ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)最新文献

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A QPTAS for ɛ-Envy-Free Profit-Maximizing Pricing on Line Graphs 折线图上无嫉妒利润最大化定价的QPTAS
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2021-08-16 DOI: 10.1145/3456762
Khaled M. Elbassioni
{"title":"A QPTAS for ɛ-Envy-Free Profit-Maximizing Pricing on Line Graphs","authors":"Khaled M. Elbassioni","doi":"10.1145/3456762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3456762","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem of pricing edges of a line graph so as to maximize the profit made from selling intervals to single-minded customers. An instance is given by a set E of n edges with a limited supply for each edge, and a set of m clients, where each client specifies one interval of E she is interested in and a budget Bj which is the maximum price she is willing to pay for that interval. An envy-free pricing is one in which every customer is allocated an (possibly empty) interval maximizing her utility. Grandoni and Rothvoss (SIAM J. Comput. 2016) proposed a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the unlimited supply case with running time (nm)O((1/ɛ) 1/ɛ), which was extended to the limited supply case by Grandoni and Wiese (ESA 2019). By utilizing the known hierarchical decomposition of doubling metrics, we give a PTAS with running time (nm)O(1/ ɛ2) for the unlimited supply case. We then consider the limited supply case, and the notion of ɛ-envy-free pricing in which a customer gets an allocation maximizing her utility within an additive error of ɛ. For this case, we develop an approximation scheme with running time (nm)O(log 5/2maxeHe/ɛ3), where He= Bmax(e)/Bmin(e) is the maximum ratio of the budgets of any two customers demanding edge e. This yields a PTAS in the uniform budget case, and a quasi-PTAS for the general case. The best approximation known, in both cases, for the exact envy-free pricing version is O(log cmax), where cmax is the maximum item supply. Our method is based on the known hierarchical decomposition of doubling metrics, and can be applied to other problems, such as the maximum feasible subsystem problem with interval matrices.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"74 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132720388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
∃ℝ-complete Decision Problems about (Symmetric) Nash Equilibria in (Symmetric) Multi-player Games (对称)多人对策中(对称)纳什均衡的∃-完全决策问题
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2021-05-29 DOI: 10.1145/3456758
Vittorio Bilò, M. Mavronicolas
{"title":"∃ℝ-complete Decision Problems about (Symmetric) Nash Equilibria in (Symmetric) Multi-player Games","authors":"Vittorio Bilò, M. Mavronicolas","doi":"10.1145/3456758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3456758","url":null,"abstract":"A decision problem about Nash equilibria is concerned with whether a given game has a Nash equilibrium with certain natural properties. We settle the complexity of such decision problems over multi-player games, establishing that (nearly) all decision problems that were before shown NP-complete over 2-player games in References [5, 12, 18] become ∃ℝ-complete over multi-player games. ∃ℝ [27] is the class capturing the complexity of deciding the Existential Theory of the Reals. Specifically, we present a simple, unifying, parametric polynomial time reduction from the problem of deciding, given a 3-player (symmetric) game, whether there is a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium where all strategies played with non-zero probability come from a given set, which was shown ∃ℝ-complete in Reference [17]. By suitably working on the tuning parameters, our reduction delivers two extensive catalogs of ∃ℝ-complete decision problems in multi-player games. The first addresses Nash equilibria in general games, while the second encompasses symmetric Nash equilibria in symmetric games. These results resolve completely the main open problem from Reference [17] to enlarge the class of ∃ℝ-complete decision problems about (symmetric) Nash equilibria in multi-player (symmetric) games.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121207271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Timing Matters 考虑时间的问题
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2021-05-10 DOI: 10.1145/3434425
Shuchi Chawla, J. Naor, Debmalya Panigrahi, Mohit Singh, S. Umboh
{"title":"Timing Matters","authors":"Shuchi Chawla, J. Naor, Debmalya Panigrahi, Mohit Singh, S. Umboh","doi":"10.1145/3434425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3434425","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies the equilibrium states that can be reached in a network design game via natural game dynamics. First, we show that an arbitrarily interleaved sequence of arrivals and departures of players can lead to a polynomially inefficient solution at equilibrium. This implies that the central controller must have some control over the timing of agent arrivals and departures to ensure efficiency of the system at equilibrium. Indeed, we give a complementary result showing that if the central controller is allowed to restore equilibrium after every set of arrivals/departures via improving moves, then the eventual equilibrium states reached have exponentially better efficiency.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"636 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117092628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction to the Special Issue on WINE’18: Part 2 WINE ' 18特刊简介:第二部分
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2021-03-26 DOI: 10.1145/3447512
Giorgos Christodoulou, T. Harks
