Shitong Zhu, Zhongjie Wang, Xun Chen, Shasha Li, Keyu Man, Umar Iqbal, Zhiyun Qian, Kevin S. Chan, S. Krishnamurthy, Zubair Shafiq, Yu Hao, Guoren Li, Zheng Zhang, Xiaochen Zou
{"title":"Eluding ML-based Adblockers With Actionable Adversarial Examples","authors":"Shitong Zhu, Zhongjie Wang, Xun Chen, Shasha Li, Keyu Man, Umar Iqbal, Zhiyun Qian, Kevin S. Chan, S. Krishnamurthy, Zubair Shafiq, Yu Hao, Guoren Li, Zheng Zhang, Xiaochen Zou","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3488008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3488008","url":null,"abstract":"Online advertisers have been quite successful in circumventing traditional adblockers that rely on manually curated rules to detect ads. As a result, adblockers have started to use machine learning (ML) classifiers for more robust detection and blocking of ads. Among these, AdGraph which leverages rich contextual information to classify ads, is arguably, the state of the art ML-based adblocker. In this paper, we present a4, a tool that intelligently crafts adversarial ads to evade AdGraph. Unlike traditional adversarial examples in the computer vision domain that can perturb any pixels (i.e., unconstrained), adversarial ads generated by a4 are actionable in the sense that they preserve the application semantics of the web page. Through a series of experiments we show that a4 can bypass AdGraph about 81% of the time, which surpasses the state-of-the-art attack by a significant margin of 145.5%, with an overhead of <20% and perturbations that are visually imperceptible in the rendered webpage. We envision that a4’s framework can be used to potentially launch adversarial attacks against other ML-based web applications.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128282761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"FINN: Fingerprinting Network Flows using Neural Networks","authors":"F. Rezaei, A. Houmansadr","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3488010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3488010","url":null,"abstract":"Traffic analysis is essential to network security by enabling the correlation of encrypted network flows; in particular, traffic analysis has been used to detect stepping stone attackers and de-anonymize anonymous connections. A modern type of traffic analysis is flow fingerprinting, which works by slightly perturbing network flows to embed secret information into the flows that later can be used for traffic analysis. It is shown that flow fingerprinting enables the use of traffic analysis in a wide range of applications. In this paper, we introduce an effective flow fingerprinting technique by leveraging neural networks. Specifically, our system uses a fully connected network to generate slight perturbations that are then added to the live flows to fingerprint them. We show that our fingerprinting system offers reliable performance in the different network settings, outperforming the state-of-the-art. We also enforce an invisibility constraint in generating our flow fingerprints and use GAN to generate fingerprinting delays with Laplacian distribution to make it similar to natural network jitter. Therefore, we show that our fingerprinted flows are highly indistinguishable from benign network flows.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130558742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rocky: Replicating Block Devices for Tamper and Failure Resistant Edge-based Virtualized Desktop Infrastructure","authors":"Beom Heyn Kim, Hyoungshick Kim","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485886","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, edge-based virtual desktop infrastructure (EdgeVDI), which brings the power of virtualized desktop infrastructure to cloudlets closer to users, has been considered as an attractive solution for WAN mobility. However, ransomware and wiper malware are becoming more and more prevalent, which can impose serious cybersecurity threats to EdgeVDI users. Existing tamper-resistant solutions cannot deal with cloudlet failures. In this paper, we propose Rocky, the first distributed replicated block device for EdgeVDI that can recover from tampering attacks and failures. The key enabler is replicating to store a consistent write sequence across cloudlets as an append-only immutable mutation history. In addition, Rocky uses a replication broker to allow heterogenous cloudlets to control replication rates at their pace and reduces both disk space and network bandwidth consumption by coalescing writes for both uplink and downlink. To show the feasibility of Rocky, we implemented Rocky in Java. The experimental results show that Rocky’s write and read throughputs are similar to those of a baseline device with 8.4% and 11.9% additional overheads, respectively. In addition, we could reduce repeated writes by 88.5% and 100% for editing presentation slides and a photo, respectively.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129739186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Elijah Rivera, Samuel Mergendahl, Howie Shrobe, Hamed Okhravi, N. Burow
{"title":"Keeping Safe Rust Safe with Galeed","authors":"Elijah Rivera, Samuel Mergendahl, Howie Shrobe, Hamed Okhravi, N. Burow","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485903","url":null,"abstract":"Rust is a programming language that simultaneously offers high performance and strong security guarantees. Safe Rust (i.e., Rust code that does not use the unsafe keyword) is memory and type safe. However, these guarantees are violated when safe Rust interacts with unsafe code, most notably code written in other programming languages, including in legacy C/C++ applications that are incrementally deploying Rust. This is a significant problem as major applications such as Firefox, Chrome, AWS, Windows, and Linux have either deployed Rust or are exploring doing so. It is important to emphasize that unsafe code is not only unsafe itself, but also it breaks the safety guarantees of ‘safe’ Rust; e.g., a dangling pointer in a linked C/C++ library can access and overwrite memory allocated to Rust even when the Rust code is fully safe. This paper presents Galeed, a technique to keep safe Rust safe from interference from unsafe code. Galeed has two components: a runtime defense to prevent unintended interactions between safe Rust and unsafe code and a sanitizer to secure intended interactions. The runtime component works by isolating Rust’s heap from any external access and is enforced using Intel Memory Protection Key (MPK) technology. The sanitizer uses a smart data structure that we call pseudo-pointer along with automated code transformation to avoid passing raw pointers across safe/unsafe boundaries during intended interactions (e.g., when Rust and C++ code exchange data). We implement and evaluate the effectiveness and performance of Galeed via micro- and macro-benchmarking, and use it to secure a widely used component of Firefox.