{"title":"The Welfare Effects of ICC Rate Regulation Revisited","authors":"C. Winston","doi":"10.2307/3003519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003519","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the welfare effects of ICC rate regulation for the U.S. surface freight transportation system. An estimate of the deadweight loss under first-best and Ramsey pricing is provided. Various alternatives to current rate regulation are discussed including partial and complete rate reform. The major conclusion regarding piecemeal approaches is that solely deregulating motor freight will increase the amount of traffic misallocation. In the final analysis, the most desirable alternative appears to be deregulation of motor carrier rates accompanied by regulated rate reform in rail.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114698957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An empirical test of regulatory effects","authors":"H. Petersen","doi":"10.2307/3003217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003217","url":null,"abstract":"Averch and Johnson have provided analytical support for the assertion that rate of return regulation causes insufficient production because of the overuse of capital. Empirical evidence in support or refutation of their thesis is just beginning to appear. This paper provides additional evidence. The regulated firm's objective is stated in terms of cost minimization subject to a regulatory constraint. The effect of changes in the allowed rate of return on capital are evaluated. It is shown that as the allowed return approaches the cost of capital, costs increase and the percentage of total costs paid to capital also increases. These are testable implications of the revised A-J model. Data on costs, input prices, and output are collected for electric power production. Three measures of regulatory policy with regard to the allowed return are formulated. Econometric analysis suggests that lower allowed rates of return are significantly associated with higher costs and larger proportions of cost going to capital. These findings are consistent with the revised A-J model and with those of other recent investigators.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114931954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cost Allocation in Railroad Regulation","authors":"Z. Griliches","doi":"10.2307/3003069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003069","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews a number of cost studies conducted by the Cost Finding Section of the ICC purporting to show that the elasticity of total railroad costs with respect to output (percent variable) is 0.8.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116421368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Price System vs. Rationing: An Extension","authors":"F. Rivera-batiz","doi":"10.2307/3003520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003520","url":null,"abstract":"Elaborating on the analysis of Weitzman, this note examines how the comparative effectiveness of the price system vs. rationing is affected when planners face a cubic loss function. It is shown that the comparative advantage of the price system over rationing will depend on the skewness of income distribution as well as on the aversion of the planners towards underfulfillment of the consumers' allocation plan.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121910607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sequential location among firms with foresight","authors":"E. Prescott, Michael Visscher","doi":"10.2307/3003293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003293","url":null,"abstract":"Existing theory poorly describes the product diversity in a modern market economy largely because such theory is founded on an inadequate concept of equilibrium. Standard analysis regards decision makers as naive in their anticipations of the response of rivals to their decisions and neglects the substantial costs of relocating in the product characteristic space. In this paper, we construct an equilibrium model of firms in which each firm locates in sequence with correct expectations of the way its decisions influence the decisions of firms yet to locate. The nature of the equilibrium is explored in a series of familiar examples taken from the literature.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116811004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Production Theory and the Stock Market","authors":"H. Leland.","doi":"10.2307/3003095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003095","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional economic models separate firms' production decisions from equilibrium in stock markets. In this paper, we develop an integrated model of production in the presence of capital asset market equilibrium. Our theory indicates that, in a stochastic environment, production and financial variables are inextricably interrelated. Following the financial equilibrium models of Sharpe, Lintner, and Mossin, we assume that profits and therefore portfolio returns are random. But stockholders can alter their distributions of returns by altering firms' production decisions as well as by altering their portfolios. The key to the analysis is a \"unanimity theorem,\" which shows that in many environments stockholders will agree on optimal output decisions, despite their different expectations and attitudes towards risk. We develop equilibrium conditions which must be satisfied by production decisions. Profit maximization is indeed optimal for a firm whose profits are riskless. But risky firms' outputs depend on financial as well as cost variables, and the equilibrium conditions lead to a theory of production under uncertainty which replaces the now-vacuous notion of profit maximization. We further show that the output decisions will be Pareto optimal for stockholders, and that these decisions maximize market value only in a \"purely competitive\" world. Our results provide a synthesis of the conflicting conclusions of Diamond, Stiglitz, and Wilson on the optimality of stock markets.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117080740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Losses on Savings Deposits from Interest Rate Regulation","authors":"David H. Pyle.","doi":"10.2307/3003123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003123","url":null,"abstract":"Ceilings on the deposit rates payable by savings institutions under the Interest Rate Adjustment Act of 1966 resulted in interest income losses for savers. A recursive, rate-adjustment model of deposit rate formation is used to predict the deposit rates which would have been paid in the absence of the Act. The resulting estimate of lost interest income during the 1968 through 1970 period is over five billion dollars.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124093965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Choice of Optimal Time Periods for a Surplus-Maximizing Utility Subject to Fluctuating Demand","authors":"J. Craven","doi":"10.2307/3003002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003002","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of this paper is to give a set of necessary conditions for the determination of the optimal switching points between peak and off-peak tariffs. Optimal tariffs are also determined, with some remarks made on the number of different tariff rates and on the best level of capacity to install. The paper concludes with a simple numerical example.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125978474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Price-induced distortions in urban highway investment","authors":"William L. C. Wheaton","doi":"10.2307/3003602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003602","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares \"first-best\" highway investment when congestion pricing is in effect with \"second-best\" investment when such pricing is not used. The paper's main result is that as the pricing of roads falls below social costs, \"second-best\" investment expands to accommodate demand, but not by nearly so much as would be called for under first-best cost-benefit criteria. Under second-best investment, the level of time congestion is allowed to rise to compensate for the absence of monetary congestion pricing. There is some suggestion that overinvestment in American highways could have occurred from following first-best investment criteria when second-best criteria were appropriate.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124651475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The distributional impact of alternative gasoline conservation policies","authors":"Robert B. Archibald, R. Gillingham","doi":"10.2307/3003565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003565","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides a methodology for evaluating the direct distributional impacts of energy conservation plans. Focusing on gasoline conservation, we analyze two different types of plans: excise taxes and white market coupon rationing. Using a sample which focuses on the nonbusiness use of individual households and a gasoline demand function estimated on data from these households, we provide simulated burdens for the different conservation plans. We analyze in detail the distribution of the burden, partitioning the population by income class as well as by several important demographic characteristics.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124691487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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