LaserShark:在气隙系统中建立快速、双向通信

Niclas Kühnapfel, S. Preussler, Maximilian Noppel, T. Schneider, Konrad Rieck, Christian Wressnegger
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引用次数: 0

摘要

物理隔离,即所谓的气隙,是保护安全关键型计算机和网络的有效方法。虽然有可能通过供应链、内部攻击或社会工程引入恶意代码,但可以防止与外部世界进行通信。基于电磁、声学和光通信信道,已经开发出了突破这条重要防线的不同方法。然而,所有这些方法在数据速率或距离上都是有限的,并且经常只提供数据泄漏。我们提出了一种新的方法来渗透数据到气隙系统无需任何额外的硬件现场。通过将激光瞄准已经内置的led并记录它们的响应,我们是第一个实现长距离(25米),双向和快速(18.2 kbps输入和100 kbps输出)隐蔽通信通道的人。该方法可用于任何在CPU的GPIO接口上操作led的办公设备。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
LaserShark: Establishing Fast, Bidirectional Communication into Air-Gapped Systems
Physical isolation, so called air-gapping, is an effective method for protecting security-critical computers and networks. While it might be possible to introduce malicious code through the supply chain, insider attacks, or social engineering, communicating with the outside world is prevented. Different approaches to breach this essential line of defense have been developed based on electromagnetic, acoustic, and optical communication channels. However, all of these approaches are limited in either data rate or distance, and frequently offer only exfiltration of data. We present a novel approach to infiltrate data to air-gapped systems without any additional hardware on-site. By aiming lasers at already built-in LEDs and recording their response, we are the first to enable a long-distance (25 m), bidirectional, and fast (18.2 kbps in & 100 kbps out) covert communication channel. The approach can be used against any office device that operates LEDs at the CPU’s GPIO interface.
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