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127000607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"MineHunter: A Practical Cryptomining Traffic Detection Algorithm Based on Time Series Tracking","authors":"Shize Zhang, Zhiliang Wang, Jiahai Yang, Xin Cheng, Xiaoqian Ma, Hui Zhang, Bo Wang, Zimu Li, Jianping Wu","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485835","url":null,"abstract":"With the development of cryptocurrencies’ market, the problem of cryptojacking, which is an unauthorized control of someone else’s computer to mine cryptocurrency, has been more and more serious. Existing cryptojacking detection methods require to install anti-virus software on the host or load plug-in in the browser, which are difficult to deploy on enterprise or campus networks with a large number of hosts and servers. To bridge the gap, we propose MineHunter, a practical cryptomining traffic detection algorithm based on time series tracking. Instead of being deployed at the hosts, MineHunter detects the cryptomining traffic at the entrance of enterprise or campus networks. Minehunter has taken into account the challenges faced by the actual deployment environment, including extremely unbalanced datasets, controllable alarms, traffic confusion, and efficiency. The accurate network-level detection is achieved by analyzing the network traffic characteristics of cryptomining and investigating the association between the network flow sequence of cryptomining and the block creation sequence of cryptocurrency. We evaluate our algorithm at the entrance of a large office building in a campus network for a month. The total volumes exceed 28 TeraBytes. Our experimental results show that MineHunter can achieve precision of 97.0% and recall of 99.7%.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121890855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rafael Uetz, Christian Hemminghaus, Louis Hackländer, Philipp Schlipper, Martin Henze
{"title":"Reproducible and Adaptable Log Data Generation for Sound Cybersecurity Experiments","authors":"Rafael Uetz, Christian Hemminghaus, Louis Hackländer, Philipp Schlipper, Martin Henze","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3488020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3488020","url":null,"abstract":"Artifacts such as log data and network traffic are fundamental for cybersecurity research, e.g., in the area of intrusion detection. Yet, most research is based on artifacts that are not available to others or cannot be adapted to own purposes, thus making it difficult to reproduce and build on existing work. In this paper, we identify the challenges of artifact generation with the goal of conducting sound experiments that are valid, controlled, and reproducible. We argue that testbeds for artifact generation have to be designed specifically with reproducibility and adaptability in mind. To achieve this goal, we present SOCBED, our proof-of-concept implementation and the first testbed with a focus on generating realistic log data for cybersecurity experiments in a reproducible and adaptable manner. SOCBED enables researchers to reproduce testbed instances on commodity computers, adapt them according to own requirements, and verify their correct functionality. We evaluate SOCBED with an exemplary, practical experiment on detecting a multi-step intrusion of an enterprise network and show that the resulting experiment is indeed valid, controlled, and reproducible. Both SOCBED and the log dataset underlying our evaluation are freely available.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"137 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131558169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"2D-2FA: A New Dimension in Two-Factor Authentication","authors":"Maliheh Shirvanian, Shashank Agrawal","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485910","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a two-factor authentication (2FA) mechanism called 2D-2FA to address security and usability issues in existing methods. 2D-2FA has three distinguishing features: First, after a user enters a username and password on a login terminal, a unique identifier is displayed to her. She inputs the same identifier on her registered 2FA device, which ensures appropriate engagement in the authentication process. Second, a one-time PIN is computed on the device and automatically transferred to the server. Thus, the PIN can have very high entropy, making guessing attacks infeasible. Third, the identifier is also incorporated into the PIN computation, which renders concurrent attacks ineffective. Third-party services such as push-notification providers and 2FA service providers, do not need to be trusted for the security of the system. The choice of identifiers depends on the device form factor and the context. Users could choose to draw patterns, capture QR codes, etc. We provide a proof of concept implementation, and evaluate performance, accuracy, and usability of the system. We show that the system offers a lower error rate (about half) and better efficiency (2-3 times faster) compared to the commonly used PIN-2FA. Our study indicates a high level of usability with a SUS of 75, and a high perception of efficiency, security, accuracy, and adoptability.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131159384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yumei Zhang, Xinzhi Liu, Cong Sun, Dongrui Zeng, Gang Tan, Xiao Kan, Siqi Ma
