{"title":"Sectoral Interlinkages in Lobal Value Chains: Spillovers and Network Effects","authors":"Erik Frohm, Vanessa Gunnella","doi":"10.2866/489819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2866/489819","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the role of global input-output linkages in transmitting economic disturbances in the international economy. Our empirical results suggest that these sectoral spillovers are both statistically significant and of economic importance. We also provide evidence that it is not the interlinkages per se that matter for the international transmission but rather the presence of global hub sectors that are either large suppliers or purchasers of other sectors' inputs. When the links between these sectors and the rest of the global value chain are severed, the spillovers diminish strongly and eventually become statistically insignificant. This highlights the importance of the structure of the network for enabling spillovers and the prominent role played by hub sectors in the global economy. JEL Classification: E30, E32, F44, F62","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122755952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exchange Status, Ability Status, and Reputation within Venture Capital Markets","authors":"Oghenovo A. Obrimah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2891608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2891608","url":null,"abstract":"This study finds status that derives from new entrant venture capitalists' (VCs') information reach and frequency of repeated partnerships (exchange status) - the status construct generated by conventional implementations of the Bonacich (1987) construct - does not have any forecast power for future realizations of market reputations or future realizations of its own construct within venture capital markets. In empirical tests that substitute estimates of intrinsic ability for 'frequency of repeated partnerships' in implementation of the Bonacich (1987) construct, the resulting hybrid variable, ability status is shown to have forecast power for future realizations of market reputations and future realizations of exchange status. Forecast outcomes of ability status reveal strategies that enhance future realizations of market reputations do not simultaneously enhance future realizations of exchange status, and vice versa. A formal theoretical model demonstrates exchange status fails to have forecast power for future outcomes because the value of syndication is conditional on estimates of VCs' ability at timing of syndication activity. The formal model predicts, and empirical results show separating price equilibriums within venture capital markets can be characterized as arising out of a market structure within which strata of ability coexist with strata of project innovativeness, with higher ability VCs more likely to invest in, and more likely to syndicate investments in more innovative projects.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126336784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To What Extent Does Wonton (Dumpling Soup) Market in Binhu District, Wuxi Fulfill the Characteristics of Monopolistic Competition?","authors":"Xinye Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3562760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3562760","url":null,"abstract":"“Wonton” is one of the traditional Chinese food, especially popular in the south-east region such as the city Wuxi. There are numerous Wonton retailers around Wuxi, making it hard to analyze such abundant retailers. Consequently, I decide to highlight a specific area in Wuxi city, Binhu District, one of Wuxi’s biggest districts and then initiate research and paper.<br><br>The purpose of this research is to investigate the extent to which the Wonton (dumpling soup) in Wuxi fulfills the characteristics of monopolistic competition.<br><br>Individual retailers do not have significant market power, having a slight ability to fluctuating prices. The price is particularly of great significance in the Wonton market. Since there are no large-sized firms dominating the market, ample small retailers compete with each other. While some characteristics of monopolistic competition are present—different types of shops with various prices such as chain retailers and individual retailers—most of Wonton retailers in Binhu District have very similar prices.<br><br>Secondary data have been polled through the internet, mostly from the official website for the local shop information section. To make sure the availability and accuracy of data, I went to each random-selected Wonton retailers’ stores and interviewed two owners and some consumers in the shops. To achieve a further understanding of consumers’ behaviors, 75 people were asked to complete two questionnaires (APPENDIX I II). After analyzing the information from the sample surveys, it provided me with insights into how consumer decisions influence the market.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116527996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990-1999","authors":"Mitsuru Igami, Takuo Sugaya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2889837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2889837","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some cartels survive for a decade but others collapse within a few years? We study one of the most prominent cases in recent history, the vitamin cartels, to quantify the member firms' incentives to collude. American court documents and European criminal investigation provide direct evidence on the cartels' organization as well as the leading firms' internal cost data, which we analyze within a standard repeated game framework. Preliminary results suggest the cartel leader's incentive diminished significantly at the time of the Vitamin C cartel's actual collapse in 1995, mainly because of growing supply from fringe competitors in China, whereas the markets for Beta Carotene, Vitamin A, and Vitamin E remained stable. We also find that the BASF-Takeda merger in 2001, if consummated a decade earlier, would have prolonged the Vitamin C cartel.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125643054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank Regulation and Market Structure","authors":"C. Nielsen, G. Weinrich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2739777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2739777","url":null,"abstract":"Following the recent and on-going tightenings of capital requirements in response to the financial crisis many experts have predicted a decline in the importance of the banking sector as banks struggle to compete with other providers of financial intermediation. The purpose of our research is to investigate this hypothesis in a model where the need for bank regulation is explained from first principles.Our analysis suggests that, in a monopolistic competition setting, with higher capital requirements the bank sector may see bank competition reduced as the sector becomes dominated by fewer banks. Parallel with this development depositors may stop using banks in favor of an outside option that can be interpreted as banks which are either unregulated or subject to other, possibly less stringent, types of regulation. It is noteworthy that the first effect goes against an objective often stated by regulators, namely to reduce the number of large banks in the market, banks which may be \"too big to fail\".We explain tightened capital requirements as the regulator's response to financial innovation. In our model such innovation increases the riskiness of certain asset classes without improving on their expected return. The only way to prevent banks from using these new assets is by increasing the capital requirements for all asset classes. The costs of these requirements are ultimately born by depositors and may lead them to look for better returns elsewhere.Our model builds on the Salop (1979) model and in doing so also sheds some light on its properties. In particular we show that so-called monopoly equilibria only exist when the number of banks is constrained to be an integer.