Dario Paccagnan, R. Chandan, Bryce L. Ferguson, Jason R. Marden
{"title":"Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games","authors":"Dario Paccagnan, R. Chandan, Bryce L. Ferguson, Jason R. Marden","doi":"10.1145/3457168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457168","url":null,"abstract":"How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing. Within this context, a methodology for designing tolling mechanisms that minimize the system inefficiency (price of anarchy) exploiting solely local information is so far missing in spite of the scientific interest. In this article, we resolve this problem through a tractable linear programming formulation that applies to and beyond polynomial congestion games. When specializing our approach to the polynomial case, we obtain tight values for the optimal price of anarchy and corresponding tolls, uncovering an unexpected link with load balancing games. We also derive optimal tolling mechanisms that are constant with the congestion level, generalizing the results of Caragiannis et al. [8] to polynomial congestion games and beyond. Finally, we apply our techniques to compute the efficiency of the marginal cost mechanism. Surprisingly, optimal tolling mechanism using only local information perform closely to existing mechanism that utilize global information, e.g., Bilò and Vinci [6], while the marginal cost mechanism, known to be optimal in the continuous-flow model, has lower efficiency than that encountered levying no toll. All results are tight for pure Nash equilibria and extend to coarse correlated equilibria.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116200698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves","authors":"T. Roughgarden, Joshua R. Wang","doi":"10.1145/3355900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355900","url":null,"abstract":"We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first define the Maximizing Multiple Reserves (MMR) problem in single-parameter matroid environments, where the input is m valuation profiles v1,…,vm, indexed by the same n bidders, and the goal is to compute the vector r of (non-anonymous) reserve prices that maximizes the total revenue obtained on these profiles by the VCG mechanism with reserves r. We prove that the problem is APX-hard, even in the special case of single-item environments, and give a polynomial-time 1/2-approximation algorithm for it in arbitrary matroid environments. We then consider the online no-regret learning problem and show how to exploit the special structure of the MMR problem to translate our offline approximation algorithm into an online learning algorithm that achieves asymptotically time-averaged revenue at least 1/2 times that of the best fixed reserve prices in hindsight. On the negative side, we show that, quite generally, computational hardness for the offline optimization problem translates to computational hardness for obtaining vanishing time-averaged regret. Thus, our hardness result for the MMR problem implies that computationally efficient online learning requires approximation, even in the special case of single-item auction environments.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123314749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish","authors":"Ziv Epstein, A. Peysakhovich, David G. Rand","doi":"10.1145/3355947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355947","url":null,"abstract":"The human willingness to pay costs to benefit anonymous others is often explained by social preferences: rather than only valuing their own material payoff, people also include the payoffs of others in their utility function. But how successful is this concept of outcome-based social preferences for actually predicting out-of-sample behavior? We investigate this question by having 1,067 participants each make 20 Dictator Game decisions with randomized parameters (e.g., outcomes for the self, for the other, benefit/cost ratio of pro-sociality). We then use machine learning to try to predict behavior by each participant in each decision. A representative agent model (a small, shared, set of parameters) predicts better than random but still quite poorly (AUC = 0.69). Allowing for full heterogeneity across individuals in the mapping from decision-parameters to outcome yields good predictive performance (AUC = 0.89). However, this heterogeneous model is complicated and unwieldy, thus we also investigate whether a simpler model can yield similar performance. We find that the vast majority of the predictive power (AUC = 0.88) is achieved by a model that allows for three behavioral types. Finally, we show that cannot be well proxied for by other measures in psychology. This final analysis adds further evidence to the literature that human “cooperative phenotypes” are indeed meaningful, relatively orthogonal person-level traits.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114765936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue on EC’16","authors":"Yiling Chen, D. Bergemann","doi":"10.1145/3357235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3357235","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue of the ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) features selected articles from the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’16), which was held July 24–28, 2016, in Maastricht, The Netherlands. We served as program chairs for the conference and as guest editors for the special issue. Based on the conference reviews, we invited a selection of the articles accepted at the conference for this special issue. The articles submitted to this special issue then went through TEAC’s own review process. We are delighted to introduce the following six outstanding articles in this issue:","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114462011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
N. Alon, M. Feldman, Y. Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
{"title":"Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups","authors":"N. Alon, M. Feldman, Y. Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz","doi":"10.1145/3355948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355948","url":null,"abstract":"Exclusive social groups are ones in which the group members decide whether or not to admit a candidate to the group. Examples of exclusive social groups include academic departments and fraternal organizations. In this article, we introduce an analytic framework for studying the dynamics of exclusive social groups. In our model, every group member is characterized by his opinion, which is represented as a point on the real line. The group evolves in discrete time steps through a voting process carried out by the group’s members. Due to homophily, each member votes for the candidate who is more similar to him (i.e., closer to him on the line). An admission rule is then applied to determine which candidate, if any, is admitted. We consider several natural admission rules including majority and consensus. We ask: How do different admission rules affect the composition of the group in the long run? We study both growing groups (where new members join old ones) and fixed-size groups (where new members replace those who quit). Our analysis reveals intriguing phenomena and phase transitions, some of which are quite counterintuitive.