Tax Law & Policy eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda for Reform","authors":"David M. Schizer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.516543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.516543","url":null,"abstract":"By now, it is well understood that aggressive tax planning among high-income individuals and corporations represents a grave threat to the U.S. tax system, and that derivatives are staples of this planning. In response, the usual recommendation is consistency, which means that the same tax treatment should apply to economically comparable bets, regardless of what form is used. Yet because consistency is unattainable, this Article develops an alternative theory: Policymakers should strive instead for balance. This means that for each risky position, the treatment of gains should match the treatment of losses. For example, if the government bears 15% of losses, it has to share in 15% of gains. On a different derivative, if the government bears 35% of losses, it should share in 35% of gains. As long as this matching is achieved across the board for all risky bets, the admittedly counterintuitive reality is that taxpayers need not prefer, or engage in planning to attain, a low effective rate. A low rate obviously is appealing for gains, but it is correspondingly unappealing for losses (i.e., since deducting the loss is less valuable). Moreover, even if a low rate is desired, taxpayers can get the same aftertax return by increasing the size of their bet. The main advantage of this reform agenda is flexibility. To prove this point, this Article outlines three ways to match gains and losses on derivatives: mark-to-market accounting; a novel reform called the stated-term approach, in which gains and losses are deferred until the scheduled maturity date of the derivative, even if the contract is terminated earlier; and a zero tax rate. The provocative conclusion is that these thoroughly inconsistent approaches can coexist for economically comparable derivatives, without prompting planning. Yet this flexibility is not free, so the limitations of this reform agenda are considered as well, along with implications for cutting edge problems in the taxation of derivatives, including the timing and character rules for swaps, Section 1032, and the wash sale rules.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128993212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is it Unethical to Evade the Social Security Tax?","authors":"Robert W. McGee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.242507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.242507","url":null,"abstract":"The accounting and philosophical literature on tax evasion has been scant, at least until recently. The few articles that have discussed the ethics of tax evasion have usually taken either a generalist approach or have focused their attention on the ethics of evading income taxes. This article is the first to address the issue of whether it is unethical to evade the Social Security tax.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123724888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"User Fees as an Alternative to Coercive Taxation: A Look at Some Economic and Ethical Issues","authors":"Robert W. McGee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.242570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.242570","url":null,"abstract":"Most forms of public finance rely on force or the threat of force to collect revenue. Two forms of public finance that do not rely on force are lotteries and user fees. This article discusses some of the economic and ethical issues involved in using user fees as a form of public finance.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129251175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Status Report","authors":"P. Perun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.236837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.236837","url":null,"abstract":"For the past 25 years, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) have provided employers with a means to transfer substantial ownership interests to their employees. But as the popularity of company stock as an investment option increases among employees, employers have some new alternatives to consider. This report reviews the current status of ESOPs through an analysis of 1997 Form 5500 data collected by the Department of Labor. It also describes the competition - stock options, stock purchase plans and company stock funds in 401k plans. It concludes that ESOPs have lost much of their appeal as companies now have access to less complicated and more versatile means for aligning employee and corporate interests. The alternatives to ESOPS also provide employees with greater choice about how much company stock they will hold and when they will buy and sell it. The future of employee ownership does not appear to belong to ESOPs. But ESOPs still retain special financing and tax benefits particularly attractive to the small, privately held company. As long as Congress believes providing tax subsidies for ownership transfers to employees in such companies is important, ESOPs will most likely survive for this purpose alone rather than as a primary employee benefit.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"117 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117278598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Flat Tax, Equity and Politics","authors":"P. Ganderton, D. Hineline","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.238483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.238483","url":null,"abstract":"We study a simple flat tax proposal that combines the federal income tax and the payroll tax. This tax reform may have a higher probability of political acceptance by treating the large middle income classes more favorably than other flat tax reform proposals. Our analysis compares the distribution of marginal and average tax rates across income groups for the current system, and two revenue neutral flat tax alternatives. Replacing the current federal income tax rate structure and the payroll tax with a flat 36 percent tax on personal and business income above a generous threshold offers significant tax relief for the lowest income classes, offers middle income earners lower average tax rates and spreads the burden of the present regressive payroll tax to the highest income classes.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125416539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fiscal Federalism, Jurisdictional Competition and Tax Coordination: Translating Theory to Policy in the European Union","authors":"W. Bratton, J. McCahery","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.205410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.205410","url":null,"abstract":"This paper applies the economic theories of fiscal federalism and jurisdictional competition to the question whether the juridical presumption favoring decentralization of authority manifested in the European Union's subsidiarity principle has been rebutted in the case the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation. The Code is a pending EU tax coordination initiative that identifies and prohibits a zone of distortionary member state competition respecting taxation of capital. Evaluation of the Code under subsidiarity gives rise to three questions: (1) Whether subsidiarity's decentralization presumption implies a further presumption favoring tax competition; (2) whether subsidiarity's decentralization presumption can be overcome by a purely theoretical showing of distortionary effects of tax competition; and (3) whether, if