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue on WINE’18: Part 2","authors":"Giorgos Christodoulou, T. Harks","doi":"10.1145/3447512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3447512","url":null,"abstract":"The 14th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE’18) was held from Saturday December 15 to Monday December 17, 2018, in Oxford at St. Anne’s College. This conference brought together researchers in theoretical computer science, mathematics, artificial intelligence, and economics to exchange ideas and results on problems involving incentives and computation. These problems are of particular importance in application areas like the Web and the Internet that involve large and diverse populations. As the guest editors of this special issue of ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), we are pleased to present extended versions of papers presented at WINE’18. We invited authors of a small set of papers that received extremely positive conference reviews to submit their extended work to TEAC. Each submission went through TEAC’s own rigorous review process. This has led to nine excellent articles that appear in two parts. The second part comprises the following five articles: • Anshelevich and Zhu, “Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility Location Problems Given Candidate Positions” • Cheng, Gravin, Munagala, and Wang, “A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer” • Chawla, Naor, Panigrahi, Singh, and Umboh, “Timing Matters: Online Dynamics in Broadcast Games” • Li and Vetta, “The Fair Division of Hereditary Set Systems” • Gölz, Kahng, Mackenzie, and Procaccia, “The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy”","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115121943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction to the Special Issue on WINE’18: Part 1 WINE ' 18特刊简介:第一部分
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2021-03-08 DOI: 10.1145/3447510
Giorgos Christodoulou, T. Harks
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue on WINE’18: Part 1","authors":"Giorgos Christodoulou, T. Harks","doi":"10.1145/3447510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3447510","url":null,"abstract":"The 14th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE’18) was held from Saturday December 15 to Monday December 17, 2018, in Oxford at St. Anne’s College. This conference brought together researchers in theoretical computer science, mathematics, artificial intelligence, and economics to exchange ideas and results on problems involving incentives and computation. These problems are of particular importance in application areas like the Web and the Internet that involve large and diverse populations. As the guest editors of this special issue of ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), we are pleased to present extended versions of papers presented at WINE’18. We invited authors of a small set of papers that received extremely positive conference reviews to submit their extended work to TEAC. Each submission went through TEAC’s own rigorous review process. This has led to nine excellent articles that appear in two parts. The first part comprises the following four articles: • Goldberg and Marmolejo Cossio, “Learning Convex Partitions and Computing Gametheoretic Equilibria from Best Response Queries” • Giannakopoulos and Zhu, “Optimal Pricing for MHR and λ-Regular Distributions” • Immorlica, Lucier, Mao, Syrgkanis and Tzamos, “Combinatorial Assortment Optimization” • Jalaly and Tardos, “Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations”","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115234553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Pricing for MHR and λ-regular Distributions MHR和λ正则分布的最优定价
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2021-01-02 DOI: 10.1145/3434423
Y. Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças, Keyu Zhu
{"title":"Optimal Pricing for MHR and λ-regular Distributions","authors":"Y. Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças, Keyu Zhu","doi":"10.1145/3434423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3434423","url":null,"abstract":"We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have i.i.d. valuations for a single item. We show that for the natural class of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions, offering the same, take-it-or-leave-it price to all bidders can achieve an (asymptotically) optimal revenue. In particular, the approximation ratio is shown to be 1+O(ln ln n/ ln n), matched by a tight lower bound for the case of exponential distributions. This improves upon the previously best-known upper bound of e/(e−1)≈ 1.58 for the slightly more general class of regular distributions. In the worst case (over n), we still show a global upper bound of 1.35. We give a simple, closed-form description of our prices, which, interestingly enough, relies only on minimal knowledge of the prior distribution, namely, just the expectation of its second-highest order statistic. Furthermore, we extend our techniques to handle the more general class of λ-regular distributions that interpolate between MHR (λ =0) and regular (λ =1). Our anonymous pricing rule now results in an asymptotic approximation ratio that ranges smoothly, with respect to λ, from 1 (MHR distributions) to e/(e−1) (regular distributions). Finally, we explicitly give a class of continuous distributions that provide matching lower bounds, for every λ.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121371385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors 具有先验的黑盒机构设计的复杂性
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2020-10-16 DOI: 10.1145/3417744
Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos
