自愿披露与股票发行:减少信息不对称还是炒作股票?

Mark Lang, Russell J. Lundholm
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摘要

我们研究了公司围绕经验丰富的股票发行的披露活动及其与股票价格的关系。从上市前6个月开始,我们的样本发行公司大幅增加了披露活动,特别是在公司拥有最大自由裁量权的披露类别方面。在控制了公司当前和未来的盈利表现后,这一增长是显著的,而且对于那些出售股东参与发行的公司来说,这一增长往往是最大的。然而,在股票发行之前,前瞻性陈述的频率没有变化,这是证券法明确禁止的。保持一致披露水平的公司在发行前经历了价格上涨,而在发行公告时相对于控制公司只有轻微的价格下跌,这表明披露可能减少了发行中固有的信息不对称。在发行前6个月大幅增加信息披露活动的公司,相对于控股公司,也会在发行前经历价格上涨,但在宣布发行股本的意图时,价格下跌幅度要大得多,这表明信息披露的增加可能被用来“炒作股票”,市场可能已经部分纠正了之前的价格上涨。与控制公司相比,保持一致披露水平的公司在公告后没有异常的回报行为,而“炒作”其股票的公司继续遭受负回报,这进一步证明了增加的披露活动可能是“炒作”,并表明“炒作”可能成功地降低了公司的股权资本成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock?
We examine corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings and its relation to stock prices. Beginning six months before the offering, our sample issuing firms dramatically increase their disclosure activity, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion. The increase is significant after controlling for the firm's current and future earnings performance and tends to be largest for firms with selling shareholders participating in the offering. However, there is no change in the frequency of forward-looking statements prior to the equity offering, something that is expressly discouraged by the securities law. Firms that maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the offering and only minor price declines at the offering announcement relative to the control firms, suggesting that disclosure may have reduced the information asymmetry inherent in the offering. Firms that substantially increase their disclosure activity in the six months prior to the offering also experience price increases prior to the offering relative to the control firms, but suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity, suggesting that the disclosure increase may have been used to "hype the stock" and the market may have partially corrected for the earlier price increase. Firms that maintain a consistent disclosure level have no unusual return behavior relative to the control firms subsequent to the announcement, while the firms that "hyped" their stock continue to suffer negative returns, providing further evidence that the increased disclosure activity may have been "hype," and suggesting that the "hype" may have been successful in lowering the firms' cost of equity capital.
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