Earnings Management: A Perspective

M. Beneish
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引用次数: 474

Abstract

Compares three definitions of earnings management used by accounting researchers and three methods of estimating it: aggregate accruals, specific accruals and discontinuities in earnings distribution. Discusses evidence relating to the reasons for income‐increasing earnings management, income‐decreasing earnings management and specific contexts, e.g. financial institutions with regulatory constraints. Concludes that, although the evidence is limited, managers are more likely to manipulate income up rather than down; and identifies some opportunities for further research.
盈余管理:一个视角
比较会计研究者使用的盈余管理的三种定义和估计盈余管理的三种方法:累计应计项目、特定应计项目和盈余分配的不连续性。讨论与收益增加盈余管理、收益减少盈余管理的原因相关的证据,以及具体背景,例如有监管约束的金融机构。结论是,尽管证据有限,但管理者更有可能操纵收入上升而不是下降;并指出了一些进一步研究的机会。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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