{"title":"ReCFA: Resilient Control-Flow Attestation","authors":"Yumei Zhang, Xinzhi Liu, Cong Sun, Dongrui Zeng, Gang Tan, Xiao Kan, Siqi Ma","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485900","url":null,"abstract":"Recent IoT applications gradually adapt more complicated end systems with commodity software. Ensuring the runtime integrity of these software is a challenging task for the remote controller or cloud services. Popular enforcement is the runtime remote attestation which requires the end system (prover) to generate evidence for its runtime behavior and a remote trusted verifier to attest the evidence. Control-flow attestation is a kind of runtime attestation that provides diagnoses towards the remote control-flow hijacking at the prover. Most of these attestation approaches focus on small or embedded software. The recent advance to attesting complicated software depends on the source code and CFG traversing to measure the checkpoint-separated subpaths, which may be unavailable for commodity software and cause possible context missing between consecutive subpaths in the measurements. In this work, we propose a resilient control-flow attestation (ReCFA), which does not need the offline measurement of all legitimate control-flow paths, thus scalable to be used on complicated commodity software. Our main contribution is a multi-phase approach to condensing the runtime control-flow events; as a result, the vast amount of control-flow events are abstracted into a deliverable size. The condensing approach consists of filtering skippable call sites, folding program-structure related control-flow events, and a greedy compression. Our approach is implemented with binary-level static analysis and instrumentation. We employ a shadow stack mechanism at the verifier to enforce context-sensitive control-flow integrity and diagnose the compromised control-flow events violating the security policy. The experimental results on real-world benchmarks show both the efficiency of the control-flow condensing and the effectiveness of security enforcement.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114026406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sojhal Ismail Khan, Dominika Woszczyk, Chengzeng You, Soteris Demetriou, Muhammad Naveed
{"title":"Characterizing Improper Input Validation Vulnerabilities of Mobile Crowdsourcing Services","authors":"Sojhal Ismail Khan, Dominika Woszczyk, Chengzeng You, Soteris Demetriou, Muhammad Naveed","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485888","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile crowdsourcing services (MCS), enable fast and economical data acquisition at scale and find applications in a variety of domains. Prior work has shown that Foursquare and Waze (a location-based and a navigation MCS) are vulnerable to different kinds of data poisoning attacks. Such attacks can be upsetting and even dangerous especially when they are used to inject improper inputs to mislead users. However, to date, there is no comprehensive study on the extent of improper input validation (IIV) vulnerabilities and the feasibility of their exploits in MCSs across domains. In this work, we leverage the fact that MCS interface with their participants through mobile apps to design tools and new methodologies embodied in an end-to-end feedback-driven analysis framework which we use to study 10 popular and previously unexplored services in five different domains. Using our framework we send tens of thousands of API requests with automatically generated input values to characterize their IIV attack surface. Alarmingly, we found that most of them (8/10) suffer from grave IIV vulnerabilities which allow an adversary to launch data poisoning attacks at scale: 7400 spoofed API requests were successful in faking online posts for robberies, gunshots, and other dangerous incidents, faking fitness activities with supernatural speeds and distances among many others. Lastly, we discuss easy to implement and deploy mitigation strategies which can greatly reduce the IIV attack surface and argue for their use as a necessary complementary measure working toward trustworthy mobile crowdsourcing services.","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128710442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sohaib Kiani, S. Awan, Chao Lan, Fengjun Li, Bo Luo
{"title":"Two Souls in an Adversarial Image: Towards Universal Adversarial Example Detection using Multi-view Inconsistency","authors":"Sohaib Kiani, S. Awan, Chao Lan, Fengjun Li, Bo Luo","doi":"10.1145/3485832.3485904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485832.3485904","url":null,"abstract":"In the evasion attacks against deep neural networks (DNN), the attacker generates adversarial instances that are visually indistinguishable from benign samples and sends them to the target DNN to trigger misclassifications. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-view adversarial image detector, namely Argos, based on a novel observation. That is, there exist two “souls” in an adversarial instance, i.e., the visually unchanged content, which corresponds to the true label, and the added invisible perturbation, which corresponds to the misclassified label. Such inconsistencies could be further amplified through an autoregressive generative approach that generates images with seed pixels selected from the original image, a selected label, and pixel distributions learned from the training data. The generated images (i.e., the “views”) will deviate significantly from the original one if the label is adversarial, demonstrating inconsistencies that Argos expects to detect. To this end, Argos first amplifies the discrepancies between the visual content of an image and its misclassified label induced by the attack using a set of regeneration mechanisms and then identifies an image as adversarial if the reproduced views deviate to a preset degree. Our experimental results show that Argos significantly outperforms two representative adversarial detectors in both detection accuracy and robustness against six well-known adversarial attacks. Code is available at: https://github.com/sohaib730/Argos-Adversarial_Detection","PeriodicalId":175869,"journal":{"name":"Annual Computer Security Applications Conference","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122446151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}