Sebastian Banescu, A. Pretschner, Dominic Battré, Stéfano Cazzulani, R. Shield, Greg Thompson
{"title":"Software-Based Protection against Changeware","authors":"Sebastian Banescu, A. Pretschner, Dominic Battré, Stéfano Cazzulani, R. Shield, Greg Thompson","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699099","url":null,"abstract":"We call changeware software that surreptitiously modifies resources of software applications, e.g., configuration files. Changeware is developed by malicious entities which gain profit if their changeware is executed by large numbers of end-users of the targeted software. Browser hijacking malware is one popular example that aims at changing web-browser settings such as the default search engine or the home page. Changeware tends to provoke end-user dissatisfaction with the target application, e.g. due to repeated failure of persisting the desired configuration. We describe a solution to counter changeware, to be employed by vendors of software targeted by changeware. It combines several protection mechanisms: white-box cryptography to hide a cryptographic key, software diversity to counter automated key retrieval attacks, and run-time process memory integrity checking to avoid illegitimate calls of the developed API.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121342602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CryptStream: Cryptographic Access Controls for Streaming Data","authors":"C. Thoma, Adam J. Lee, Alexandros Labrinidis","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699134","url":null,"abstract":"With data becoming available in larger quantities and at higher rates, new data processing paradigms have been proposed to handle large and fast data. Data Stream Processing is one such paradigm wherein transient data flows as streams through sets of continuous queries, only returning results when data is of interest to the querier, allowing uninteresting data to be ignored. To process these data streams, users are employing third party computational platforms or large private platforms to reduce the individual cost for querying and computing over data streams. Utilizing third parties for outsourcing computation means data being processed is available to the third party as well, which could violate the data provider's privacy. There has been research done into access control for streaming data, and these works provide a good first step, but fall short of a complete system. In this paper, we introduce CryptStream for cryptographically enforcing access controls over streaming data. CryptStream combines data providers access control policies with ones prescribed by the data consumer and the server as well. We show that CryptStream improves over earlier work in the same design space while providing smaller overheads and more flexibility.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127116323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yury Zhauniarovich, Maqsood Ahmad, O. Gadyatskaya, B. Crispo, F. Massacci
{"title":"StaDynA: Addressing the Problem of Dynamic Code Updates in the Security Analysis of Android Applications","authors":"Yury Zhauniarovich, Maqsood Ahmad, O. Gadyatskaya, B. Crispo, F. Massacci","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699105","url":null,"abstract":"Static analysis of Android applications can be hindered by the presence of the popular dynamic code update techniques: dynamic class loading and reflection. Recent Android malware samples do actually use these mechanisms to conceal their malicious behavior from static analyzers. These techniques defuse even the most recent static analyzers that usually operate under the \"closed world\" assumption (the targets of reflective calls can be resolved at analysis time; only classes reachable from the class path at analysis time are used at runtime). Our proposed solution allows existing static analyzers to remove this assumption. This is achieved by combining static and dynamic analysis of applications in order to reveal the hidden/updated behavior and extend static analysis results with this information. This paper presents design, implementation and preliminary evaluation results of our solution called StaDynA.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128368939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Privacy Preserving Techniques","authors":"Li Xiong","doi":"10.1145/3257832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3257832","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114842192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Secure Information and Resource Sharing in Cloud","authors":"Yun Zhang, R. Krishnan, R. Sandhu","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699126","url":null,"abstract":"The significant threats from information security breaches in cyber world is one of the most serious security problems. Organizations are facing growing number of sophisticated cyber-attacks every year. Efficient and secure sharing of attack and security information during cyber incident response plays increasingly significant role in fixing the problems as well as helping organizations recover fast. While traditional systems are slow and inefficient in sharing information and resources securely, cloud platform provides us a considerable convenience to facilitate the sharing. In this paper, we propose access control models for secure information and resource sharing (IARS) in cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126004863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Differentially-Private Mining of Moderately-Frequent High-Confidence Association Rules","authors":"Mihai Maruseac, Gabriel Ghinita","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699102","url":null,"abstract":"Association rule mining allows discovering of patterns in large data repositories, and benefits diverse application domains such as healthcare, marketing, social studies, etc. However, mining datasets that contain data about individuals may cause significant privacy breaches, and disclose sensitive information about one's health status, political orientation or alternative lifestyle. Recent research addressed the privacy threats that arise when mining sensitive data, and several techniques allow data mining with differential privacy guarantees. However, existing methods only discover rules that have very large support, i.e., occur in a large fraction of the dataset transactions (typically, more than 50%). This is a serious limitation, as numerous high-quality rules do not reach such high frequencies (e.g., rules about rare diseases, or luxury merchandise). In this paper, we propose a method that focuses on mining high-quality association rules with moderate and low frequencies. We employ a novel technique for rule extraction that combines the exponential mechanism of differential privacy with reservoir sampling. The proposed algorithm allows us to directly mine association rules, without the need to compute noisy supports for large numbers of itemsets. We provide a privacy analysis of the proposed method, and we perform an extensive experimental evaluation which shows that our technique is able to sample low- and moderate-support rules with high precision.