{"title":"Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship","authors":"S. Shavell","doi":"10.2307/3003319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003319","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies arrangements concerning the payment of a fee by a principal to his agent. For such an arrangement, or fee schedule, to be Pareto optimal, it must implicitly serve to allocate the risk attaching to the outcome of the agent's activity in a satisfactory way and to create appropriate incentives for the agent in his activity. Pareto-optimal fee schedules are described in two cases: when the principal has knowledge only of the outcome of the agent's activity and when he has as well (possibly imperfect) information about the agent's activity. In each case, characteristics of Pareto-optimal fee schedules are related to the attitudes toward risk of the principal and of the agent.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"211 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132618412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Internal Organization of Hospitals: Some Economic Implications","authors":"J. Harris","doi":"10.2307/3003297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003297","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the economic implications of the hospital's internal organizations structure. It concludes: (1) The hospital is actually two separate firms -- a medical staff (or demand division) and an administration (or supply division). Each half of the organization has its own managers, objectives, pricing strategies and constraints. (2) Within this dual organization, the medical staff and administration have devised a complicated system of nonprice allocative rules. (3) This internal allocative scheme is subject to repeated breakdowns, especially when the medical staff's internal demands exceed the short-run capacity supplied by the administration. (4) Our current regulatory policy toward hospitals is almost exclusively directed at the supply side of the organization. Unless we revise our definition of \"hospital\" to include the doctor part of the firm, this policy is doomed to failure. (5) Ultimately, a rational public policy toward hospitals requires a change in the internal organization of the hospital itself.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131141728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Dynamic Programming Model of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve","authors":"T. Teisberg","doi":"10.2307/3003570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003570","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a stochastic dynamic programming model which may be used to obtain optimal acquisition and sale strategies for the U.S. oil reserve. The model incorporates quota or tariff policies which may be used in conjunction with the stockpile policy. Although the main focus is on U.S. stockpile policy, a joint consumer country policy is also considered. The analysis indicates the importance of the degree of oil supply response in determining the effectiveness of a stockpile policy.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130723881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Industrial Electricity Demand and the Hopkinson Rate: An Application of the Extreme Value Distribution","authors":"M. Veall","doi":"10.2307/3003644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003644","url":null,"abstract":"The Hopkinson rate is the most common method of pricing electricity for industrial use. It consists of an \"energy charge\" for total kilowatt hour consumption plus an additional \"demand charge\" based on the maximum usage by the plan during any quarter-hour period during the month. Despite this tariff's apparent drawbacks, it can have useful properties in the pricing of demand variance so that a combination of the Hopkinson rate and time-of-use pricing may be desirable. The extreme value distribution is used to simplify this analysis and also as part of an econometric analysis of the effect of the Hopkinson rate on the peak demands of a sample of eight Ontario pulp and paper mills between 1970 and 1977.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133271959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Hazard in Teams","authors":"Bengt R. Holmstrom","doi":"10.2307/3003457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003457","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. This new role is essential for controlling incentives and suggests that firms in which ownership and labor are partly separated will have an advantage over partnerships in which output is distributed among agents. A new characterization of informative (hence valuable) monitoring is derived and applied to analyze the value of relative performance evaluation. It is shown that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally. Competition per se is worthless. The role of aggregate measures in relative performance evaluation is also explored, and the implications for investment rules are discussed.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"65 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133310153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Analysis of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated Industries","authors":"R. R. Braeutigam","doi":"10.2307/3003407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003407","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the economic consequences of allocating common costs by (1) gross revenues, (2) directly attributable costs, and (3) relative output levels (such as ton-miles) to determine fully distributed cost prices for regulated firms. The analysis characterizes FDC tariffs by examining the nature of the economic inefficiency associated with the rules and explains how opportunities for entry by unregulated firms might change if Ramsey optional pricing was used instead of FDC pricing.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131696577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stopping rules for selling bonds","authors":"W. Boyce","doi":"10.2307/3003021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003021","url":null,"abstract":"We model the problem of selling or issuing bonds so as to maximize the selling price (minimize the interest rate) as an optimal stopping problem for a random process or time series. Available information on, or predictions of, the price at a future time are included as a constraint on the process. Both continuous-time and discrete models are analyzed. For the case in which the predicted future price is normal or Gaussian we obtain good estimates of the optimal stopping strategy and expected gain. A significant conclusion is that the nature of the optimal strategy can be very sensitive to the relative variance of the predicted future price.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124259341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Helium: Investments in the Future","authors":"D. Epple, L. Lave","doi":"10.2307/3003383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003383","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops and implements a method for evaluating an exhaustible resource (helium) whose rate of production is governed by the rate of production of a second exhaustible resource (natural gas). We determine optimum future price and consumption paths, optimal production rates from various sources, and optimal storage policies for a number of scenarios. We conduct a sensitivity analysis to find which of several possible storage policies performs best for a variety of demand growth rates and discount rates.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114480859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cowling's Market Structure and Corporate Behavior","authors":"L. Weiss","doi":"10.2307/3003107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003107","url":null,"abstract":"* This is a collection of seven essays on assorted topics in industrial organization.1 Most are reports on research in process. The theoretical analysis is often impressive. Most of the papers end with empirical studies that are preliminary and, in a number of cases, unconvincing. In the first piece, Hindley reviews the literature on the causes and effects of mergers. He emphasizes the work of Gort and Dennis Mueller and merely bows to traditional notions about mergers for monopoly or economies of scale and ignores short-run speculative motives. He emphasizes mergers to transfer capital or specialized skills or to increase growth or head off takeovers where managements are growth-maximizers. He notes previous evidence that merging firms are less profitable than either their component predecessors or nonmerging firms and finds it unconvincing because merger may be an attempt to remedy an even poorer prospective performance. He cites his own evidence that a large number of poor performance, widely held firms survive in spite of widespread mergers. This, he feels, is conclusive evidence that the threat of takeover is insufficient to make managers into present value maximizers. It is also inconsistent with growth maximization since a growth maximizer would put a higher value on any firm, efficient or not, than capital markets do.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114866900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Economics of Railroading: The Beginning of Cartelization and Regulation","authors":"R. Spann, E. Erickson","doi":"10.2307/3003182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003182","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contains an analysis of the need for and effect of regulation in the railroad industry at the inception of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The authors briefly review and integrate a substantial body of literature that has developed over a period of more than half a century. Next they examine the cost conditions under which railroads operated in the latter part of the 19th century and disentangle the separate effects of technological change and economies of large output. Finally, they estimate approximate elasticities of demand in the long and short-haul markets in the trunkline cartel area. These elasticities are used to calculate the relative magnitudes of the gains and losses resulting from the behavior of the railroads in response to the particular form of rate regulation imposed by the ICC.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115006593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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