{"title":"Quotient states and probabilistic channels","authors":"I. S. Moskowitz","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128187","url":null,"abstract":"Restrictiveness is interpreted in terms of a quotient set of the states of a machine. Consideration is given to how restrictiveness can still allow certain probabilistic effects to open up a communication channel between high and low users of a computer system. Specifically, assigning probabilities to transitions in order to look for simple probabilistic channels is examined. The theory is then extended to deal with extended transitions. How Shannon's work on information theory can be used to analyze a system that is restrictive but nonetheless has a probabilistic channel is discussed.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115011829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A new polyinstantiation integrity constraint for multilevel relations","authors":"R. Sandhu, S. Jajodia, T. Lunt","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128196","url":null,"abstract":"A new polyinstantiation integrity constraint for multilevel relations based on the intuitive idea that every entity in a relation can have at most one tuple for every access class is proposed. The consequences of this property and some of its variations are discussed. A core set of properties which should apply to all relations is identified. These are entity integrity, interinstance integrity, subsumption integrity, and polyinstantiation integrity in the sense of PI-FD. Specific models impose additional polyinstantiation constraints. Oakland requires PI-null, Sea View requires PI-MVD, and the new Franconia model requires PI-Tuple-class. Each of these properties appears likely to arise often enough in practice to justify DBMS (database management system) support for its enforcement on a relation-by-relation basis.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129252001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Categorising non-interference","authors":"J. Jacob","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128184","url":null,"abstract":"Noninterference (see J.A. Goguen and J. Meseguer, 1982) is given an abstract definition in category-theoretic terms. Unwinding theorems are investigated from this starting point. The theorems assume that commands form a monoid. Thus the results do not apply to systems where some sequences of commands are syntactically invalid. The extension to categories would generalize the results to languages where not every string is a syntactically valid program. It is concluded that category theory is a powerful tool for reasoning about noninterference.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125654007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Petri net based modelling of information flow security requirements","authors":"V. Varadharajan","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128185","url":null,"abstract":"An extended Petri net formalism which can be used to model information flow security requirements is described. The proposed framework can be used to specify a range of security policies by making specific choices for the components of the model. It is believed that Petri nets provide an elegant way of modeling security policies in a distributed system. The ability to model concurrency, the structural generality of Petri nets, and the existence of powerful analytical techniques make the Petri-net modeling approach even more useful. Two examples are given to illustrate the use of such a model.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131777715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Providing a flexible security override for trusted systems","authors":"L. Badger","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128192","url":null,"abstract":"A definition of security, relaxation security, which is expressed in terms of the guarantees that a trusted system may provide, is presented. Relaxation secure systems permit dynamic, incremental relaxation of security constraints by authorized users. The use of guarantees permits security damage sustained during a period of constraint relaxation to be expressed in terms of guarantees violated; the set of violated guarantees may then be used as input for security recovery. A definition of security using a state machine formulation is presented, the implications of relaxation security for security recovery are discussed, and the utility of the approach is demonstrated using an example application.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126946067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A logic of communication in hostile environment","authors":"P. Bieber","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128181","url":null,"abstract":"The author adapts a knowledge-oriented model of distributed systems in order to analyze cryptographic protocols. This new model provides semantics for a logic of knowledge, time and communication. He expresses and proves with this logic security properties as secrecy and authentication.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125459905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hookup security for synchronous machines","authors":"J. Millen","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128188","url":null,"abstract":"The author further delineates and improves the evidence that nondeducibility on strategies is a respectable candidate for a definition of security against information compromise, at least for the class of systems that can be modeled as synchronized state machines. First, the author confirms the thesis of J.T. Wittbold and D.M. Johnson (1990) that nondeducibility on strategies is stronger than the notion of nondeducibility on inputs, defined by D. Sutherland (1986), which is generally viewed as a minimum requirement for security. Second, it is shown that nondeducibility on strategies is preserved when two machines that are secure by this definition are hooked up arbitrarily, even when loops are created by the interconnection. In order to make these more general hookups possible, it is necessary to generalize the definition of a synchronized state machine.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"28 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132738221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Information-flow analysis for covert-channel identification in multilevel secure operating systems","authors":"Jingsha He, V. Gligor","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128194","url":null,"abstract":"Given an information flow consisting of the flow path and the flow condition under which the flow takes place, the problem of determining whether the information flow is legal is considered; that is, whether the flow complies with the underlying nondiscretionary security policy of a trusted computing base (TCB). It is shown that the proposed approach to information-flow analysis has the advantage of eliminating the possibility of generating false illegal flow, namely flows that are identified by the analysis process to be illegal but which, in reality, are legal. Without eliminating false illegal flows from analysis, automated tools for secure information-flow analysis would be of limited use in this area because manual work would still be needed. Finally, it is shown how to apply this information-flow analysis approach to Secure XENIX and how information-flow analysis can help reduce the amount of effort for information-flow integration within TCB programs.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124430720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Security models for priority buffering and interrupt handling","authors":"D. Rosenthal","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128189","url":null,"abstract":"Ways to securely buffer messages are examined. The focus is on the development of a decomposition theorem for the theory of restrictiveness, so that if the buffering part of a process and the output part of a process satisfy the specified constraints then the combined process is restrictive. This technique is applied to a number of buffering methods, including a priority queue. A method of decomposition for interrupt handling is shown.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122935925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A policy model for denial of service","authors":"E. Amoroso","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128191","url":null,"abstract":"A service model that is framed on the notions of subject priority and object criticality is introduced. The prevent (p, c) denial of service policy is expressed with respect to the service model. The author demonstrates an approach to arguing compliance with the policy by interpreting the System V/MLS secure operating system in terms of the service model, and then providing a sketch of an evaluation with respect to the prevent (2, 2) policy.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126219590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}