Felicitas Hetzelt, M. Radev, Robert Buhren, M. Morbitzer, Jean-Pierre Seifert
{"title":"VIA: Analyzing Device Interfaces of Protected Virtual Machines","authors":"Felicitas Hetzelt, M. Radev, Robert Buhren, M. Morbitzer, Jean-Pierre Seifert","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3488011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3488011","url":null,"abstract":"Both AMD and Intel have presented technologies for confidential computing in cloud environments. The proposed solutions — AMD SEV (-ES, -SNP) and Intel TDX — protect VMs (VMs) against attacks from higher privileged layers through memory encryption and integrity protection. This model of computation draws a new trust boundary between virtual devices and the VM, which in so far lacks thorough examination. In this paper, we therefore present an analysis of the virtual device interface and discuss several attack vectors against a protected VM. Further, we develop and evaluate VIA, an automated analysis tool to detect cases of improper sanitization of input recieved via the virtual device interface. VIA improves upon existing approaches for the automated analysis of device interfaces in the following aspects: (i) support for virtualization relevant buses, (ii) efficient Direct Memory Access (DMA) support and (iii) performance. VIA builds upon the Linux Kernel Library and clang’s libfuzzer to fuzz the communication between the driver and the device via MMIO, PIO, and DMA. An evaluation of VIA shows that it performs 570 executions per second on average and improves performance compared to existing approaches by an average factor of 2706. Using VIA, we analyzed 22 drivers in Linux 5.10.0-rc6, thereby uncovering 50 bugs and initiating multiple patches to the virtual device driver interface of Linux. To prove our findings’ criticality under the threat model of AMD SEV and Intel TDX, we showcase three exemplary attacks based on the bugs found. The attacks enable a malicious hypervisor to corrupt the memory and gain code execution in protected VMs with SEV-ES and are theoretically applicable to SEV-SNP and TDX.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"253 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122072121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G. Marson, Sébastien Andreina, Lorenzo Alluminio, Konstantin Munichev, Ghassan O. Karame
{"title":"Mitosis: Practically Scaling Permissioned Blockchains","authors":"G. Marson, Sébastien Andreina, Lorenzo Alluminio, Konstantin Munichev, Ghassan O. Karame","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485915","url":null,"abstract":"Scalability remains one of the biggest challenges to the adoption of permissioned blockchain technologies for large-scale deployments. Namely, permissioned blockchains typically exhibit low latencies, compared to permissionless deployments—however at the cost of poor scalability. As a remedy, various solutions were proposed to capture “the best of both worlds”, targeting low latency and high scalability simultaneously. Among these, blockchain sharding emerges as the most prominent technique. Most existing sharding proposals exploit features of the permissionless model and are therefore restricted to cryptocurrency applications. A few permissioned sharding proposals exist, however, they either make strong trust assumptions on the number of faulty nodes or rely on trusted hardware or assume a static participation model where all nodes are expected to be available all the time. In practice, nodes may join and leave the system dynamically, which makes it challenging to establish how to shard and when. In this work, we address this problem and present Mitosis, a novel approach to practically improve scalability of permissioned blockchains. Our system allows the dynamic creation of blockchains, as more participants join the system, to meet practical scalability requirements. Crucially, it enables the division of an existing blockchain (and its participants) into two—reminiscent of mitosis, the biological process of cell division. Mitosis inherits the low latency of permissioned blockchains while preserving high throughput via parallel processing. Newly created chains in our system are fully autonomous, can choose their own consensus protocol, and yet they can interact with each other to share information and assets—meeting high levels of interoperability. We analyse the security of Mitosis and evaluate experimentally the performance of our solution when instantiated over Hyperledger Fabric. Our results show that Mitosis can be ported with little modifications and manageable overhead to existing permissioned blockchains, such as Hyperledger Fabric. As far as we are aware, Mitosis emerges as the first workable and practical solution to scale existing permissioned blockchains.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127608390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can We Leverage Predictive Uncertainty to Detect Dataset Shift and Adversarial Examples in Android Malware Detection?","authors":"Deqiang Li, Tian Qiu, Shuo Chen, Qianmu Li, Shouhuai Xu","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485916","url":null,"abstract":"The deep learning approach to detecting malicious software (malware) is promising but has yet to tackle the problem of dataset shift, namely that the joint distribution of examples and their labels associated with the test set is different from that of the training set. This problem causes the degradation of deep learning models without users’ notice. In order to alleviate the problem, one approach is to let a classifier not only predict the label on a given example but also present its uncertainty (or confidence) on the predicted label, whereby a defender can decide whether to use the predicted label or not. While intuitive and clearly important, the capabilities and limitations of this approach have not been well understood. In this paper, we conduct an empirical study to evaluate the quality of predictive uncertainties of malware detectors. Specifically, we re-design and build 24 Android malware detectors (by transforming four off-the-shelf detectors with six calibration methods) and quantify their uncertainties with nine metrics, including three metrics dealing with data imbalance. Our main findings are: (i) predictive uncertainty indeed helps achieve reliable malware detection in the presence of dataset shift, but cannot cope with adversarial evasion attacks; (ii) approximate Bayesian methods are promising to calibrate and generalize malware detectors to deal with dataset shift, but cannot cope with