Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Xuan-Vinh Ho, J. Sliwinski, Yair Zick
{"title":"The Price of Quota-based Diversity in Assignment Problems","authors":"Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Xuan-Vinh Ho, J. Sliwinski, Yair Zick","doi":"10.1145/3411513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3411513","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we introduce and analyze an extension to the matching problem on a weighted bipartite graph (i.e., the assignment problem): Assignment with Type Constraints. Here, the two parts of the graph are each partitioned into subsets, called types and blocks, respectively; we seek a matching with the largest sum of weights under the constraint that there is a pre-specified cap on the number of vertices matched in every type-block pair. Our primary motivation stems from the large-scale public housing program run by the state of Singapore, accounting for over 70% of its residential real estate. To promote ethnic diversity within its housing projects, Singapore imposes ethnicity quotas: The population is divided into ethnicity-based groups and each new housing development into blocks of flats such that each group must not own more than a certain percentage of flats in a block. However, other domains use similar hard capacity constraints to maintain diversity: These include matching prospective students to schools or medical residents to hospitals. Limiting agents’ choices for ensuring diversity in this manner naturally entails some welfare loss. One of our goals is to study the tradeoff between diversity and (utilitarian) social welfare in such settings. We first show that, while the classic assignment program is polynomial-time computable, adding diversity constraints makes the problem computationally intractable; however, we identify a ½-approximation algorithm, as well as reasonable assumptions on the structure of utilities (or weights) that permit poly-time algorithms. Next, we provide two upper bounds on the price of diversity—a measure of the loss in welfare incurred by imposing diversity constraints—as functions of natural problem parameters. We conclude the article with simulations based on publicly available data from two diversity-constrained allocation problems—Singapore Public Housing and Chicago School Choice—which shed light on how the constrained maximization as well as lottery-based variants perform in practice.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122390520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I. Caragiannis, George A. Krimpas, Alexandros A. Voudouris
{"title":"How Effective Can Simple Ordinal Peer Grading Be?","authors":"I. Caragiannis, George A. Krimpas, Alexandros A. Voudouris","doi":"10.1145/3412347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3412347","url":null,"abstract":"Ordinal peer grading has been proposed as a simple and scalable solution for computing reliable information about student performance in massive open online courses. The idea is to outsource the grading task to the students themselves as follows. After the end of an exam, each student is asked to rank—in terms of quality—a bundle of exam papers by fellow students. An aggregation rule then combines the individual rankings into a global one that contains all students. We define a broad class of simple aggregation rules, which we call type-ordering aggregation rules, and present a theoretical framework for assessing their effectiveness. When statistical information about the grading behaviour of students is available (in terms of a noise matrix that characterizes the grading behaviour of the average student from a student population), the framework can be used to compute the optimal rule from this class with respect to a series of performance objectives that compare the ranking returned by the aggregation rule to the underlying ground-truth ranking. For example, a natural rule known as Borda is proved to be optimal when students grade correctly. In addition, we present extensive simulations that validate our theory and prove it to be extremely accurate in predicting the performance of aggregation rules even when only rough information about grading behaviour (i.e., an approximation of the noise matrix) is available. Both in the application of our theoretical framework and in our simulations, we exploit data about grading behaviour of students that have been extracted from two field experiments in the University of Patras.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123790730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Approval Voting and Incentives in Crowdsourcing","authors":"Nihar B. Shah, Dengyong Zhou","doi":"10.1145/3396863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3396863","url":null,"abstract":"The growing need for labeled training data has made crowdsourcing a vital tool for developing machine learning applications. Here, workers on a crowdsourcing platform are typically shown a list of unlabeled items, and for each of these items, are asked to choose a label from one of the provided options. The workers in crowdsourcing platforms are not experts, thereby making it essential to judiciously elicit the information known to the workers. With respect to this goal, there are two key shortcomings of current systems: (i) the incentives of the workers are not aligned with those of the requesters; and (ii) the interface does not allow workers to convey their knowledge accurately by forcing them to make a single choice among a set of options. In this article, we address these issues by introducing approval voting to utilize the expertise of workers who have partial knowledge of the true answer and coupling it with two strictly proper scoring rules. We additionally establish attractive properties of optimality and uniqueness of our scoring rules. We also conduct preliminary empirical studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and the results of these experiments validate our approach.