Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games

Dario Paccagnan, R. Chandan, Bryce L. Ferguson, Jason R. Marden
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引用次数: 19

Abstract

How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing. Within this context, a methodology for designing tolling mechanisms that minimize the system inefficiency (price of anarchy) exploiting solely local information is so far missing in spite of the scientific interest. In this article, we resolve this problem through a tractable linear programming formulation that applies to and beyond polynomial congestion games. When specializing our approach to the polynomial case, we obtain tight values for the optimal price of anarchy and corresponding tolls, uncovering an unexpected link with load balancing games. We also derive optimal tolling mechanisms that are constant with the congestion level, generalizing the results of Caragiannis et al. [8] to polynomial congestion games and beyond. Finally, we apply our techniques to compute the efficiency of the marginal cost mechanism. Surprisingly, optimal tolling mechanism using only local information perform closely to existing mechanism that utilize global information, e.g., Bilò and Vinci [6], while the marginal cost mechanism, known to be optimal in the continuous-flow model, has lower efficiency than that encountered levying no toll. All results are tight for pure Nash equilibria and extend to coarse correlated equilibria.
原子拥塞游戏中的最优税收
我们如何设计机制来促进共享资源的有效利用?在这里,我们将通过原子拥塞博弈来回答这个问题,原子拥塞博弈被用于模拟各种问题,包括交通路由。在这一背景下,设计收费机制的方法,以最大限度地减少系统效率低下(无政府状态的价格),仅利用当地的信息,迄今为止是缺失的,尽管科学兴趣。在本文中,我们通过一个可处理的线性规划公式来解决这个问题,该公式适用于多项式拥塞博弈。当我们将方法专门用于多项式情况时,我们获得了无政府状态的最优价格和相应的通行费的紧值,揭示了与负载平衡游戏的意想不到的联系。我们还推导出最优收费机制,该机制随拥塞水平不变,并将Caragiannis等人[8]的结果推广到多项式拥塞博弈及其他情况。最后,我们运用我们的技术来计算边际成本机制的效率。令人惊讶的是,仅使用局部信息的最优收费机制与利用全局信息的现有机制表现接近,如Bilò和Vinci[6],而已知在连续流模型中最优的边际成本机制的效率低于不收取通行费的机制。所有结果对于纯纳什均衡是严密的,并推广到粗相关均衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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