{"title":"Efficiency Losses from Tax Distortions vs. Government Control","authors":"C. Bai, R. Gordon, David D. Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.162108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.162108","url":null,"abstract":"Why has the rapid privatization of firms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union not brought dramatically higher performance as expected? If private ownership were so clearly dominant, why has state control of enterprises been such a common phenomenon historically, even in many Western countries? In this paper, we argue that with private ownership, any price distortions (whether from high tax rates or explicit price controls) generate efficiency losses roughly proportional to the square of the implicit tax rate. In contrast, the efficiency loss under state ownership should be largely independent of these implicit tax rates. Therefore, the efficiency loss from state ownership can be less than that from private ownership when price distortions become large enough. Historically, there does seem to have been a close association between state ownership and high tax rates. For good reasons, privatization is normally associated with sharp drops in tax and nontax distortions. When privatization occurs without a substantial reduction in tax rates, as in Russia, efficiency costs from the high tax rates have been obvious, raising questions about the internal consistency of this set of policies.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121596863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Determinants of Income Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota","authors":"Marsha Blumenthal, C. Christian, J. Slemrod","doi":"10.3386/W6575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W6575","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports on the results of a controlled experiment in Minnesota in which a random sample of taxpayers was informed that their income tax returns would certainly be closely examined. We analyze reported income of this sample of taxpayers, reported income on their previous year's returns, and reported income from the two corresponding years' returns of a control group of taxpayers that did not receive the letter. We find that the treatment effect varies depending on the level of income. Low and middle income taxpayers increased reported income and tax liability relative to the control group, which we interpret as indicating the presence of noncompliance. The effect was much stronger for those with more opportunity' to evade, as measured by their source of income. However, the reported income of the high-income treatment group fell sharply relative to the control group. We suggest a model based on tax audits as a negotiation that can explain this apparently perverse result.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114179688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Distributional Analysis of an Environmental Tax Shift","authors":"G. Metcalf","doi":"10.3386/W6546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W6546","url":null,"abstract":"I use data from the 1994 Consumer Expenditure Survey as well as other sources to measure the distributional impact of green tax reforms and consumption tax reforms using both annual income and lifetime income approaches to rank households. A modest tax reform in which environmental taxes equal to 10% of federal receipts are collected has a negligible impact on the income distribution when the funds are rebated to households through reductions in the payroll tax and personal income tax. The degree of income shifting can be adjusted with changes in how the revenues are returned to households and it is possible to increase the progressivity of the tax system with an environmental tax reform. I then compare these reforms to a reform that shifts the tax base from income to consumption. In this case, it is difficult to maintain the level of progressivity that exists under the current income tax although ways exist by which the regressivity of the reform could be blunted. Whether the long term growth gains from consumption tax reform would offset the initial increase in regressivity remains to be determined. A shift to greater reliance on environmental taxes would reduce the progressivity of the tax system. This analysis indicates that reforms can be designed to preserve the existing income distribution. In fact, it appears to be easier to maintain distributional neutrality with a Green tax reform than with a comprehensive consumption tax reform.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133658458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taxation and the Sources of Growth: Estimates from United States Multinational Corporations","authors":"Jason G. Cummins","doi":"10.3386/W6533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W6533","url":null,"abstract":"Capital income tax policy affects investment by the parent and affiliates of multinational corporations (MNCs). In a model in which technical advances are embodied in new capital, investment will translate directly into productivity gains. In this paper, I use this framework to guide the growth accounting decomposition and clarify the relationship between capital growth and overall firm growth. A semiparametric technique is used to correct for the usual bias that afflicts production function parameter estimates. These estimates are used to analyze the sources of MNC's growth. Three findings stand out: (1) growth in parent and affiliate capital are the most important sources of growth, with FDI contributing more to growth than the sum of the contributions of parent and affiliate employment, and materials; (2) productivity has boomed since 1992, due to productivity growth in MNCs with Canadian affiliates; (3) the investment elasticity of productivity growth is large and adjustment costs of investment are small, suggesting that changes in the after-tax price of capital result in robust investment which translates directly into productivity gains.