Journal of Accounting Abstracts最新文献_第9页

Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory 薪酬与激励:实践vs.理论

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 1988-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.94029

G. Baker, M. C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy

引用次数: 1770

Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock? 自愿披露与股票发行:减少信息不对称还是炒作股票?

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.252653

Mark Lang, Russell J. Lundholm

{"title":"Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock?","authors":"Mark Lang, Russell J. Lundholm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.252653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.252653","url":null,"abstract":"We examine corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings and its relation to stock prices. Beginning six months before the offering, our sample issuing firms dramatically increase their disclosure activity, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion. The increase is significant after controlling for the firm's current and future earnings performance and tends to be largest for firms with selling shareholders participating in the offering. However, there is no change in the frequency of forward-looking statements prior to the equity offering, something that is expressly discouraged by the securities law. Firms that maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the offering and only minor price declines at the offering announcement relative to the control firms, suggesting that disclosure may have reduced the information asymmetry inherent in the offering. Firms that substantially increase their disclosure activity in the six months prior to the offering also experience price increases prior to the offering relative to the control firms, but suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity, suggesting that the disclosure increase may have been used to \"hype the stock\" and the market may have partially corrected for the earlier price increase. Firms that maintain a consistent disclosure level have no unusual return behavior relative to the control firms subsequent to the announcement, while the firms that \"hyped\" their stock continue to suffer negative returns, providing further evidence that the increased disclosure activity may have been \"hype,\" and suggesting that the \"hype\" may have been successful in lowering the firms' cost of equity capital.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123450217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Institutional and Structural Constraints to Detecting Earnings Management of Firms Subjected to Price Regulation 价格管制下企业盈余管理的制度和结构约束

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.15063

Stephen Lim

引用次数: 0

Discussion of the Eyeballs Have it: Searching for the Value in Internet Stocks “眼球有它”的讨论:寻找互联网股票的价值

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.248137

E. Keating

引用次数: 9

Small Negative Surprises: Frequency and Consequence 小的负面惊喜:频率和后果

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.281383

L. Brown

引用次数: 25

Managing Earnings Surprises in the U.S. Versus 12 Other Countries 管理美国与其他12个国家的意外收益

Journal of Accounting Abstracts Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.202132

L. Brown, H. N. Higgins

{"title":"Managing Earnings Surprises in the U.S. Versus 12 Other Countries","authors":"L. Brown, H. N. Higgins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.202132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.202132","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether managers in the U.S. manage earnings, profits and losses surprises to a greater extent than do managers in 12 other countries. We expect managers in the U.S. to be more likely to manage earnings, profits and losses surprises than do managers in other countries since U.S. managers have greater incentives to monitor current price performance. These incentives include greater equity ownership by top executives, more monitoring by institutional and large shareholders, a larger number of outside directors on their board of directors, a greater threat of external takeovers, and a more litigious environment. Consistent with our expectations, we find that managers in the U.S. manage earnings surprises relatively more than do managers in 12 other countries. More specifically, U.S. managers are more likely to manage profits surprises than do managers in all 12 other countries examined, and they are more likely to manage losses surprises than do managers in all other countries except Japan, the only country requiring managers to forecast earnings. We also expect U.S. managers to be more likely to manage analysts' estimates, given their extensive public relations departments and their greater incentives to manage earnings surprises. Our evidence bears out our contention.","PeriodicalId":180033,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting Abstracts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129605992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 70