{"title":"On the Character of Phishing URLs: Accurate and Robust Statistical Learning Classifiers","authors":"Rakesh M. Verma, K. Dyer","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699115","url":null,"abstract":"Phishing attacks resulted in an estimated $3.2 billion dollars worth of stolen property in 2007, and the success rate for phishing attacks is increasing each year [17]. Phishing attacks are becoming harder to detect and more elusive by using short time windows to launch attacks. In order to combat the increasing effectiveness of phishing attacks, we propose that combining statistical analysis of website URLs with machine learning techniques will give a more accurate classification of phishing URLs. Using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test along with other features we were able to accurately classify 99.3% of our dataset, with a false positive rate of less than 0.4%. Thus, accuracy of phishing URL classification can be greatly increased through the use of these statistical measures.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"2001 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128303135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Software Security","authors":"Murat Kantarcioglu","doi":"10.1145/3257827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3257827","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121699457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Big Data Security and Privacy","authors":"B. Thuraisingham","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699136","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes the issues surrounding big data security and privacy and provides a summary of the National Science Foundation sponsored workshop on this topic held in Dallas, Texas on September 16-17, 2014. Our goal is to build a community in big data security and privacy to explore the challenging research problems.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126170195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Acker, Daniel Hausknecht, W. Joosen, A. Sabelfeld
{"title":"Password Meters and Generators on the Web: From Large-Scale Empirical Study to Getting It Right","authors":"S. Acker, Daniel Hausknecht, W. Joosen, A. Sabelfeld","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699118","url":null,"abstract":"Web services heavily rely on passwords for user authentication. To help users chose stronger passwords, password meter and password generator facilities are becoming increasingly popular. Password meters estimate the strength of passwords provided by users. Password generators help users with generating stronger passwords. This paper turns the spotlight on the state of the art of password meters and generators on the web. Orthogonal to the large body of work on password metrics, we focus on getting password meters and generators right in the web setting. We report on the state of affairs via a large-scale empirical study of web password meters and generators. Our findings reveal pervasive trust to third-party code to have access to the passwords. We uncover three cases when this trust is abused to leak the passwords to third parties. Furthermore, we discover that often the passwords are sent out to the network, invisibly to users, and sometimes in clear. To improve the state of the art, we propose SandPass, a general web framework that allows secure and modular porting of password meter and generation modules. We demonstrate the usefulness of the framework by a reference implementation and a case study with a password meter by the Swedish Post and Telecommunication Agency.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130810623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jing Tian, Kevin R. B. Butler, P. Mcdaniel, Padma Krishnaswamy
{"title":"Securing ARP From the Ground Up","authors":"Jing Tian, Kevin R. B. Butler, P. Mcdaniel, Padma Krishnaswamy","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699123","url":null,"abstract":"The basis for all IPv4 network communication is the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), which maps an IP address to a device's Media Access Control (MAC) identifier. ARP has long been recognized as vulnerable to spoofing and other attacks, and past proposals to secure the protocol have often involved modifying the basic protocol. This paper introduces arpsec, a secure ARP/RARP protocol suite which a) does not require protocol modification, b) enables continual verification of the identity of the tar- get (respondent) machine by introducing an address binding repository derived using a formal logic that bases additions to a host's ARP cache on a set of operational rules and properties, c) utilizes the TPM, a commodity component now present in the vast majority of modern computers, to augment the logic-prover-derived assurance when needed, with TPM-facilitated attestations of system state achieved at viably low processing cost. Using commodity TPMs as our attestation base, we show that arpsec incurs an overhead ranging from 7% to 15.4% over the standard Linux ARP implementation and provides a first step towards a formally secure and trustworthy networking stack.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"77 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122590996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Network Security Game Model","authors":"Vivek Shandilya, S. Shiva","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699133","url":null,"abstract":"There have been attempts to model the interaction between users, both malicious and benign, and network administrators as games. Building on such works, we here present a game model which is generic enough to capture various modes of such interactions. The model facilitates stochastic games with imperfect information. The imperfect information is due to erroneous sensors leading to incorrect perception of the current state by the players. To model this error in perception distributed over other multiple states, we use Euclidean distances between inputs from the sensors.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114990121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kadhim Hayawi, A. Mortezaei, Mahesh V. Tripunitara
{"title":"The Limits of the Trade-Off Between Query-Anonymity and Communication-Cost in Wireless Sensor Networks","authors":"Kadhim Hayawi, A. Mortezaei, Mahesh V. Tripunitara","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699113","url":null,"abstract":"We address query-anonymity, the property that the destination of a client's query is indistinguishable from other potential destinations, in the context of wireless sensor networks. Prior work has established that this is an important issue, and has also pointed out that there appears to be a natural trade-off between query-anonymity and communication-cost. We explore what we call the limits of this trade-off: what is the communication-cost that is sufficient to achieve a certain query-anonymity, and what is the communication-cost that we must necessarily incur to achieve a certain query-anonymity? Towards this, we point out that two notions of query-anonymity that prior work in this context proposes are not meaningful. We propose an unconditional notion of query-anonymity that we argue has intuitive appeal. We then establish the limits of the trade-off. In particular, we show that in wireless sensor networks whose topology is a square grid and are source-routed, the necessary and sufficient communication-cost for query-anonymity asymptotically smaller than n, where n is the number of nodes in the network, is dependent on n only, and the necessary and sufficient communication-cost for query-anonymity larger than n is dependent on the desired query-anonymity only. We then generalize to topologies that are arbitrary connected undirected graphs, an exercise that involves a novel approach based on a spanning tree for the graph. We show that the diameter of the graph is the inflection point in the trade-off. We discuss extensions of our results to other settings, such as those in which routes are not necessarily shortest-paths. We also validate our analytical insights empirically, via simulations in Tossim, a de facto standard approach for wireless sensor networks. In summary, our work establishes sound and interesting theoretical results for query-anonymity in wireless sensor networks, and validates them empirically.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"237 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132983618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Privacy and Access Control","authors":"A. Pretschner","doi":"10.1145/3257821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3257821","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130231797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pleco and Plectron -- Two Provably Secure Password Hashing Algorithms","authors":"Bo Zhu, Xinxin Fan, G. Gong","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699125","url":null,"abstract":"We propose two practical and provably secure password hashing algorithms, Pleco and Plectron. They are built upon well-understood cryptographic algorithms, and combine advantages of symmetric and asymmetric primitives. By employing the Rabin cryptosystem, we prove that the one-wayness of Pleco is at least as strong as the hard problem of integer factorization. In addition, both password hashing algorithms are designed to be sequential memory-hard, in order to thwart large-scale password cracking by parallel hardware, such as GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs. Moreover, the total computation and memory consumptions of Pleco and Plectron are tunable through their cost parameters.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121722236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jing Qiu, B. Yadegari, Brian Johannesmeyer, S. Debray, Xiaohong Su
{"title":"Identifying and Understanding Self-Checksumming Defenses in Software","authors":"Jing Qiu, B. Yadegari, Brian Johannesmeyer, S. Debray, Xiaohong Su","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699109","url":null,"abstract":"Software self-checksumming is widely used as an anti-tampering mechanism for protecting intellectual property and deterring piracy. This makes it important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches to self-checksumming. This paper describes a dynamic information-flow-based attack that aims to identify and understand self-checksumming behavior in software. Our approach is applicable to a wide class of self chesumming defenses and the information obtained can be used to determine how the checksumming defenses may be bypassed. Experiments using a prototype implementation of our ideas indicate that our approach can successfully identify self-checksumming behavior in (our implementations of) proposals from the research literature.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126829334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}