{"title":"The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors","authors":"Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos","doi":"10.1145/3417744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3417744","url":null,"abstract":"We study black-box reductions from mechanism design to algorithm design for welfare maximization in settings of incomplete information. Given oracle access to an algorithm for an underlying optimization problem, the goal is to simulate an incentive compatible mechanism. The mechanism will be evaluated on its expected welfare, relative to the algorithm provided, and its complexity is measured by the time (and queries) needed to simulate the mechanism on any input. While it is known that black-box reductions are not possible in many prior-free settings, settings with priors appear more promising: there are known reductions for Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism design for general classes of welfare maximization problems. This dichotomy begs the question: which mechanism design problems admit black-box reductions, and which do not? Our main result is that black-box mechanism design is impossible under two of the simplest settings not captured by known positive results. First, for the problem of allocating n goods to a single buyer whose valuation is additive and independent across the goods, subject to a downward-closed constraint on feasible allocations, we show that there is no polytime (in n) BIC black-box reduction for expected welfare maximization. Second, for the setting of multiple single-parameter agents—where polytime BIC reductions are known—we show that no polytime reductions exist when the incentive requirement is tightened to Max-In-Distributional-Range. In each case, we show that achieving a sub-polynomial approximation to the expected welfare requires exponentially many queries, even when the set of feasible allocations is known to be downward-closed.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126639262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fair Mixing 公平的混合
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2020-10-16 DOI: 10.1145/3417738
H. Aziz, Anna Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin
{"title":"Fair Mixing","authors":"H. Aziz, Anna Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin","doi":"10.1145/3417738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3417738","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a setting in which agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes. The agents have dichotomous preferences: Each outcome is liked or disliked by an agent. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is strategyproof and guarantees to any group of like-minded agents an influence proportional to its size. It is easier to compute and more efficient than the familiar Random Priority rule. We show, both formally and by numerical experiments, that its inefficiency is low when the number of agents is low. The efficient Egalitarian rule protects individual agents but not coalitions. It is excludable strategyproof: An agent does not want to lie if she cannot consume outcomes she claims to dislike. The efficient Max Nash Product rule offers the strongest welfare guarantees to coalitions, which can force any outcome with a probability proportional to their size. But it even fails the excludable form of strategyproofness.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"178 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123411252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations 可加性估值的最优预算-可行机制
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2020-10-16 DOI: 10.1145/3417746
N. Gravin, Yaonan Jin, P. Lu, Chenhao Zhang
{"title":"Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations","authors":"N. Gravin, Yaonan Jin, P. Lu, Chenhao Zhang","doi":"10.1145/3417746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3417746","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we show a tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approximation ratio of 2, improving the previous best known result of 3. Our bound is tight with respect to either the optimal offline benchmark or its fractional relaxation. We also present a simple deterministic mechanism with the tight approximation guarantee of 3 against the fractional optimum, improving the best known result of (2+ √ 2) for the weaker integral benchmark.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130485136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets 私人预测市场的可能性和局限性
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) Pub Date : 2020-09-25 DOI: 10.1145/3412348
Rachel Cummings, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
{"title":"The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets","authors":"Rachel Cummings, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan","doi":"10.1145/3412348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3412348","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the design of private prediction markets, financial markets designed to elicit predictions about uncertain events without revealing too much information about market participants’ actions or beliefs. Our goal is to design market mechanisms in which participants’ trades or wagers influence the market’s behavior in a way that leads to accurate predictions, yet no single participant has too much influence over what others are able to observe. We study the possibilities and limitations of such mechanisms using tools from differential privacy. We begin by designing a private one-shot wagering mechanism in which bettors specify a belief about the likelihood of a future event and a corresponding monetary wager. Wagers are redistributed among bettors in a way that more highly rewards those with accurate predictions. We provide a class of wagering mechanisms that are guaranteed to satisfy truthfulness, budget balance on expectation, and other desirable properties while additionally guaranteeing ε-joint differential privacy in the bettors’ reported beliefs, and analyze the trade-off between the achievable level of privacy and the sensitivity of a bettor’s payment to her own report. We then ask whether it is possible to obtain privacy in dynamic prediction markets, focusing our attention on the popular cost-function framework in which securities with payments linked to future events are bought and sold by an automated market maker. We show that under general conditions, it is impossible for such a market maker to simultaneously achieve bounded worst-case loss and ε-differential privacy without allowing the privacy guarantee to degrade extremely quickly as the number of trades grows (at least logarithmically in number of trades), making such markets impractical in settings in which privacy is valued. We conclude by suggesting several avenues for potentially circumventing this lower bound.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"405 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123069660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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