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134108527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Grouping and Search for Quality Journalism, Online versus Offline","authors":"M. Ellman, Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2853072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2853072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how supply-side factors influence the search for quality content in online and offline environments. We show that lower fixed costs of online publishing reduce the incentives to bundle content, as compared to offline journalism. In the presence of asymmetric information over journalistic quality, bundling of content by journalists who publish as a group generates positive informational externalities for users. Journalists group assortatively, better journalists having better partners. Then a consumer who discovers one quality journalist, has found several. The online environment, by reducing the pressure to group up, can lower welfare in our baseline model. We establish conditions for this result and investigate a number of countervailing forces.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128794854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Real Estate Market in the Russian Federation in H1 2016","authors":"Georgy Zadonsky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2842175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2842175","url":null,"abstract":"As for 1 August 2016, since the turn of the year 521,600 apartments were built totaling to 37.2 mn sq. m, which constitutes 92.6% of the floor area commissioned during the same period of 2015. Decline in the volumes of commissioned housing in 2016 was owing, first of all, to a reduction of housing floor area constructed by individuals. In H1 2016, the number of registrations of land mortgage loans extended to individuals exceeded by 33.6% the number of registrations of land mortgage loans extended to individuals in H1 2015 and constituted 79.02% of the total number of mortgages extended during 2016. In H1 2016, credit institutions issued 389,800 housing mortgage loans (HML) totaling to Rb 664.5bn, which by 44.2% exceeded the amount of housing mortgage loans originated in H1 2015. As of 1 July 2016, outstanding debt on HML denominated in rubles in percent to residual debt went up by 0.03 p.p. against 2015 and constituted 1.11%. Average weighted interest rate for June 2016 on HML denominated in rubles came to 12.99% exceeding by 0.48 p.p. interest rates of February 2016.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114894039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Productivity and Reallocation: Evidence from the Universe of Italian Firms","authors":"A. Linarello, A. Petrella","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2910391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2910391","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the contribution of allocative efficiency to aggregate labor productivity growth in Italy between 2005 and 2013. Exploiting a unique dataset that covers the universe of active firms, we find that allocative efficiency accounted for 35 per cent of aggregate productivity in 2005 and its weight increased by almost 7 percentage points during the period of observation. We show that the dynamics of aggregate labor productivity benefited from the reallocation of resources among continuing firms and from the net effect of business demography. Among industries, we find that reallocation has been stronger in industries that are more exposed to import competition from developing countries. Moreover, we document that the observed adjustments have not evenly affected all firms across the productivity distribution: selection has become tougher for firms belonging to the lower tail, forcing the exit of the least productive firms and favoring the reallocation of the workforce to the best performing firms.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115399238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vertical Relationships within Platform Marketplaces","authors":"M. Tremblay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2593132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2593132","url":null,"abstract":"In two-sided markets a platform allows consumers and sellers to interact by creating sub-markets within the platform marketplace. For example, Amazon has sub-markets for all of the different product categories available on its site, and smartphones have sub-markets for different types of applications (gaming apps, weather apps, map apps, ridesharing apps, etc.). The network benefits between consumers and sellers depend on the mode of competition within the sub-markets: more competition between sellers lowers product prices, increases the surplus consumers receive from a sub-market, and makes platform membership more desirable for consumers. However, more competition also lowers profits for a seller which makes platform membership less desirable for a seller and reduces seller entry and the number of sub-markets available on the platform marketplace. This dynamic between seller competition within a sub-market and agents’ network benefits leads to platform pricing strategies, participation decisions by consumers and sellers, and welfare results that depend on the mode of competition. Thus, the sub-market structure is important when investigating platform marketplaces.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114450498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition in Retail Electricity Markets: An Assessment of Ten Year Dutch Experience","authors":"M. Mulder, B. Willems","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2796043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2796043","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines a decade of retail competition in the Dutch electricity market and discusses market structure, regulation, and market performance. We find a proliferation of product variety, in particular by the introduction of quality-differentiated green-energy products. Product innovation could be a sign of a well-functioning market that caters to customer’s preferences, but it can also indicate a strategic product differentiation to soften price competition. Although slightly downward trending, gross retail margins remain relatively high, especially for green products. Price dispersion across retailers for identical products remains high, as also across products for a single retailer. We do not find evidence of asymmetric pass-through of wholesale costs. Overall, the retail market matured as evidenced by fewer consumer complaints and higher switching rates. A fairly intensive regulation of mature energy retail markets appears to be needed to create benefits for consumers.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125745859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}