Matching Private Savings with Federal Dollars: USA Accounts and Other Subsidies for Saving

P. Perun
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The Clinton Administration has proposed a new savings initiative called "Universal Savings Accounts" or a "USA Accounts." These accounts would provide low and middle income workers with automatic annual contributions for retirement savings. They also borrow the popular technique of matching contributions from the private pension system and surround it with a new federal program of savings incentives and subsidies. Similar proposals for individual savings accounts - the Bipartisan Social Security Reform Act of 1999 and the 21st Century Retirement Act - have also been introduced in Congress as part of the debate over Social Security. The federal government currently supports savings by providing indirect subsidies through the tax code to the pension system. These three proposals envision a new role for the federal government in leveraging individual savings through direct, progressive incentives and subsidies. The paper analyses these proposals on four dimensions: incentives and subsidies; ease of use; coordination with other savings vehicles; and administrative expense. It finds that all three proposals are innovative approaches to increasing retirement savings. They are also all targeted to an appropriate population, low and middle income workers, which in reality could use some help from the government in saving for retirement. USA Accounts offer more generous federal contributions for savings at very modest income levels and devote most of their resources to those most in need of assistance. They also work best with the private pension system. But these are all very complex programs, and participation rates for voluntary contributions may be low. All proposals will be expensive to implement and administer. The paper suggests that federal resources might be better spent on direct subsidies for the poor in retirement than on a complicated incentive program which may produce only a marginal increase in savings. It might also be better to target savings incentives to those who can afford to save and are motivated to respond. One alternative to consider is subsidizing contributions into IRAs and other 401(k)-type plans while providing very similar rules for taxing contributions and benefits. This would preserve the incentives for savings that are the essence of these proposals while reducing their complexity and cost.
与联邦美元匹配私人储蓄:美国账户和其他储蓄补贴
克林顿政府提出了一项新的储蓄计划,称为“通用储蓄账户”或“美国账户”。这些账户将为中低收入工人提供退休储蓄的自动年度缴款。他们还借用了与私人养老金体系相匹配的流行技术,并在其周围建立了一个新的联邦储蓄激励和补贴计划。类似的个人储蓄账户提案——《1999年两党社会保障改革法案》和《21世纪退休法案》——也作为社会保障辩论的一部分提交给了国会。联邦政府目前通过税法向养老金系统提供间接补贴来支持储蓄。这三项建议设想了联邦政府在通过直接、累进的激励和补贴撬动个人储蓄方面的新角色。本文从四个方面对这些建议进行了分析:激励与补贴;易用性;与其他储蓄工具协调;还有管理费用。报告发现,这三项建议都是增加退休储蓄的创新方法。它们也都针对适当的人群,即中低收入工人,这些人实际上可以在退休储蓄方面得到政府的一些帮助。美国账户为收入水平非常低的人提供更慷慨的联邦储蓄,并将大部分资源用于最需要帮助的人。它们与私人养老金体系的合作效果也最好。但这些都是非常复杂的项目,自愿捐款的参与率可能很低。所有建议的实施和管理都将是昂贵的。这篇论文建议,联邦资源最好花在为退休的穷人提供直接补贴上,而不是花在复杂的激励计划上,后者可能只会略微增加储蓄。将储蓄激励措施的目标对准那些有能力储蓄并有动力作出反应的人,可能也会更好。一个可以考虑的替代方案是,对个人退休账户(ira)和其他401(k)类型的计划提供补贴,同时对捐款和福利征税提供非常相似的规则。这将保留这些建议的本质——节约的动机,同时减少其复杂性和成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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