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133926750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few Queries","authors":"Sepehr Assadi, S. Khanna, Yang Li","doi":"10.1145/3355903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355903","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by an application in kidney exchange, we study the following stochastic matching problem: We are given a graph G(V, E) (not necessarily bipartite), where each edge in E is realized with some constant probability p > 0, and the goal is to find a maximum matching in the realized graph. An algorithm in this setting is allowed to make queries to edges in E to determine whether or not they are realized. We design an adaptive algorithm for this problem that, for any graph G, computes a (1−ϵ)-approximate maximum matching in the realized graph Gp with high probability, while making O (log (1/ϵ p)/ϵ p) queries per vertex, where the edges to query are chosen adaptively in O (log (1/ϵ p)/ϵ p) rounds. We further present a non-adaptive algorithm that makes O (log (1/ϵ p)/ϵ p) queries per vertex and computes a (1/2−ϵ)-approximate maximum matching in Gp with high probability. Both our adaptive and non-adaptive algorithms achieve the same approximation factor as the previous best algorithms of Blum et al. (EC 2015) for this problem, while requiring an exponentially smaller number of per-vertex queries (and rounds of adaptive queries for the adaptive algorithm). Our results settle an open problem raised by Blum et al. by achieving only a polynomial dependency on both ϵ and p. Moreover, the approximation guarantee of our algorithms is instance-wise as opposed to only being competitive in expectation as is the case for Blum et al. This is of particular relevance to the key application of stochastic matching in kidney exchange. We obtain our results via two main techniques—namely, matching-covers and vertex sparsification—that may be of independent interest.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114564072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, Junxing Wang
{"title":"The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare","authors":"I. Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, Junxing Wang","doi":"10.1145/3355902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3355902","url":null,"abstract":"The maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution—which selects an allocation that maximizes the product of utilities—is known to provide outstanding fairness guarantees when allocating divisible goods. And while it seems to lose its luster when applied to indivisible goods, we show that, in fact, the MNW solution is strikingly fair even in that setting. In particular, we prove that it selects allocations that are envy-free up to one good—a compelling notion that is quite elusive when coupled with economic efficiency. We also establish that the MNW solution provides a good approximation to another popular (yet possibly infeasible) fairness property, the maximin share guarantee, in theory and—even more so—in practice. While finding the MNW solution is computationally hard, we develop a nontrivial implementation and demonstrate that it scales well on real data. These results establish MNW as a compelling solution for allocating indivisible goods and underlie its deployment on a popular fair-division website.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126009749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Weighted Envy-freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation","authors":"Mithun Chakraborty, Warut Suksompong, Yair Zick","doi":"10.1145/3457166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457166","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1): strong, where envy can be eliminated by removing an item from the envied agent’s bundle, and weak, where envy can be eliminated either by removing an item (as in the strong version) or by replicating an item from the envied agent’s bundle in the envying agent’s bundle. We show that for additive valuations, an allocation that is both Pareto optimal and strongly WEF1 always exists and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time; moreover, an allocation that maximizes the weighted Nash social welfare may not be strongly WEF1, but it always satisfies the weak version of the property. Moreover, we establish that a generalization of the round-robin picking sequence algorithm produces in polynomial time a strongly WEF1 allocation for an arbitrary number of agents; for two agents, we can efficiently achieve both strong WEF1 and Pareto optimality by adapting the adjusted winner procedure. Our work highlights several aspects in which weighted fair division is richer and more challenging than its unweighted counterpart.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129469617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ashish Goel, A. Krishnaswamy, Sukolsak Sakshuwong, Tanja Aitamurto
{"title":"Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting","authors":"Ashish Goel, A. Krishnaswamy, Sukolsak Sakshuwong, Tanja Aitamurto","doi":"10.1145/3340230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3340230","url":null,"abstract":"We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this setting, which we call “Knapsack Voting.” We study its strategic properties—we show that it is strategy-proof under a natural model of utility (a dis-utility given by the ℓ1 distance between the outcome and the true preference of the voter) and “partially” strategy-proof under general additive utilities. We extend Knapsack Voting to more general settings with revenues, deficits, or surpluses and prove a similar strategy-proofness result. To further demonstrate the applicability of our scheme, we discuss its implementation on the digital voting platform that we have deployed in partnership with the local government bodies in many cities across the nation. From voting data thus collected, we present empirical evidence that Knapsack Voting works well in practice.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115807996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Earning and Utility Limits in Fisher Markets","authors":"Xiaohui Bei, J. Garg, M. Hoefer, K. Mehlhorn","doi":"10.1145/3340234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3340234","url":null,"abstract":"Earning limits and utility limits are novel aspects in the classic Fisher market model. Sellers with earning limits have bounds on their income and lower the supply they bring to the market if income exceeds the limit. Buyers with utility limits have an upper bound on the amount of utility that they want to derive and lower the budget they bring to the market if utility exceeds the limit. Markets with these properties can have multiple equilibria with different characteristics. We analyze earning limits and utility limits in markets with linear and spending-constraint utilities. For markets with earning limits and spending-constraint utilities, we show that equilibrium price vectors form a lattice and the spending of buyers is unique in non-degenerate markets. We provide a scaling-based algorithm to compute an equilibrium in time O(n3ℓ log (ℓ + nU)), where n is the number of agents, ℓ ≥ n a bound on the segments in the utility functions, and U the largest integer in the market representation. We show how to refine any equilibrium in polynomial time to one with minimal prices or one with maximal prices (if it exists). Moreover, our algorithm can be used to obtain in polynomial time a 2-approximation for maximizing Nash social welfare in multi-unit markets with indivisible items that come in multiple copies. For markets with utility limits and linear utilities, we show similar results—lattice structure of price vectors, uniqueness of allocation in non-degenerate markets, and polynomial-time refinement procedures to obtain equilibria with minimal and maximal prices. We complement these positive results with hardness results for related computational questions. We prove that it is NP-hard to compute a market equilibrium that maximizes social welfare, and it is PPAD-hard to find any market equilibrium with utility functions with separate satiation points for each buyer and each good.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131253933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}