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127719067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria for Cost-Sharing in Generalized Weighted Congestion Games","authors":"M. Gairing, Kostas Kollias, Grammateia Kotsialou","doi":"10.1145/3391434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3391434","url":null,"abstract":"This work studies the impact of cost-sharing methods on the existence and efficiency of (pure) Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. We also study generalized weighted congestion games, where each player may control multiple commodities. Our results are fairly general; we only require that our cost-sharing method and our set of cost functions satisfy certain natural conditions. For general weighted congestion games, we study the existence of pure Nash equilibria in the induced games, and we exhibit a separation from the standard single-commodity per player model by proving that the Shapley value is the only cost-sharing method that guarantees existence of pure Nash equilibria. With respect to efficiency, we present general tight bounds on the price of anarchy, which are robust and apply to general equilibrium concepts. Our analysis provides a tight bound on the price of anarchy, which depends only on the used cost-sharing method and the set of allowable cost functions. Interestingly, the same bound applies to weighted congestion games and generalized weighted congestion games. We then turn to the price of stability and prove an upper bound for the Shapley value cost-sharing method, which holds for general sets of cost functions and which is tight in special cases of interest, such as bounded degree polynomials. Also for bounded degree polynomials, we provide a somewhat surprising result, showing that a slight deviation from the Shapley value has a huge impact on the price of stability. In fact, for this case, the price of stability becomes as bad as the price of anarchy. Again, our bounds on the price of stability are independent on whether players are single or multi-commodity.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114157794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pricing (and Bidding) Strategies for Delay Differentiated Cloud Services","authors":"Jiayi Song, R. Guérin","doi":"10.1145/3381531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3381531","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a cloud provider that seeks to maximize its revenue by offering services with different trade-offs between cost and timeliness of job completion. Spot instances and preemptible instances are examples of such services, with, in both cases, possible service interruptions delaying a job’s completion. Our focus is on exploiting heterogeneity across jobs in terms of value and sensitivity to execution delay, with a joint distribution that determines their relationship across the user population. We characterize optimal (revenue maximizing) pricing strategies and, in the case of spot instances, optimal bidding strategies as well as identify conditions under which bidding at a fixed price is optimal. We show that correlation between delay sensitivity and job value needs to exceed a certain threshold for a service offering that differentiates based on speed of execution to be beneficial to the provider. We further assess the results’ robustness under more general assumptions, and we offer guidelines for users and providers.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124217470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Privacy Games","authors":"Yiling Chen, Or Sheffet, S. Vadhan","doi":"10.1145/3381533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3381533","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of analyzing the effect of privacy concerns on the behavior of selfish utility-maximizing agents has received much attention lately. Privacy concerns are often modeled by altering the utility functions of agents to consider also their privacy loss [4, 14, 20, 28]. Such privacy-aware agents prefer to take a randomized strategy even in very simple games in which non-privacy-aware agents play pure strategies. In some cases, the behavior of privacy-aware agents follows the framework of Randomized Response, a well-known mechanism that preserves differential privacy. Our work is aimed at better understanding the behavior of agents in settings where their privacy concerns are explicitly given. We consider a toy setting where agent A, in an attempt to discover the secret type of agent B, offers B a gift that one type of B agent likes and the other type dislikes. As opposed to previous works, B’s incentive to keep her type a secret isn’t the result of “hardwiring” B’s utility function to consider privacy, but rather takes the form of a payment between B and A. We investigate three different types of payment functions and analyze B’s behavior in each of the resulting games. As we show, under some payments, B’s behavior is very different than the behavior of agents with hardwired privacy concerns and might even be deterministic. Under a different payment, we show that B’s BNE strategy does fall into the framework of Randomized Response.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127706313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue on EC’17","authors":"Moshe Babaioff, S. Kominers","doi":"10.1145/3383321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3383321","url":null,"abstract":"The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) is proud to present a special issue with extended versions of a selected set of papers presented at the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’17). EC’17 was held at MIT in Cambridge, MA, June 26–30, 2017, with Moshe Babaioff and Hervé Moulin serving as program chairs. EC is the leading scientific conference on advances in theory, systems, and applications at the interface of economics and computation. Based on the conference reviews, we as guest editors invited a set of papers that were among the top-rated of the 75 papers accepted for presentation at EC’17; the journal versions of these papers were required to extend upon the conference papers and went through an independent and rigorous review process. We are delighted to present the resulting set of five articles, spanning topics in information elicitation, auctions, pricing, and social choice:","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125661895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Arpit Agarwal, Debmalya Mandal, D. Parkes, Nisarg Shah