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123573309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rapid Screening of Transformed Data Leaks with Efficient Algorithms and Parallel Computing","authors":"Xiaokui Shu, Jing Zhang, D. Yao, Wu-chun Feng","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699130","url":null,"abstract":"The leak of sensitive data on computer systems poses a serious threat to organizational security. Organizations need to identify the exposure of sensitive data by screening the content in storage and transmission, i.e., to detect sensitive information being stored or transmitted in the clear. However, detecting the exposure of sensitive information is challenging due to data transformation in the content. Transformations (such as insertion, deletion) result in highly unpredictable leak patterns. Existing automata-based string matching algorithms are impractical for detecting transformed data leaks, because of its formidable complexity when modeling the required regular expressions. We design two new algorithms for detecting long and transformed data leaks. Our system achieves high detection accuracy in recognizing transformed leaks compared to the state-of-the-art inspection methods. We parallelize our prototype on graphics processing unit and demonstrate the strong scalability of our detection solution required by a sizable organization.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129600759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Sarfraz, Mohamed Nabeel, Jianneng Cao, E. Bertino
{"title":"DBMask: Fine-Grained Access Control on Encrypted Relational Databases","authors":"M. Sarfraz, Mohamed Nabeel, Jianneng Cao, E. Bertino","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699101","url":null,"abstract":"For efficient data management and economic benefits, organizations are increasingly moving towards the paradigm of \"database as a service\" by which their data are managed by a database management system (DBMS) hosted in a public cloud. However, data are the most valuable asset in an organization, and inappropriate data disclosure puts the organization's business at risk. Therefore, data are usually encrypted in order to preserve their confidentiality. Past research has extensively investigated query processing on encrypted data. However, a naive encryption scheme negates the benefits provided by the use of a DBMS. In particular, past research efforts have not adequately addressed flexible cryptographically enforced access control on encrypted data at different granularity levels which is critical for data sharing among different users and applications. In this paper, we propose DBMask, a novel solution that supports fine-grained cryptographically enforced access control, including column, row and cell level access control, when evaluating SQL queries on encrypted data. Our solution does not require modifications to the database engine, and thus maximizes the reuse of the existing DBMS infrastructures. Our experiments evaluate the performance and the functionality of an encrypted database and results show that our solution is efficient and scalable to large datasets.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132164145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Zach Jorgensen, J. Chen, Christopher S. Gates, Ninghui Li, R. Proctor, Ting Yu
{"title":"Dimensions of Risk in Mobile Applications: A User Study","authors":"Zach Jorgensen, J. Chen, Christopher S. Gates, Ninghui Li, R. Proctor, Ting Yu","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699108","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile platforms, such as Android, warn users about the permissions an app requests and trust that the user will make the correct decision about whether or not to install the app. Unfortunately many users either ignore the warning or fail to understand the permissions and the risks they imply. As a step toward developing an indicator of risk that decomposes risk into several categories, or dimensions, we conducted two studies designed to assess the dimensions of risk deemed most important by experts and novices. In Study 1, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 19 security experts, who also performed a card sorting task in which they categorized permissions. The experts identified three major risk dimensions in the interviews (personal information privacy, monetary risk, and device availability/stability), and a forth dimension (data integrity) in the card sorting task. In Study 2, 350 typical Android users, recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, filled out a questionnaire in which they (a) answered questions concerning their mobile device usage, (b) rated how often they considered each of several types of information when installing apps, (c) indicated what they considered to be the biggest risk associated with installing an app on their mobile device, and (d) rated their concerns with regard to specific risk types and about apps having access to specific types of information. In general, the typical users' concerns were similar to those of the security experts. The results of the studies suggest that risk information should be organized into several risk types that can be better understood by users and that a mid-level risk summary should incorporate the dimensions of personal information privacy, monetary risk, device availability/stability risk and data integrity risk.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114175404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Daniele Gallingani, Rigel Gjomemo, V. Venkatakrishnan, S. Zanero
{"title":"Practical Exploit Generation for Intent Message Vulnerabilities in Android","authors":"Daniele Gallingani, Rigel Gjomemo, V. Venkatakrishnan, S. Zanero","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699132","url":null,"abstract":"Android's Inter-Component Communication (ICC) mechanism strongly relies on Intent messages. Unfortunately, due to the lack of message origin verification in Intents, application security completely relies on the programmer's skill and attention. In this paper, we advance the state of the art by developing a method to automatically detect potential vulnerabilities and, most importantly, demonstrate whether they can be exploited or not. To this end, we adopt a formal approach to automatically produce malicious payloads that can trigger dangerous behavior in vulnerable applications. We test our methods on a representative sample of applications, and we find that 29 out of 64 tested applications are potentially vulnerable, while 26 of them are automatically proven to be exploitable.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115872565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}