ERN: Altruism (Topic)最新文献

Asking to Give: Moral Licensing and Pro-Social Behavior in the Aggregate 要求给予:道德许可与总体亲社会行为

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-09-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3920355

Manuel Grieder, J. Schmitz, R. Schubert

{"title":"Asking to Give: Moral Licensing and Pro-Social Behavior in the Aggregate","authors":"Manuel Grieder, J. Schmitz, R. Schubert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3920355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3920355","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effect of repeated opportunities to behave pro-socially on aggregate pro-social behavior in two laboratory experiments and in field data on charitable giving. In the first experiment we show that two consecutive pro-social decisions (implemented as donations to a charity) lead to the typical pattern of moral licensing: the presence of a first donation lowers the second donation. However, we find that this decrease merely represents a form of substitution between different opportunities to behave pro-socially. Presenting people with multiple opportunities to donate increases aggregate contributions even compared against adequate experimental control conditions. The second experiment studies potential drivers of this result and finds that people seem to respond positively to each additional ask and that the response is independent of whether asks are presented simultaneously or sequentially. We find similar patterns in field data from 73 charity campaigns sent out by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to 455,102 individuals between 2013-2020. Average giving per ask decreases after the first donation, but on average individuals respond with positive donations to each additional ask, meaning that asking more often increases an individual's donations in the aggregate. Our findings indicate that moral licensing does not matter from an aggregate perspective. This is good news for managers of charitable organizations worried about negative effects of repeated fundraising activities and for policymakers who are concerned about negative spillover effects of measures targeted at increasing pro-social behavior.","PeriodicalId":159232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Altruism (Topic)","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126238873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

To Earmark or to Non-Earmark? The Role of Control, Transparency, Salience and Warm-Glow 专项拨款还是非专项拨款?控制，透明，突出和暖光的作用

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-08-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3907401

Ö. Özer, Gloria Urrea, Sebastián Villa

{"title":"To Earmark or to Non-Earmark? The Role of Control, Transparency, Salience and Warm-Glow","authors":"Ö. Özer, Gloria Urrea, Sebastián Villa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3907401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907401","url":null,"abstract":"Charities face tension when deciding whether or not to offer earmarking to donors — i.e., let donors restrict donations to a specific purpose. Research shows that earmarking decreases operational performance because it limits charities’ flexibility to use donations. However, there is also a common belief that earmarking increases donations. Earmarking is assumed to increase donations through four mechanisms: by (i) giving donors control over their donations, (ii) increasing operational transparency of donations (iii) leveraging highly salient projects and (iv) increasing donors’ warm-glow. To resolve this tension, we study how, when, and why earmarking affects donors’ decisions. We consider three important decisions donors make that impact the fundraising outcome: preference between earmarking and non-earmarking, decision on whether to donate or not (i.e., donor activation) and donation amount. We design three online experiments that allow us to quantify the effect of earmarking on donors’ decisions and investigate the role of the four mechanisms in fundraising. Our results reveal that earmarking has varying effects on the three decisions donors make and does not always increase donations. Moreover, we determine the conditions under which the four mechanisms affect the outcome of fundraising campaigns. Our findings provide clear insights for how charities can design fundraising campaigns more effectively and suggest when to leverage earmarking and the four mechanisms depending on the charity’s fundraising goals.","PeriodicalId":159232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Altruism (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128359688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Tipping in Crises: Evidence from Chicago Taxi Drivers during COVID-19 危机中的小费:来自新冠肺炎期间芝加哥出租车司机的证据

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-06-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3861074

Sarah Conlisk

{"title":"Tipping in Crises: Evidence from Chicago Taxi Drivers during COVID-19","authors":"Sarah Conlisk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3861074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3861074","url":null,"abstract":"In early 2020, the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) spread to America and upended normal life for over a year. Using trip-level data on 17 million taxi rides taken in Chicago from 2018-2021, I explore how tipping patterns changed during the COVID-19 pandemic. I find that the average non-zero tip left by passengers increased by almost 2 percentage points, from roughly 26% to 28% of the taxi fare. Meanwhile, the likelihood that a passenger leaves a tip at all declined by roughly 5 percentage points, down from a pre-pandemic average of 95%. I interpret these opposing effects on aggregate tipping generosity as evidence of the disparate economic effects of the pandemic and use a crude proxy of passenger's income to provide evidence for a \"K-shaped\" trends in tipping generosity. I offer a secondary hypothesis, that elevated tipping rates reflect an effort to compensate essential workers for the increased risk of COVID-19 infection, and test this theory of hazard pay by exploiting variation in trip lengths and daily hospitalizations at the time of trip. Given the numerous reasons one might expect tipping rates to decrease during the pandemic, I consider the aggregate increase in tip generosity during the pandemic as evidence that crises and broad negative shocks increase preferences for altruism and reciprocity in tipping. <br>","PeriodicalId":159232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Altruism (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128882802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Optimal Bequests Taxation in the Steady State 稳态下的最优遗赠税