empirical evidence of distortionary effects is required, the coordination legislation in question must address the empirically-established distortion with adjudicative particularity. The paper reaches a firm answer as to question (1): Subsidiarity does not favor tax competition, remaining neutral on the subject. It brings fiscal federalism theory to bear in reaching this conclusion: Under fiscal federalism the list of legitimate central government functions lengthens as a minimal federation like the EU successfully brings about economic integration by opening national borders to free movement. As member state economies become less heterogeneous and economic interconnections between them increase in number and depth, member state economic policies, particularly taxing and spending policies, cause more fiscal externalities. Fiscal federalism theory also describes allocative inefficiencies in competitive tax systems, particularly with respect to corporate income and commodity taxes, and highlights negative distributional consequences of tax competition. Coordinative initiatives directed to the elimination of resulting inefficiencies in resource allocations therefore hold a legitimate place on the EU's integration agenda. The paper's answers for questions (2) and (3) are more qualified. The strength of both subsidiarity's decentralization presumption and of any rebuttal case depend on political risks and economic factors specific to the situation. In the tax coordination case addressed, the risks turn out to be low, permitting the presumption to be rebutted by a strong theoretical case articulated on a spotty empirical record.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128257444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Intra-Group, Interstate Strategic Income Management for Tax, Financial Reporting, and Regulatory Purposes","authors":"Anne Beatty, David G. Harris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.206070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.206070","url":null,"abstract":"In this study we examine whether banks owned by interstate multibank holding companies coordinate their security gains and losses to manage their tax, earnings, and capital management objectives. Specifically, we examine whether the realization of security gains and losses is related to the objectives of the individual bank, the consolidated group, or both. We find subsidiary banks manage their gain realizations not only to reduce their own state taxes, but also strategically to reduce their consolidated groups' tax expense. Specifically, members of consolidated banking groups shift gain recognition to lower‐taxed group members and away from higher‐taxed group members. In addition, we find evidence suggesting that banks realize security gains and losses to manage both their own and their groups' financial statement earnings.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"197 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116471904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Matching Private Savings with Federal Dollars: USA Accounts and Other Subsidies for Saving","authors":"P. Perun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.236840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.236840","url":null,"abstract":"The Clinton Administration has proposed a new savings initiative called \"Universal Savings Accounts\" or a \"USA Accounts.\" These accounts would provide low and middle income workers with automatic annual contributions for retirement savings. They also borrow the popular technique of matching contributions from the private pension system and surround it with a new federal program of savings incentives and subsidies. Similar proposals for individual savings accounts - the Bipartisan Social Security Reform Act of 1999 and the 21st Century Retirement Act - have also been introduced in Congress as part of the debate over Social Security. The federal government currently supports savings by providing indirect subsidies through the tax code to the pension system. These three proposals envision a new role for the federal government in leveraging individual savings through direct, progressive incentives and subsidies. The paper analyses these proposals on four dimensions: incentives and subsidies; ease of use; coordination with other savings vehicles; and administrative expense. It finds that all three proposals are innovative approaches to increasing retirement savings. They are also all targeted to an appropriate population, low and middle income workers, which in reality could use some help from the government in saving for retirement. USA Accounts offer more generous federal contributions for savings at very modest income levels and devote most of their resources to those most in need of assistance. They also work best with the private pension system. But these are all very complex programs, and participation rates for voluntary contributions may be low. All proposals will be expensive to implement and administer. The paper suggests that federal resources might be better spent on direct subsidies for the poor in retirement than on a complicated incentive program which may produce only a marginal increase in savings. It might also be better to target savings incentives to those who can afford to save and are motivated to respond. One alternative to consider is subsidizing contributions into IRAs and other 401(k)-type plans while providing very similar rules for taxing contributions and benefits. This would preserve the incentives for savings that are the essence of these proposals while reducing their complexity and cost.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116513955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Time Inconsistency in Environmental Policy: Tax Earmarking as a Commitment Solution","authors":"L. Marsiliani, T. Renstrom","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.200591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.200591","url":null,"abstract":"Tax earmarking imposes a constraint on government policymaking, and may be desirable if it solves a time-inconsistency problem in tax policy. In a two-period economy, in which the policy decisions regarding taxes, public goods provision, and pollution abatement are taken by a majority-elected individual, we show how the time-inconsistency problem in environmental policy arises. We demonstrate that the commitment equilibrium under no earmarking rules cannot be as fully implemented as a no-commitment equilibrium under earmarking rules. However, the earmarking rules do act as a partial commitment mechanism.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122947955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Debt-Equity Hybrid Securities","authors":"Ellen Engel, Merle M. Erickson, Edward L. Maydew","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.175868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.175868","url":null,"abstract":"Trust preferred stock, first issued in 1993, was engineered to be treated as preferred stock for financial statement purposes and as debt for tax purposes (i.e., payments on trust preferred stock are deductible by the issuer). Our analyses exploit the features of trust preferred stock to shed light on three issues: 1) the extent to which firms incur costs to manage the balance sheet classification of a security; ii) the magnitude of tax benefits, if any, associated with leverage increasing capital structure decisions, and iii) the extent to which investor-level taxation inmposes implicit taxes on securities.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130964605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}