{"title":"Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users","authors":"Arpit Agarwal, Debmalya Mandal, D. Parkes, Nisarg Shah","doi":"10.1145/3381519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3381519","url":null,"abstract":"Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize agents to truthfully report their signals, in the absence of a verification mechanism, by comparing their reports with those of their peers. Prior work in this area is essentially restricted to the case of homogeneous agents, whose signal distributions are identical. This is limiting in many domains, where we would expect agents to differ in taste, judgment, and reliability. Although the Correlated Agreement (CA) mechanism [Shnayder et al. 2016a] can be extended to handle heterogeneous agents, there is a new challenge of efficiently estimating agent signal types. We solve this problem by clustering agents based on their reporting behavior, proposing a mechanism that works with clusters of agents, and designing algorithms that learn such a clustering. In this way, we also connect peer prediction with the Dawid and Skene [1979] literature on latent types. We retain the robustness against coordinated misreports of the CA mechanism, achieving an approximate incentive guarantee of ε-informed truthfulness. We show on real data that this incentive approximation is reasonable in practice, even with a small number of clusters.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127795873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division","authors":"Siddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy","doi":"10.1145/3381525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3381525","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, which is defined to be the maximum value that an agent can ensure for herself, if she were to partition the goods into n bundles, and then receive a minimum valued bundle. Since maximin fair allocations (i.e., allocations in which each agent gets at least her maximin share) do not always exist, prior work has focused on approximation results that aim to find allocations in which the value of the bundle allocated to each agent is (multiplicatively) as close to her maximin share as possible. In particular, Procaccia and Wang (2014) along with Amanatidis et al. (2015) have shown that under additive valuations, a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation always exists and can be found in polynomial time. We complement these results by developing a simple and efficient algorithm that achieves the same approximation guarantee. Furthermore, we initiate the study of approximate maximin fair division under submodular valuations. Specifically, we show that when the valuations of the agents are nonnegative, monotone, and submodular, then a 0.21-approximate maximin fair allocation is guaranteed to exist. In fact, we show that such an allocation can be efficiently found by using a simple round-robin algorithm. A technical contribution of the article is to analyze the performance of this combinatorial algorithm by employing the concept of multilinear extensions.","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123366378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction","authors":"Sepehr Assadi","doi":"10.1145/3381521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3381521","url":null,"abstract":"We study the necessity of interaction for obtaining efficient allocations in combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. This problem was originally introduced by Dobzinski, Nisan, and Oren (STOC’14) as the following simple market scenario: m items are to be allocated among n bidders in a distributed setting where bidders valuations are private and hence communication is needed to obtain an efficient allocation. The communication happens in rounds: In each round, each bidder, simultaneously with others, broadcasts a message to all parties involved. At the end, the central planner computes an allocation solely based on the communicated messages. Dobzinski et al. showed that (at least some) interaction is necessary for obtaining even an approximately efficient allocation: No non-interactive (1-round) protocol with polynomial communication (in the number of items and bidders) can achieve approximation ratio better than Ω(m1/4), while for any r ≥ 1, there exists r-round protocols that achieve Õ(r · m1/(r+1)) approximation with polynomial communication. This in particular implies that O(log m) rounds of interaction suffice to obtain an approximately efficient allocation—namely, a polylog(m)-approximation. A natural question at this point is to identify the \"right\" level of interaction (i.e., number of rounds) necessary to obtain approximately efficient allocations. In this article, we resolve this question by providing an almost tight round-approximation tradeoff for this problem: We show that for any r ≥ 1, any r-round protocol that uses poly(m, n) bits of communication can only approximate the social welfare up to a factor of Ω(1/r · m1/(2r+1)). This in particular implies that Ω(log m/log log m) rounds of interaction are necessary for obtaining any allocation with a reasonable welfare approximation—namely, a constant or even a polylog(m)-approximation. Our work builds on the multi-party round-elimination technique of Alon, Nisan, Raz, and Weinstein (FOCS’15)—used to prove similar-in-spirit lower bounds for round-approximation tradeoff in unit-demand markets—and settles an open question posed initially by Dobzinski et al. (STOC’14) and subsequently by Alon et al. (FOCS’15).","PeriodicalId":166176,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)","volume":"154 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122446814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}