{"title":"Tunably-Oblivious Memory: Generalizing ORAM to Enable Privacy-Efficiency Tradeoffs","authors":"Jonathan L. Dautrich, C. Ravishankar","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699097","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the challenge of providing privacy-preserving access to data outsourced to an untrusted cloud provider. Even if data blocks are encrypted, access patterns may leak valuable information. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) protocols guarantee full access pattern privacy, but even the most efficient ORAMs to date require roughly L log2 N block transfers to satisfy an L-block query, for block store capacity N. We propose a generalized form of ORAM called Tunably-Oblivious Memory (lambda-TOM) that allows a query's public access pattern to assume any of lambda possible lengths. Increasing lambda yields improved efficiency at the cost of weaker privacy guarantees. 1-TOM protocols are as secure as ORAM. We also propose a novel, special-purpose TOM protocol called Staggered-Bin TOM (SBT), which efficiently handles large queries that are not cache-friendly. We also propose a read-only SBT variant called Multi-SBT that can satisfy such queries with only O(L + log N) block transfers in the best case, and only O(L log N) transfers in the worst case, while leaking only O(log log log N) bits of information per query. Our experiments show that for N = 2^24 blocks, Multi-SBT achieves practical bandwidth costs as low as 6X those of an unprotected protocol for large queries, while leaking at most 3 bits of information per query.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"169 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120996412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Mobile Security","authors":"Gabriel Ghinita","doi":"10.1145/3257822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3257822","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116256373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"SemaDroid: A Privacy-Aware Sensor Management Framework for Smartphones","authors":"Zhi Xu, Sencun Zhu","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699114","url":null,"abstract":"While mobile sensing applications are booming, the sensor management mechanisms in current smartphone operating systems are left behind -- they are incomprehensive and coarse-grained, exposing a huge attack surface for malicious or aggressive third party apps to steal user's private information through mobile sensors. In this paper, we propose a privacy-aware sensor management framework, called SemaDroid, which extends the existing sensor management framework on Android to provide comprehensive and fine-grained access control over onboard sensors. SemaDroid allows the user to monitor the sensor usage of installed apps, and to control the disclosure of sensing information while not affecting the app's usability. Furthermore, SemaDroid supports context-aware and quality-of-sensing based access control policies. The enforcement and update of the policies are in real-time. Detailed design and implementation of SemaDroid on Android are presented to show that SemaDroid works compatible with the existing Android security framework. Demonstrations are also given to show the capability of SemaDroid on sensor management and on defeating emerging sensor-based attacks. Finally, we show the high efficiency and security of SemaDroid.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"4 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115904763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Toward De-Anonymizing Bitcoin by Mapping Users Location","authors":"Jules Dupont, A. Squicciarini","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699128","url":null,"abstract":"The Bitcoin system (https://bitcoin.org) is a pseudo-anonymous currency that can dissociate a user from any real-world identity. In that context, a successful breach of the virtual and physical divide represents a signficant aw in the Bit-coin system [1]. In this project we demonstrate how to glean information about the real-world users behind Bitcoin transactions. We analyze publicly available data about the cryptocurrency. In particular, we focus on determining information about a Bitcoin user's physical location by examining that user's spending habits.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128672454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Panel Session","authors":"B. Thuraisingham","doi":"10.1145/3257830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3257830","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125622900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Session details: Cloud and BigData Security","authors":"E. Bertino","doi":"10.1145/3257826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3257826","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114464310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards Server-side Repair for Erasure Coding-based Distributed Storage Systems","authors":"Bo Chen, Anil Kumar Ammula, Reza Curtmola","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699122","url":null,"abstract":"Erasure coding is one of the main mechanisms to add redundancy in a distributed storage system, by which a file with k data segments is encoded into a file with n coded segments such that any k coded segments can be used to recover the original k data segments. Each coded segment is stored at a storage server. Under an adversarial setting in which the storage servers can exhibit Byzantine behavior, remote data checking (RDC) can be used to ensure that the stored data remains retrievable over time. The main previous RDC scheme to offer such strong security guarantees, HAIL, has an inefficient repair procedure, which puts a high load on the data owner when repairing even one corrupt data segment. In this work, we propose RDC-EC, a novel RDC scheme for erasure code-based distributed storage systems that can function under an adversarial setting. With RDC-EC we offer a solution to an open problem posed in previous work and build the first such system that has an efficient repair phase. The main insight is that RDC-EC is able to reduce the load on the data owner during the repair phase (i.e., lower bandwidth and computation) by shifting most of the burden from the data owner to the storage servers during repair. RDC-ECis able to maintain the advantages of systematic erasure coding: optimal storage for a certain reliability level and sub-file access. We build a prototype for RDC-EC and show experimentally that RDC-EC can handle efficiently large amounts of data.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127923182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. H. Ziegeldorf, Fred Grossmann, Martin Henze, Nicolas Inden, Klaus Wehrle
