{"title":"用代数安全模型表示部分知识","authors":"C. Meadows","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128182","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The author extends a security model and specification language for key distribution protocols which describes protocols algebraically in terms of term-rewriting systems to include certain kinds of partial knowledge available to a penetrator. She also shows how the model describes the actions by which a penetrator takes advantage of partial knowledge, and gives an example of a protocol specified in the language.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":185508,"journal":{"name":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1990-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"20","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Representing partial knowledge in an algebraic security model\",\"authors\":\"C. Meadows\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CSFW.1990.128182\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The author extends a security model and specification language for key distribution protocols which describes protocols algebraically in terms of term-rewriting systems to include certain kinds of partial knowledge available to a penetrator. She also shows how the model describes the actions by which a penetrator takes advantage of partial knowledge, and gives an example of a protocol specified in the language.<<ETX>>\",\"PeriodicalId\":185508,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1990-06-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"20\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128182\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"[1990] Proceedings. The Computer Security Foundations Workshop III","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1990.128182","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Representing partial knowledge in an algebraic security model
The author extends a security model and specification language for key distribution protocols which describes protocols algebraically in terms of term-rewriting systems to include certain kinds of partial knowledge available to a penetrator. She also shows how the model describes the actions by which a penetrator takes advantage of partial knowledge, and gives an example of a protocol specified in the language.<>