{"title":"Information sharing in secure systems","authors":"J. W. Gray","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128193","url":null,"abstract":"The author attempts to establish a theoretical foundation for secure information sharing. He proposes a secure system structuring construct, called a secure object manager, as an example of a one-way information sharing mechanism. Secrecy, integrity, and availability requirements for the secure object manager are defined. A formal system model, including a careful treatment of communication via bounded buffers, is developed. Then he formally defines secrecy in terms of the model. This definition of secrecy precludes all covert channels, including storage, probabilistic, and timing channels. An implementation of the secure object manager that satisfies all the requirements considered is presented.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133749091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Formal semantics for logics of cryptographic protocols","authors":"P. Syverson","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128183","url":null,"abstract":"A logic and associated formal semantics specifically designed to represent and analyze cryptographic protocols are presented. A language is given with distinct means to represent knowledge of an individual word (e.g., the ability to recognize or produce a decryption key) and propositional knowledge. A sample analysis of a protocol is given to demonstrate the potential usefulness of the system.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124979975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Representing partial knowledge in an algebraic security model","authors":"C. Meadows","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128182","url":null,"abstract":"The author extends a security model and specification language for key distribution protocols which describes protocols algebraically in terms of term-rewriting systems to include certain kinds of partial knowledge available to a penetrator. She also shows how the model describes the actions by which a penetrator takes advantage of partial knowledge, and gives an example of a protocol specified in the language.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130797200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A logic for reasoning about security","authors":"J. Glasgow, G. MacEwen, P. Panangaden","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128180","url":null,"abstract":"A formal framework called security logic (SL) is developed for specifying and reasoning about security policies, and for verifying that system designs adhere to such policies. Included in this framework is a definition of knowledge based on modal logic so that properties can be time-related, a definition of permission, and a definition of obligation. Permission is used to specify secrecy policies, and obligation is used to specify integrity policies. A security policy is given as a set of policy constraints on the SL model. The combination of policies is addressed. Examples based on policies from the current literature are given.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126306032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A formal framework for single level decomposition of multilevel relations","authors":"S. Jajodia, R. Sandhu","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128195","url":null,"abstract":"Multilevel relations in which security classifications are assigned at the granularity of individual data elements are considered. Usually these multilevel relations exist only at the logical level. In reality, a multilevel relation is decomposed into a collection of single level base relations which are then physically stored in a database, and a recovery algorithm is used to reconstruct the original multilevel relation. The authors formalize the relationship that exists between the decomposition-independent filtered relations and the multilevel relations obtained from decomposed single level relations using the recovery algorithm. Three requirements that must be met by any decomposition and recovery algorithms are stated. It is pointed out that previous algorithms given by the authors (1990) meet these requirements.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128292887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Secure information flow using security groups","authors":"S. Foley","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128186","url":null,"abstract":"A new model and approach for secure information flow are described. The model is driven by a lattice-based information flow policy which describes the permitted dissemination of information in the system. System entities are allowed to handle different classes of information from the flow policy, and information is permitted to flow between entities as long as the flow policy is not violated. With this conceptually simple notion of security it is possible to describe many interesting security policies, for example, multilevel policies, aggregation policies, and Chinese walls. Details of how secure systems based on the model can be implemented in practice are given. Attention is also given to how other types of security policies, such as integrity and separation of duty, can be defined in terms of lattice-based policies.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"129 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123107532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}