{"title":"CoinParty: Secure Multi-Party Mixing of Bitcoins","authors":"J. H. Ziegeldorf, Fred Grossmann, Martin Henze, Nicolas Inden, Klaus Wehrle","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699100","url":null,"abstract":"Bitcoin is a digital currency that uses anonymous cryptographic identities to achieve financial privacy. However, Bitcoin's promise of anonymity is broken as recent work shows how Bitcoin's blockchain exposes users to reidentification and linking attacks. In consequence, different mixing services have emerged which promise to randomly mix a user's Bitcoins with other users' coins to provide anonymity based on the unlinkability of the mixing. However, proposed approaches suffer either from weak security guarantees and single points of failure, or small anonymity sets and missing deniability. In this paper, we propose CoinParty a novel, decentralized mixing service for Bitcoin based on a combination of decryption mixnets with threshold signatures. CoinParty is secure against malicious adversaries and the evaluation of our prototype shows that it scales easily to a large number of participants in real-world network settings. By the application of threshold signatures to Bitcoin mixing, CoinParty achieves anonymity by orders of magnitude higher than related work as we quantify by analyzing transactions in the actual Bitcoin blockchain and is first among related approaches to provide plausible deniability.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116386141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epidemic Behavior of Negative Users in Online Social Sites","authors":"C. Liao, A. Squicciarini, C. Griffin","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699129","url":null,"abstract":"With the increasing popularity of user-contributed sites, the phenomenon of \"social\" pollution, the presence of abusive posts has become increasingly prevalent. In this paper, we describe a novel approach to explain and predict negative behavior spreading dynamics in online social networks by using well-known epidemic models. We show how using pure and hybrid models, it is possible not only to explain the phenomenon of abusiveness in certain online commentaries, but also that it is possible to predict these behavioral patterns with properly defined hybrid models. We summarize our results on a large set of experiments on Youtube commentaries, and show how the different epidemic patterns of behavior are tied to specific interaction patterns among users.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115775118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"DetAnom: Detecting Anomalous Database Transactions by Insiders","authors":"Syed Rafiul Hussain, Asmaa Sallam, E. Bertino","doi":"10.1145/2699026.2699111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2699026.2699111","url":null,"abstract":"Database Management Systems (DBMSs) provide access control mechanisms that allow database administrators (DBA) to grant application programs access privileges to databases. However, securing the database alone is not enough, as attackers aiming at stealing data can take advantage of vulnerabilities in the privileged applications and make applications to issue malicious database queries. Therefore, even though the access control mechanism can prevent application programs from accessing the data to which the programs are not authorized, it is unable to prevent misuse of the data to which application programs are authorized for access. Hence, we need a mechanism able to detect malicious behavior resulting from previously authorized applications. In this paper, we design and implement an anomaly detection mechanism, DetAnom, that creates a profile of the application program which can succinctly represent the application's normal behavior in terms of its interaction (i.e., submission of SQL queries) with the database. For each query, the profile keeps a signature and also the corresponding constraints that the application program must satisfy to submit that query. Later in the detection phase, whenever the application issues a query, the corresponding signature and constraints are checked against the current context of the application. If there is a mismatch, the query is marked as anomalous. The main advantage of our anomaly detection mechanism is that we need neither any previous knowledge of application vulnerabilities nor any example of possible attacks to build the application profiles. As a result, our DetAnom mechanism is able to protect the data from attacks tailored to database applications such as code modification attacks, SQL injections, and also from other data-centric attacks as well. We have implemented our mechanism with a software testing technique called concolic testing and the PostgreSQL DBMS. Experimental results show that our profiling technique is close to accurate, and requires acceptable amount of time, and that the detection mechanism incurs low run-time overhead.","PeriodicalId":195053,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127529573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}