Journal of Accounting Abstracts最新文献_第2页

A Unified Analysis of Executive Pay: The Case of the Financial Sector 高管薪酬的统一分析:以金融业为例

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.215630

E. Talmor, James S. Wallace

{"title":"A Unified Analysis of Executive Pay: The Case of the Financial Sector","authors":"E. Talmor, James S. Wallace","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.215630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.215630","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines executive compensation determinants in the U.S. financial services sector. Multiple theories of executive pay are discussed and tested using a relatively homogenous sample. We perform an in-depth look at the corporate governance and ownership structure of the companies selected. The analysis is conducted for the financial sector as a whole and for each of three sub-groups: commercial banks, brokerage and other non-depository institutions, and insurance companies. Variables that proxy for managerial strategic discretion and task complexity are found to best explain CEO compensation. Corporate governance, including board characteristics and external ownership, is the second leading determinant of pay variation, while firm performance and CEO specific characteristics seem to play the least role. We explore the simultaneous relationship between compensation, firm performance, and board strength and find evidence that the board of directors provides a monitoring function and that a strong board appears to be a substitute with incentive compensation for aligning incentives. These findings, when viewed with subsequent firm performance, support an efficient contracting argument.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124596797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 26

Estimating Expected Cost of Equity Capital: A Theory-Based Approach 权益资本预期成本估算:一种基于理论的方法

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.279309

Christine Botosan, Marlene A. Plumlee

{"title":"Estimating Expected Cost of Equity Capital: A Theory-Based Approach","authors":"Christine Botosan, Marlene A. Plumlee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.279309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.279309","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we estimate the expected cost of equity capital using the unrestricted form of the classic dividend discount formula and examine the extent to which these estimates (rDIV ) reliably proxy for expected cost of equity capital. We find that the rDIV estimates are associated with six risk proxies suggested by theory and prior research in a manner consistent with expectations; the explanatory power of the model is approximately 26%. Based on these results we conclude that the rDIV estimates are a valid proxy for expected cost of equity capital. Estimating rDIV requires a terminal value forecast. Since such forecasts are not always available we also assess the reliability of estimates produced by imposing three alternative terminal value assumptions on the dividend discount model. Specifically, rGORDON (Gordon and Gordon (1997)) imposes a firm-specific assumption; rGLS (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001)) imposes an industry-specific assumption and rOJN (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2000) and Gode and Mohanram (2001)) imposes an economy-wide assumption. We find that the rGORDON estimates have the highest correlation with rDIV and behave in a manner consistent with expectations with respect to their relationships with the risk proxies. We conclude that, when sufficient data to estimate rDIV is unavailable, rGORDON represents a reasonable substitute. Finally, our data indicate that although rDIV and rGORDON reflect the distribution of expected cost of equity capital, neither measure (nor any of the alternatives) should be relied upon to estimate the magnitude of expected cost of equity capital and/or implied risk premiums.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128917907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 38

Why Do New Issues and High-Accrual Firms Underperform: The Role of Analysts' Credulity 为什么新股发行和高收益公司表现不佳:分析师轻信的作用

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.276628

S. Teoh, T. Wong

引用次数: 200

Lemmings to the Sea: The Inappropriate Use of Financial Ratios in Empirical Analysis 海上旅鼠:财务比率在实证分析中的不当使用

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.270342

Susanne Trimbath

引用次数: 6

The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting 默许的看门人:声誉中介、审计师独立性和会计治理

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.270944

J. Coffee

{"title":"The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting","authors":"J. Coffee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.270944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.270944","url":null,"abstract":"The role of \"gatekeepers\" as reputational intermediaries who can be more easily deterred than the principals they serve has been developed in theory, but less often examined in practice. Initially, this article seeks to define the conditions under which gatekeeper liability is likely to work - and, correspondingly, the conditions under which it is more likely to fail. Then, after reviewing the recent empirical literature on earnings management, it concludes that the independent auditor does not today satisfy the conditions under which gatekeeper liability should produce high law compliance. A variety of explanations - poor observability, implicit collusion, and high agency costs within the gatekeeper - provide overlapping explanations for gatekeeper failure. What remedy should work best to minimize such failures? As a more appropriate and supplementary remedy to reliance on class action litigation, this article recommends fundamental reform of the governance of the accounting profession. In particular, it contrasts the structure of self-regulation within the broker-dealer industry with the absence of similar self-discipline in the accounting profession. While such reform may be unlikely, its absence strongly implies that earnings management is likely to remain a pervasive phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129299931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 78

A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion 实证披露文献综述:讨论

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-04-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.258513

J. Core

引用次数: 694

Valuation of Internet Stocks - an IPO Perspective 互联网股票的估值——IPO视角

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.267928

Eli Bartov, Partha Mohanram, Chandra Seethamraju

{"title":"Valuation of Internet Stocks - an IPO Perspective","authors":"Eli Bartov, Partha Mohanram, Chandra Seethamraju","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.267928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267928","url":null,"abstract":"We empirically investigate valuations of Internet firms at various stages of the initial public offering (IPO) from two perspectives. First, we examine the association between the valuation of Internet IPOs and a set of financial and nonfinancial variables, which prior anecdotal or empirical evidence suggests may serve as value drivers. Second, we document differences in IPO valuations between Internet and non-Internet firms as well as across different stages in the IPO process—i.e., initial prospectus price, final offer price, and first trading day price—within each set of firms. Our primary two conclusions are as follows. First, there are noticeable differences between valuations of Internet and non-Internet firms, especially at the prospectus and final IPO stage. Specifically, the valuation of non-Internet firms generally follows the conventional wisdom regarding valuation: positive earnings and cash flows are priced, while negative earnings and negative cash flows are not. The valuation of Internet firms, however, departs from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced, and negative cash flows being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments. This difference between the two classes of firms may be expected, given the age and unique nature of the Internet industry. Second, there are significant differences between the initial valuation of firms at the prospectus and IPO stage and their valuation by the stock market at the end of the first trading day. For non-Internet firms, the difference is largely ascribed to the relative offering size. For Internet firms, however, the differences are with respect to positive cash flows, sales growth, R&D, and high-risk warnings, in addition to the relative offering size.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123252930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 166

Earnings Management: A Perspective 盈余管理:一个视角

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.269625

M. Beneish

引用次数: 474

The Role of Competitive Bidding in the Market for Initial Attest Engagements 竞争性投标在初始证明业务市场中的作用

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.197868

J. Bedard, Michael L. Ettredge, Karla M. Zehms

引用次数: 2

Auditing and Governance in the Forestry Industry: Between Protest and Professionalism 林业行业的审计与治理:在抗议与专业之间

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 2001-02-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.261309

Charles Elad

引用次数: 36