{"title":"Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets","authors":"Oğuzhan Çelebi, Joel P. Flynn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3382580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3382580","url":null,"abstract":"In many centralized matching markets, priorities take the form of a monotone transformation of an underlying order. Prominent examples include the distance-based system employed by Boston Public Schools, where students who lived within a walk-zone were prioritized over all others, and the income-based system used in New York affordable housing allocation, where eligibility is determined by a sharp income cutoff. Motivated by this, we study optimal priority design subject to not reversing an exogenously-given underlying order. Our main result is that, under stable matching mechanisms, the optimal design can be attained by splitting agents into at most three object-specific indifference classes. We apply our framework to provide insights into optimal priority design and rationalizations of the pursued priorities in three applications: distance-based priorities in Boston Public Schools, admissions tests for Chicago exam schools, and income-based priorities in New York public housing allocation.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131825680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Federico Echenique, Ruy González, Alistair J. Wilson, Leeat Yariv
{"title":"Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match","authors":"Federico Echenique, Ruy González, Alistair J. Wilson, Leeat Yariv","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3745444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3745444","url":null,"abstract":"Most doctors in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) match with one of their most preferred internship programs. However, surveys indicate doctors’ preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle: how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We provide one possible explanation. We show that the patterns in the NRMP data may be an artifact of the interview process that precedes the match. Our study highlights the importance of understanding market interactions occurring before and after a matching clearinghouse. It casts doubts on analyses of clearinghouses that take reported preferences at face value. (JEL C78, I11, I18, J44)","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130762408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Merger Efficiency Gains: Evidence from a Large Transport Merger in France","authors":"Ariane Charpin, Joanna Piechuka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3544717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3544717","url":null,"abstract":"Many industries are seeing an increase in concentration, leading to a discussion on the effectiveness of horizontal merger enforcement. The policy debate shows that one of the key arguments put forward when supporting potential mergers is the possibility of realization of merger efficiency gains, specifically in the transport industry. Yet, there exists little empirical evidence on the actual effects of realized mergers on cost efficiencies. We exploit a large and highly debated merger that took place in the French transport industry to evaluate whether a merger between two major transport groups may give rise to merger efficiency gains. We exploit the industry setting to employ a difference-in-differences methodology evaluating the effect of the merger on operating costs of merging transport groups. Our results show that the merger did not lead to any merger specific efficiency gains for the merging parties. Our study relies on the use of several control groups and is robust to a great number of robustness checks as well as to the introduction of heterogeneous treatment effects, depending on the identity of the merging party, the contract type in place, as well as the closeness of competition of local operators. Overall, our study contributes to a growing number of case studies undertaken by economists that can help determine whether horizontal merger policy is being properly enforced.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126358312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"UNA ESTIMACIÓN DE LA RENTA ECONÓMICA EN EL MERCADO DE LAS ISAPRES EN CHILE (An Estimation of the Economic Rent in the Isapres Market in Chile)","authors":"Simón Accorsi, Gino Sturla-Zerene","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3503172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3503172","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Spanish Abstract:</b> En el presente trabajo se estiman y analizan de manera conceptual y empíricamente coherente las rentas económicas en el sector Isapres Abiertas para el caso chileno en el período 2007-2017. Durante el período analizado las Isapres alcanzaron una rentabilidad promedio de 24%, cifra inusualmente elevada en comparación a otros sectores tanto a nivel nacional como internacional. En términos de renta económica esto significa utilidades extra normales en el rango de 407 y 516 mil millones para los tres escenarios considerados (CLP de septiembre 2018). En el caso del escenario medio (tasa de ganancia normal de 6%) el monto asciende a 462 mil millones, esto es, unos 42 mil millones anuales. De esta forma, es posible cuantificar la pérdida de eficiencia social debida, entre otras causas, a las asimetrías de información presentes en dicho mercado, a las barreras a la entrada y en general al uso del poder de mercado por parte de los aseguradores privados. Asimismo se revisan cualitativamente las causas posibles más importantes de dicha renta y se concluye con una serie de propuestas de políticas públicas que apuntan a un mejor funcionamiento en este mercado, entre las que se consideran (i) la existencia de planes mínimos garantizados, (ii) la implementación a cabalidad de un fondo de compensación y (iii) la posibilidad de complementar la cobertura con planes estandarizados.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> In this paper, economic rents in the open Isapres sector are estimated and analysed in a conceptual and empirically coherent manner for the Chilean case in the 2007-2017 period. During the period analysed, the Isapres reached an average rentability of 24%, an unusually high figure compared with other sectors, both nationally and internationally. In terms of economic rent this means extra normal profits in the range of 407 and 516 billion for the three scenarios considered (CLP of September 2018). In the case of the average scenario (normal 6% profit rate) the amount amounts to 462 billion, that is, about 42 billion annually. In this way, it is possible to quantify the loss of social efficiency due, among other causes, to the asymmetries of information present in said market, to the entry barriers and, in general, to the use of market power by private insurers. Likewise, the most important possible causes of said rent are qualitatively reviewed and it is concluded with proposals for public policies that aim at a better functioning in this market, among which are considered (i) the existence of guaranteed minimum plans, (ii ) the full implementation of a compensation fund and (iii) the possibility of complementing coverage with standardized plans.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132487143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Input Trade Liberalization and Import Switching: Evidence from Chinese Firms","authors":"W. Tian, Miaojie Yu","doi":"10.1111/roie.12410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12410","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how input liberalization affects firm import behavior. Using comprehensive production and trade data of Chinese firms, the paper shows that firms switch import sources from developing countries to developed countries as Chinese input tariffs fall. This finding is evident for import value and import scope. The observation holds after excluding the possible influence of reducing processing trade. The paper further demonstrates that the mechanism can be attributed to quality upgrading and innovation led by input cost reductions. The analysis handles the possible endogeneity problem, and the findings are robust and significant to different empirical methodologies and measurements.