible or restricted from users through Access Control Lists (ACLs). Swift ACL, at the finest level, works on a Swift object enforcing who can or cannot access the object. Once an object is accessible to some one, he gets the full content of the object. Thus Swift ACL is an \"all or nothing\" approach. In this work, we allow Swift users to specify access control at the content level of a Swift object. The content level policy describes who can access which part of a Swift object. When a request comes for downloading (i.e. read) an object, we check content level policy along with the ACL of the object. The response of the request is a partial content of the requested object based on the credential of the requester. Our prototype implementation is done on Swift objects of content type 'application/json'.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131187211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Collecting, Analyzing and Responding to Enterprise Scale DNS Events","authors":"Bill G. Horne","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699027","url":null,"abstract":"DNS is an important data source for security for many reasons. If the DNS infrastructure can be brought down, many networking tasks would be impossible to complete. If the integrity of the mapping between domain names and IP addresses is compromised, attackers can redirect users undetectably to IP addresses of their choosing. And malware of many types must in one way or another use the DNS infrastructure as part of their operations. For example, botnets often use fast flux techniques and domain name generation algorithms to rendezvous with command and control servers. Collecting DNS is a significant challenge. In HP, our core internal DNS clusters process approximately 16 billion DNS packets every day. Ideally, we would like to turn each and every one of those packets into an event for our security information and event management (SIEM) system. However, we would have to grow our SIEM, which is one of the largest deployments in the world, by a factor of six to collect this data. Moreover, traditional logging has a substantial performance impact on the DNS infrastructure, and therefore from an operational perspective enabling logging is also impractical. Finally, DNS servers generally do not log the information necessary to detect many security problems. To deal with these problems we collect and filter this traffic using hardware network packet sniffers, which have no impact on the performance of the DNS servers and allows us to collect all of the information we need for security purposes. We model known good traffic, and discard it, keeping only anomalous data. We developed a custom analytics engine, which analyzes this data looking for evidence of botnet infections, blacklist hits, cloud platform abuse, beaconing, data exfiltration, and cache poisoning attempts. The results of these analyses is turned into a set of alerts which are sent to our Security Operations Center (SOC). We've also developed a user interface including various visualizations to help analysts explore the data. The system has been up and running in HP since June 2014. The SOC processes on average about 20 of our alerts per day, with very low false positive rates. We've worked closely with the SOC to make sure the tool is fully integrated into the workflows that the SOC analysts use and meets the needs of the analysts. In this talk, I will describe our experiences developing this tool and the lessons we learned in the process.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126806590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"HideM: Protecting the Contents of Userspace Memory in the Face of Disclosure Vulnerabilities","authors":"Jason Gionta, W. Enck, P. Ning","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699107","url":null,"abstract":"Memory disclosure vulnerabilities have become a common component for enabling reliable exploitation of systems by leaking the contents of executable data. Previous research towards protecting executable data from disclosure has failed to gain popularity due to large performance penalties and required architectural changes. Other research has focused on protecting application data but fails to consider a vulnerable application that leaks its own executable data. In this paper we present HideM, a practical system for protecting against memory disclosures in contemporary commodity systems. HideM addresses limitations in existing advanced security protections (e.g., fine-grained ASLR, CFI) wherein an adversary discloses executable data from memory, reasons about protection weaknesses, and builds corresponding exploits. HideM uses the split-TLB architecture, commonly found in CPUs, to enable fine-grained execute and read permission on memory. HideM enforces fine-grained permission based on policy generated from binary structure thus enabling protection of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) binaries. In our evaluation of HideM, we find application overhead ranges from a 6.5% increase to a 2% reduction in runtime and observe runtime memory overhead ranging from 0.04% to 25%. HideM requires adversaries to guess ROP gadget locations making exploitation unreliable. We find adversaries have less than a 16% chance of correctly guessing a single gadget across all 28 evaluated applications. Thus, HideM is a practical system for protecting vulnerable applications which leak executable data.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126826954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}