adversarial evasion attacks; (iii) adversarial evasion attacks can render calibration methods useless, and it is an open problem to quantify the uncertainty associated with the predicted labels of adversarial examples (i.e., it is not effective to use predictive uncertainty to detect adversarial examples).","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"22 6S 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115944612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Morphence: Moving Target Defense Against Adversarial Examples","authors":"Abderrahmen Amich, Birhanu Eshete","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485899","url":null,"abstract":"Robustness to adversarial examples of machine learning models remains an open topic of research. Attacks often succeed by repeatedly probing a fixed target model with adversarial examples purposely crafted to fool it. In this paper, we introduce Morphence, an approach that shifts the defense landscape by making a model a moving target against adversarial examples. By regularly moving the decision function of a model, Morphence makes it significantly challenging for repeated or correlated attacks to succeed. Morphence deploys a pool of models generated from a base model in a manner that introduces sufficient randomness when it responds to prediction queries. To ensure repeated or correlated attacks fail, the deployed pool of models automatically expires after a query budget is reached and the model pool is seamlessly replaced by a new model pool generated in advance. We evaluate Morphence on two benchmark image classification datasets (MNIST and CIFAR10) against five reference attacks (2 white-box and 3 black-box). In all cases, Morphence consistently outperforms the thus-far effective defense, adversarial training, even in the face of strong white-box attacks, while preserving accuracy on clean data and reducing attack transferability.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132111862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Niclas Kühnapfel, S. Preussler, Maximilian Noppel, T. Schneider, Konrad Rieck, Christian Wressnegger
{"title":"LaserShark: Establishing Fast, Bidirectional Communication into Air-Gapped Systems","authors":"Niclas Kühnapfel, S. Preussler, Maximilian Noppel, T. Schneider, Konrad Rieck, Christian Wressnegger","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485911","url":null,"abstract":"Physical isolation, so called air-gapping, is an effective method for protecting security-critical computers and networks. While it might be possible to introduce malicious code through the supply chain, insider attacks, or social engineering, communicating with the outside world is prevented. Different approaches to breach this essential line of defense have been developed based on electromagnetic, acoustic, and optical communication channels. However, all of these approaches are limited in either data rate or distance, and frequently offer only exfiltration of data. We present a novel approach to infiltrate data to air-gapped systems without any additional hardware on-site. By aiming lasers at already built-in LEDs and recording their response, we are the first to enable a long-distance (25 m), bidirectional, and fast (18.2 kbps in & 100 kbps out) covert communication channel. The approach can be used against any office device that operates LEDs at the CPU’s GPIO interface.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"177 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114854271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Emperor’s New Autofill Framework:A Security Analysis of Autofill on iOS and Android","authors":"Sean Oesch, Anuj Gautam, Scott Ruoti","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485884","url":null,"abstract":"Password managers help users more effectively manage their passwords, encouraging them to adopt stronger passwords across their many accounts. In contrast to desktop systems where password managers receive no system-level support, mobile operating systems provide autofill frameworks designed to integrate with password managers to provide secure and usable autofill for browsers and other apps installed on mobile devices. In this paper, we evaluate mobile autofill frameworks on iOS and Android, examining whether they achieve substantive benefits over the ad-hoc desktop environment or become a problematic single point of failure. Our results find that while the frameworks address several common issues, they also enforce insecure behavior and fail to provide password managers sufficient information to override the frameworks’ insecure behavior, resulting in mobile managers being less secure than their desktop counterparts overall. We also demonstrate how these frameworks act as a confused deputy in manager-assisted credential phishing attacks. Our results demonstrate the need for significant improvements to mobile autofill frameworks. We conclude the paper with recommendations for the design and implementation of secure autofill frameworks.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"15 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127649839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"MISA: Online Defense of Trojaned Models using Misattributions","authors":"Panagiota Kiourti, Wenchao Li, Anirban Roy, Karan Sikka, Susmit Jha","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485908","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485908","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies have shown that neural networks are vulnerable to Trojan attacks, where a network is trained to respond to specially crafted trigger patterns in the inputs in specific and potentially malicious ways. This paper proposes MISA, a new online approach to detect Trojan triggers for neural networks at inference time. Our approach is based on a novel notion called misattributions, which captures the anomalous manifestation of a Trojan activation in the feature space. Given an input image and the corresponding output prediction, our algorithm first computes the model’s attribution on different features. It then statistically analyzes these attributions to ascertain the presence of a Trojan trigger. Across a set of benchmarks, we show that our method can effectively detect Trojan triggers for a wide variety of trigger patterns, including several recent ones for which there are no known defenses. Our method achieves 96% AUC for detecting images that include a Trojan trigger without any assumptions on the trigger pattern.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115518745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Köhler, Giulio Lovisotto, S. Birnbach, Richard Baker, I. Martinovic