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"171 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131925690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Brand Building to Deter Entry and Its Impact on Brand Value","authors":"Ron N. Bar, Avery M. Haviv","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3004992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3004992","url":null,"abstract":"Brand valuation methods traditionally focus on the value a brand generates via its ability to enhance demand and, accordingly, profitability. However, this paper explores how a brand can generate value for a firm through the ability to deter entry of new competitors. In this respect, we distinguish between a brand’s direct effect on demand and its strategic effect on the behavior of rival firms. We investigate this within the context of the U.S. stacked chips category using a dynamic model that endogenizes brand building and entry decisions. We find that up to 63% of a brand’s value can be derived from its ability to deter entry. Furthermore, we find that a brand is most valuable when the cost of entry that potential entrants face is moderate: neither too high nor too low. This paper was accepted by Matt Shum, marketing. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4608 .","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131389377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Importance of Away Fans to a Club’s Market Size and its Effect on Competitive Balance","authors":"H. Cheah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3424646","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3424646","url":null,"abstract":"A club’s market size is not equivalent to its fan-base because the club collects gate receipts from fans affiliated to rival clubs, and thus indirectly shares its revenue source with other clubs. We trace the spending of individual fans and found that clubs with a smaller fan-base benefits more from the spending of away fans, allowing them to hire better playing talents and reduce the performance gap against clubs with larger fan-base.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126654469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Battle for Homes: How Does Home Sharing Disrupt Local Residential Markets?","authors":"Wei Chen, Zaiyan Wei, Karen L. Xie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3257521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3257521","url":null,"abstract":"As cities debate how to regulate Airbnb and other home-sharing services, we study the impacts of home sharing on local residential real estate markets. By accommodating transient travelers with short-term rental properties, home-sharing platforms have evolved as a major alternative channel that attracts the growing supply of residential properties. However, on the demand side of local residential markets, home-sharing platforms are not a viable option for residents. To demonstrate this dynamic between home sharing and local residential markets, we leverage a unique quasi-experiment on Airbnb—a platform policy that caps the number of properties a host can manage in a city—and find that the policy reduced rents (in the long-term rental markets) and home values (in the for-sale housing markets) by about 3% and did not affect the price-to-rent ratio. Consistent with the conjecture, we find that the policy impacts can be attributed to increased supply in local residential markets because of the policy. Quantitatively, our estimates suggest that, if the density of affected Airbnb properties is 1% higher in a market, the policy may further decrease rents and home values by about 0.03%–0.06%, which is similar across each policy-affected city. Our empirical findings add to the debate about the impacts of home sharing on local residential markets with a novel data set and a unique identification strategy. Practically speaking, our research is a timely response to the debate on regulating home sharing and has implications for various stakeholders of the residential real estate markets. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116160129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Stochastic Analysis of Firm Dynamics: Their Impact on the Firm Size Distribution","authors":"Alexandre Reginster","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3353778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3353778","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Pareto distribution is known for its wide range of applications, including the distribution of firm sizes. Exhaustive databases on firm sizes showed deviations from the Pareto firm size distribution for the smallest and largest firm sizes. Therefore, stochastic models of firm dynamics reproducing a Pareto firm size distribution could be further generalized in order to also reproduce these deviations. Based on Cordoba (2008), we build a model of firm dynamics which can generate a wide variety of steady-state distributions and we make clear the relationship between the growth dynamics of the firms and the resulting shape of the firm size distribution. To the light of our model, we analyse the links between the observed firm dynamics and the shape of firm size distribution in Belgium between 2006 and 2013.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134284536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Have Voluntary Time-of-Use Tariffs Fallen Short in the Residential Sector?","authors":"D. Choi, M. Lim, Karthik Murali, V. Thomas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3352306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3352306","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the causes behind the underwhelming adoption of voluntary Time-of-Use (TOU) tariffs in the residential electricity market. TOU tariffs are deployed by utilities to better match electricity generation capacity with market demand by giving consumers price incentives to reduce their consumption when electricity demand is at its peak. However, consumers in residential electricity markets are heterogeneous in their consumption preferences. Hence, utilities face a trade-off when deploying voluntary TOU tariffs --- to provide aggressive price incentives that will only appeal to consumers with flatter profiles or milder incentives to appeal to a larger proportion of the market. Using a game-theoretic model, we identify the key factors that determine the viability of voluntary TOU tariff deployment. On the supply side, the gap between wholesale prices in the peak and off-peak periods determines how much the utility stands to benefit by inducing demand response. On the demand side, heterogeneity within target consumer sets determines how much demand response the utility can induce with a certain price incentive. We show that misaligned incentives between utilities and regulators lead to underwhelming TOU tariff adoption compared to the socially desirable level, and that this under-adoption is worse when consumption preferences are uniformly distributed. We also evaluate the degree of cross-subsidization across tariff structures to identify their implications for equity among the different consumer types, and find that low levels of voluntary TOU adoption are less equitable than the default tariffs.","PeriodicalId":172652,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Market Structure (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115209267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}