On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation

L. Kaplow, S. Shavell
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引用次数: 145

Abstract

The traditional view of economists has been that corrective taxes are superior to direct regulation of harmful externalities when the state's information about control costs is incomplete. In recent years, however, many economists seem to have adopted a different view--that either corrective taxes or quantity regulation could be superior to the other. We emphasize that one argument for this newer view, identified with Weitzman (1974), holds only if the state is constrained to use a fixed tax rate (a linear tax schedule) even when harm is nonlinear. But if--as seems more plausible--the state can impose a nonlinear tax equal to the schedule of harm or can adjust the tax rate upon learning that it diverges from marginal harm, then corrective taxes are superior to quantity regulation. Another argument favoring quantity regulation is that it gains appeal when the state is uncertain about the harm caused by an externality. In this case, however, a corrective tax schedule (equal to the expected harm schedule) is superior to quantity regulation. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
论纠正税对数量调控的优越性
经济学家的传统观点是,当国家对控制成本的信息不完整时,纠正性税收优于对有害外部性的直接监管。然而,近年来,许多经济学家似乎采纳了一种不同的观点——纠正性税收或数量管制可能孰优孰劣。我们要强调的是,Weitzman(1974)提出的这种新观点的一个论点,只有当国家被限制使用固定税率(线性税收表)时才成立,即使损害是非线性的。但是,如果——这似乎更有可能——国家可以征收一种与损害表相等的非线性税,或者可以在了解到它偏离边际损害后调整税率,那么纠正性税就优于数量管制。另一个支持数量管制的论点是,当国家不确定外部性造成的损害时,数量管制更有吸引力。然而,在这种情况下,纠正性税收计划(等于预期损害计划)优于数量调节。牛津大学出版社版权所有。
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