The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0013
W. R. Matthews
{"title":"Dean of St. Paul’s","authors":"W. R. Matthews","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"W. R. Matthews found the moral argument (along with the teleological argument) the most persuasive of all the theistic arguments. He reflects upon the “moral evolution of mankind” and asks what it implies concerning the nature of the universe; he discusses the conscience and asks, “On what grounds can we justify that sense of obligation which is the characteristic property of moral experience?” He ponders the nature of the good and asks, “What is the place of the Good in the general structure of the universe?” He finds that in each case he is led to the theistic hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122869391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0016
David J. Baggett, J. Walls
{"title":"Contemporary Moral Apologists","authors":"David J. Baggett, J. Walls","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"A. C. Ewing worked on moral goodness; Austin Farrer focused on the value and dignity of persons; George Mavrodes underscored the odd nature of binding moral duties in a naturalistic world. Robert Adams did work in theistic ethics that produced innovative variants of the moral argument; his wife, Marilyn Adams, demonstrated how God’s incommensurable goodness can address versions of the problem of evil. Linda Zagzebski identified three ways we need moral confidence. C. Stephen Evans defended divine command theory and a natural signs approach to apologetics. John Hare did landmark work on moral arguments. William Lane Craig used the moral argument to powerful effect in books and debates. C. Stephen Layman used the overriding reason thesis and conditional thesis in his variant of the argument. Scott Smith, Mark Linville, Angus Menuge, and Angus Ritchie have offered brilliant epistemic moral arguments. Paul Copan has used history to augment the moral argument.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132956366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0003
I. Kant
{"title":"The Sage of Königsberg","authors":"I. Kant","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Better than anyone, Kant recognized the power and authority of the moral law. On that foundation he constructed two variants of the moral argument. His argument from grace pertains to whether or not the moral life is possible. Morality requires us to achieve a stand too demanding to meet on our own. Divine assistance is needed to close the resulting gap. So rationality dictates that we postulate God’s existence. Kant’s argument from providence pertains to the aforementioned rational need for happiness and virtue to cohere. Full rational commitment to morality requires that morality is a rationally stable enterprise, which entails the ultimate correspondence between virtue and (both individual and corporate) fulfillment. Without God’s existence there’s no particularly good reason to think such correspondence obtains. So rationality dictates the postulation of God’s existence.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115421736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0011
W. G. D. Burgh
{"title":"The Gregarious Aristocrat","authors":"W. G. D. Burgh","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"For W. G. de Burgh moral evidence doesn’t entail theism but does incline toward it. Such evidence includes both goodness and rightness, and de Burgh endorsed a cumulative case for God’s existence. He thought it took Kant’s work on obligations to give the moral argument its teeth and momentum. Consciousness of moral obligations implies the reality of a moral order, which then implies God as its author and sustainer. Likewise with moral values, which are better explained by a personal God than by an impersonal Platonic realm. When it came to God’s love, he departed from the tradition of analogical predication, thinking it inadequate for a full appreciation of the Incarnation. He also argued that divine holiness without divine love would call into question God’s goodness.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130222170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0007
W. Sorley
{"title":"A Knightbridge Professor","authors":"W. Sorley","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"William Sorley argued that God provides the best and most rational and unified view of reality, the ground of both the natural and moral orders. What a close look reveals is that Sorley’s approach, rather than dated, remains a lively, instructive, and powerful model to follow. Whether he was integrating or reconciling various pieces of natural theology—the causal and moral, is and ought, reality and value, life and work, finite and infinite goods, the temporal and transcendent, the moral law and evil, philosophy and poetry, or morality and metaphysics—his was an expansive and integrative mind and an open and capacious heart whose prescient insights have proven the test of time. He demonstrated what long and intimate acquaintance with the world of ideas can generate, and his enduring example can serve as an inspiration and corrective to much of what passes for apologetics today.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126434562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0006
W. James, A. Balfour