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132797937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant","authors":"M. Hoel, L. Karp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.128675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.128675","url":null,"abstract":"We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem where the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and environmental damage depends on pollution stock. An increase in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or a decrease in the slope of the marginal damage curve, favors taxes. An increase in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favors tax usage. Taxes dominate quotas if the length of a period during which decisions are constant is sufficiently small. An empirical illustration suggests that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gasses.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"9 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134579627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation","authors":"L. Kaplow, S. Shavell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.57828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.57828","url":null,"abstract":"The traditional view of economists has been that corrective taxes are superior to direct regulation of harmful externalities when the state's information about control costs is incomplete. In recent years, however, many economists seem to have adopted a different view--that either corrective taxes or quantity regulation could be superior to the other. We emphasize that one argument for this newer view, identified with Weitzman (1974), holds only if the state is constrained to use a fixed tax rate (a linear tax schedule) even when harm is nonlinear. But if--as seems more plausible--the state can impose a nonlinear tax equal to the schedule of harm or can adjust the tax rate upon learning that it diverges from marginal harm, then corrective taxes are superior to quantity regulation. Another argument favoring quantity regulation is that it gains appeal when the state is uncertain about the harm caused by an externality. In this case, however, a corrective tax schedule (equal to the expected harm schedule) is superior to quantity regulation. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128952412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Externalities and Optimal Taxation","authors":"H. Cremer, F. Gahvari, Norbert Ladoux","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.128988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.128988","url":null,"abstract":"This paper re-examines the optimal tax design problem (income and commodities) in the presence of externalities. The nature of the second-best, and the choice of the tax instruments, are motivated by the informational structure in the economy. The main results are: (i) environmental levies (linear or nonlinear) differ in formula from Pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods; (ii) externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas (linear and nonlinear) for private goods; (iii) externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear; and (iv) a general income tax plus strictly Pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution (at any given consumption bundle).","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"243 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115642811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effects of Tax-Law Changes on Property-Casualty Insurance Prices","authors":"","doi":"10.7208/9780226070322-004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7208/9780226070322-004","url":null,"abstract":"During the 1980s, the federal income tax treatment of property-casualty insurers and their policyholders underwent several important changes, the most significant of which came in 1986. This paper develops theoretical predictions for how these changes should have affected the equilibrium prices of property-casualty insurance policies, and explores the extent to which the theoretical predictions are reflected in data on industry experience. The paper is devoted mainly to a careful specification of the income tax rules, and to deriving the connection between predictions about simple forms of insurance policy and industry data on premiums earned. Although the predicted impact of the changes in the tax rules enacted in 1986 translates into a tax on premiums (net of the cost of acquisition) of up to 13 percent (on medical malpractice, the longest-tail line of insurance, in 1987), it is small relative to the variability of the actual loss experience.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"2013 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128013350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Business Tax Incentives and Investment","authors":"T. Karier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.137861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.137861","url":null,"abstract":"Economists of all stripes view a rise in investment spending as the cure for nearly any macroeconomic disorder. Given that only public investment is amenable to direct control, how is the \"optimal\" level of investment in a given economy ensured? One route is through public policies aimed at producing incentives for private sector investment. In this paper, Karier evaluates the efficacy of one such program, the investment tax credit (ITC), in stimulating private investment expenditures. (The credit was in place sporadically and in various forms between the years 1966 and 1987 and applied only to investment in machinery, equipment, and furniture.)","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122956335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"International Tax Competition, Tax Cooperation and Capital Controls","authors":"B. Rasmussen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.8744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.8744","url":null,"abstract":"Tax competition between independent authorities is known to lead to inefficient outcomes, implying there is scope for cooperation. In an international framework where the authorities are national governments, the undesirable features of tax competition may alternatively be mitigated by imposing restrictions on international capital flows. Using a two-country model it is shown that capital controls may fully remedy the adverse effects of tax competition and thereby render tax cooperation superfluous. In more general cases, however, capital controls have some undesirable side-effects, leaving room for cooperative actions. Moreover, the mere option of imposing capital controls may promote the implementation of tax cooperation.","PeriodicalId":180571,"journal":{"name":"Tax Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133462708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}