{"title":"They See Me Rollin’: Inherent Vulnerability of the Rolling Shutter in CMOS Image Sensors","authors":"S. Köhler, Giulio Lovisotto, S. Birnbach, Richard Baker, I. Martinovic","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3488016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3488016","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we describe how the electronic rolling shutter in CMOS image sensors can be exploited using a bright, modulated light source (e.g., an inexpensive, off-the-shelf laser), to inject fine-grained image disruptions. We demonstrate the attack on seven different CMOS cameras, ranging from cheap IoT to semi-professional surveillance cameras, to highlight the wide applicability of the rolling shutter attack. We model the fundamental factors affecting a rolling shutter attack in an uncontrolled setting. We then perform an exhaustive evaluation of the attack’s effect on the task of object detection, investigating the effect of attack parameters. We validate our model against empirical data collected on two separate cameras, showing that by simply using information from the camera’s datasheet the adversary can accurately predict the injected distortion size and optimize their attack accordingly. We find that an adversary can hide up to 75% of objects perceived by state-of-the-art detectors by selecting appropriate attack parameters. We also investigate the stealthiness of the attack in comparison to a naïve camera blinding attack, showing that common image distortion metrics can not detect the attack presence. Therefore, we present a new, accurate and lightweight enhancement to the backbone network of an object detector to recognize rolling shutter attacks. Overall, our results indicate that rolling shutter attacks can substantially reduce the performance and reliability of vision-based intelligent systems.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114481182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yiming Zhang, Y. Qian, Yujie Fan, Yanfang Ye, Xin Li, Qi Xiong, Fudong Shao
{"title":"dStyle-GAN: Generative Adversarial Network based on Writing and Photography Styles for Drug Identification in Darknet Markets","authors":"Yiming Zhang, Y. Qian, Yujie Fan, Yanfang Ye, Xin Li, Qi Xiong, Fudong Shao","doi":"10.1145/3427228.3427603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3427228.3427603","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the persistent effort by law enforcement, illicit drug trafficking in darknet markets has shown great resilience with new markets rapidly appearing after old ones being shut down. In order to more effectively detect, disrupt and dismantle illicit drug trades, there’s an imminent need to gain a deeper understanding toward the operations and dynamics of illicit drug trading activities. To address this challenge, in this paper, we design and develop an intelligent system (named dSytle-GAN) to automate the analysis for drug identification in darknet markets, by considering both content-based and style-aware information. To determine whether a given pair of posted drugs are the same or not, in dStyle-GAN, based on the large-scale data collected from darknet markets, we first present an attributed heterogeneous information network (AHIN) to depict drugs, vendors, texts and writing styles, photos and photography styles, and the rich relations among them; and then we propose a novel generative adversarial network (GAN) based model over AHIN to capture the underlying distribution of posted drugs’ writing and photography styles to learn robust representations of drugs for their identifications. Unlike existing approaches, our proposed GAN-based model jointly considers the heterogeneity of network and relatedness over drugs formulated by domain-specific meta-paths for robust node (i.e., drug) representation learning. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed dStyle-GAN represents the first principled GAN-based solution over graphs to simultaneously consider writing and photography styles as well as their latent distributions for node representation learning. Extensive experimental results based on large-scale datasets collected from six darknet markets and the obtained ground-truth demonstrate that dStyle-GAN outperforms the state-of-the-art methods. Based on the identified drug pairs in the wild by dStyle-GAN, we perform further analysis to gain deeper insights into the dynamics and evolution of illicit drug trading activities in darknet markets, whose findings may facilitate law enforcement for proactive interventions.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121061591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dario Ferrari, Michele Carminati, Mario Polino, S. Zanero
{"title":"NoSQL Breakdown: A Large-scale Analysis of Misconfigured NoSQL Services","authors":"Dario Ferrari, Michele Carminati, Mario Polino, S. Zanero","doi":"10.1145/3427228.3427260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3427228.3427260","url":null,"abstract":"In the last years, NoSQL databases have grown in popularity due to their easy-to-deploy, reliable, and scalable storage mechanism. While most NoSQL services offer access control mechanisms, their default configurations grant access without any form of authentication, resulting in misconfigurations that may expose data to the Internet, as demonstrated by the recent high-profile data leaks. In this paper, we investigate the usage of the most popular NoSQL databases, focusing on automatically analyzing and discovering misconfigurations that may lead to security and privacy issues. We developed a tool that automatically scans large IP subnets to detect the exposed services and performs security analyses without storing nor exposing sensitive data. We analyzed 67,725,641 IP addresses between October 2019 and March 2020, spread across several Cloud Service Providers (CSPs), and found 12,276 misconfigured databases. The risks associated with exposed services range from data leaking, which may pose a significant menace to users’ privacy, to data tampering of resources stored in the vulnerable databases, which may pose a relevant threat to a web service reputation. Regarding the last point, we found 742 potentially vulnerable websites linked to misconfigured instances with the write permission enabled to anonymous users.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122475405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}