{"title":"That Adorable Genius and a Prime Minister","authors":"W. James, A. Balfour","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"William James offered several resources that a moral apologist can deploy. James saw it as irrational to embrace a rule of reasoning that precludes finding truth that’s really there to be found. He argued that the category of moral regret is a bad fit with a naturalistic worldview. Like other philosophers we’ve considered, his was an expansive empiricism that included considering the evidential value of relational, aesthetic, and ethical deliverances. Arthur Balfour similarly recognized the moral deficiencies of naturalism, though, more so than James, he thought reconcilable the religious and metaphysical accounts of theism. Balfour was particularly intent on underscoring the ways in which deflationary analyses of moral values and duties are better at explaining them away than actually explaining them. He didn’t think the moral argument was best thought of as a deduction; rather, he saw it as something closer to an inductive or abductive approach.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"159 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132495912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0010
C. Webb
{"title":"An Oxford Nolloth Professor","authors":"C. Webb","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"The work Clement Webb did on the moral argument often had for its context wider theological questions that he wished to explore. He primarily looked to Plato for inspiration about the nature of moral goodness, and he looked to Immanuel Kant on the nature of moral duties. Although he initially thought Kant had reduced religion to morality, he eventually softened on that conviction. As empirical experience justifies belief in an external world, he took our moral experience as solid justification for belief in moral realities. Inspired by James Martineau, Webb argued that the phenomenology of moral duties (which Kant explained so well) warranted belief in departing from an overambitious kind of Kantian autonomy that precludes belief in a “Higher than ourselves” (Martineau’s term) that gives us the moral law. Finally, Webb also saw some of the profound political implications of the erosion of moral foundations.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123232406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0012
A. Taylor
{"title":"An Eminent and Erudite Platonist","authors":"A. Taylor","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"A. E. Taylor argued at length against an artificial dichotomy between fact and value, in an effort to carve out evidential space for morality. Divorcing facts and values is like trying to separate the sounds of a great symphony from its musical quality. More important than what we do is who we are, and what’s needed is an adequate account for the sort of external assistance we desperately require to be radically transformed (even transfigured)—after all, Taylor said, we can’t pull ourselves up by our own hair—so we can enjoy a good never left behind and never superseded. The inherent features of moral guilt point in the direction of a personal and perfectly loving God as our first and final cause. Taylor counseled close and sustained attentiveness to the moral evidence and (as we’ve seen in others) modeled a laudably expansive epistemology.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116832857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0005
H. Sidgwick
{"title":"An Agnostic Moralist","authors":"H. Sidgwick","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Henry Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason is a problem confronting the ethical enterprise. It’s the tension between one’s own happiness and the happiness of others; or between rational self-love and rational benevolence. Sidgwick thought each impulse was equally legitimate, yet on occasion they encounter an intractable tension. The full rationality of morality requires the resolution of this dualism, but Sidgwick didn’t see such a rapprochement as forthcoming. The only potential solution he could see is a theistic one, according to which a providential God ensures their harmony, but Sidgwick himself refused to follow this path. Nevertheless, his writings include the seeds for such a moral argument, predicated on the full rationality of morality.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129995721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Moral ArgumentPub Date : 2019-12-26DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0004
J. Newman
{"title":"A Contentious, Contemplative Cardinal","authors":"J. Newman","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246365.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"John Henry Newman exemplified the fact that the history of apologetics is very much a story about epistemology, a theme that will recur throughout this book. His rich epistemological insights served as the foundation of his moral argument. His broad epistemology and expansive empiricism recognized that we’re more than narrow logic choppers. He likened the quest for truth to a vaulted ceiling that ingeniously throws its weight in a variety of directions. We gradually come to the conclusions we do through a complicated process of considering a great number of evidences, not just through tight discursive analyses. The phenomenology of conscience, in particular, he thought, can prove telling as we have direct experience of One to whom we’re responsible, before whom we’re ashamed, whose claims on us we fear, making possible what he called a real assent and a sense of deep assurance.","PeriodicalId":161709,"journal":{"name":"The Moral Argument","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115698789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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