风险资本市场的交换状况、能力状况和声誉

Oghenovo A. Obrimah
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本研究发现,新进入者风险资本家(vc)的信息覆盖面和重复合作的频率(交换状态)——Bonacich(1987)结构的传统实现产生的状态结构——对市场声誉的未来实现或其自身结构在风险资本市场的未来实现没有任何预测能力。在实证检验中,在Bonacich(1987)结构的实施中,用内在能力的估计来代替“重复伙伴关系的频率”,由此产生的混合变量,能力状态,显示出对未来实现市场声誉和未来实现交换状态的预测能力。能力地位的预测结果表明,提高市场声誉未来实现的策略并不能同时提高交换地位未来实现的策略,反之亦然。一个正式的理论模型表明,交换状态无法预测未来的结果,因为联合的价值取决于对风险投资在联合活动时机的能力的估计。正式模型预测,实证结果表明,风险资本市场中分离的价格均衡可以被描述为一种市场结构,在这种结构中,能力阶层与项目创新阶层共存,能力较高的风投更有可能投资于更具创新性的项目,也更有可能联合投资于更具创新性的项目。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Exchange Status, Ability Status, and Reputation within Venture Capital Markets
This study finds status that derives from new entrant venture capitalists' (VCs') information reach and frequency of repeated partnerships (exchange status) - the status construct generated by conventional implementations of the Bonacich (1987) construct - does not have any forecast power for future realizations of market reputations or future realizations of its own construct within venture capital markets. In empirical tests that substitute estimates of intrinsic ability for 'frequency of repeated partnerships' in implementation of the Bonacich (1987) construct, the resulting hybrid variable, ability status is shown to have forecast power for future realizations of market reputations and future realizations of exchange status. Forecast outcomes of ability status reveal strategies that enhance future realizations of market reputations do not simultaneously enhance future realizations of exchange status, and vice versa. A formal theoretical model demonstrates exchange status fails to have forecast power for future outcomes because the value of syndication is conditional on estimates of VCs' ability at timing of syndication activity. The formal model predicts, and empirical results show separating price equilibriums within venture capital markets can be characterized as arising out of a market structure within which strata of ability coexist with strata of project innovativeness, with higher ability VCs more likely to invest in, and more likely to syndicate investments in more innovative projects.
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