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-05-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3634605

G. Casamatta

引用次数: 0

Unobserved Altruism: How Self-Signaling Motivations and Social Benefits Shape Willingness to Donate 未观察到的利他主义:自我信号动机和社会利益如何塑造捐赠意愿

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-12-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3026475

Jennifer Savary, Kelly Goldsmith

引用次数: 28

¿Egoístas o altruistas? Un experimento social para fomentar el comportamiento cooperativo en el mercado (Selfish or Altruistic? A Social Experiment to Promote Cooperative Behavior in the Marketplace) 自私还是利他主义?鼓励市场合作行为的社会实验(自私还是利他?促进市场合作行为的社会实验)

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-06-30 DOI: 10.22430/24223182.1318

Victoria Giarrizzo, Sandra Maceri

{"title":"¿Egoístas o altruistas? Un experimento social para fomentar el comportamiento cooperativo en el mercado (Selfish or Altruistic? A Social Experiment to Promote Cooperative Behavior in the Marketplace)","authors":"Victoria Giarrizzo, Sandra Maceri","doi":"10.22430/24223182.1318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22430/24223182.1318","url":null,"abstract":"Los mercados son sistemas de relaciones complejas donde muchas de las transacciones suelen ocurrir en el anonimato. La teoría económica dominante sostiene que las personas son seres naturalmente egoístas e individualistas y, por lo tanto, en esas interacciones, sean anónimas o no, siempre intentarán maximizar su nivel de ganancia, utilidad o bienestar, aunque para ello deban comportarse de manera poco cooperativa. Por tal razón, surge el interrogante: ¿es posible que los comportamientos altruistas se conviertan en prácticas comunes y generalizadas en las decisiones del mercado? Mediante un experimento social sencillo (experimento social propio) se muestra que no todos los individuos del mercado son egoístas y es frecuente que convivan con ellos personas con actitudes más altruistas. Así, se toma como caso hipotético de estudio el comportamiento de una empresa que decide su política de precios internos en una economía, cuando tiene la opción de exportar los mismos productos que vende en el mercado local al doble de su valor. La metodología de la investigación está fundamentada en una encuesta con diseño muestral probabilístico, bietápico por conglomerados, estratificado por nivel de ingresos. Finalmente, se muestran las intervenciones experimentales sutiles para lograr mayor cooperación de los individuos, obteniendo como resultado final, un incremento en las actitudes altruistas.","PeriodicalId":159232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Altruism (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130661933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

The Altruism Budget: Measuring and Encouraging Charitable Giving 利他主义预算:衡量和鼓励慈善捐赠

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.3386/W25938

Laura K. Gee, J. Meer

引用次数: 21

Informative Fundraising: The Signaling Value of Seed Money and Matching Gifts 资讯募款:种子资金与配捐的讯号价值

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-05-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3390008

Silvana Krasteva, Piruz Saboury

{"title":"Informative Fundraising: The Signaling Value of Seed Money and Matching Gifts","authors":"Silvana Krasteva, Piruz Saboury","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3390008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3390008","url":null,"abstract":"While existing theory predicts that matching leadership gifts raise more voluntary contributions for public goods than seed money, recent experiments find otherwise. We reconcile the two by studying a model of leadership giving in a large economy with incomplete information about the quality of the public good provided by a charity. Both the fundraising scheme employed by the charity and the contribution decision by the lead donor may signal the charity's quality to subsequent donors. The charity solicits optimally for a matching gift if the lead donor is informed about the quality of the public good. Intuitively, an informed lead donor conveys quality information to downstream donors through the size of her contribution. As a result, the charity has no signaling concerns and opts for matching because it mitigates the free-riding incentives among donors and leads to higher contributions. The preference for matching, however, reduces when the lead donor's information is limited. Then, the lead donor’s contribution is less informative and the high quality charity utilizes the fundraising scheme to convey information. In particular, the charity uses seed money as a costly signaling device to convince donors of its high quality. As a result, seed money becomes a strong signal of quality and induces higher expected contributions by donors.","PeriodicalId":159232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Altruism (Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133592589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Paying for Altruism: An Investigation of Deontic Justice and Financial Rewards on Taxpayers’ Whistleblowing 为利他主义买单:义务正义与纳税人检举的经济报酬考察

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3318272

L. Berger, Jonathan Farrar, L. Thorne

{"title":"Paying for Altruism: An Investigation of Deontic Justice and Financial Rewards on Taxpayers’ Whistleblowing","authors":"L. Berger, Jonathan Farrar, L. Thorne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3318272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3318272","url":null,"abstract":"Historically tax authorities have relied upon taxpayers’ intrinsic desire for deontic justice to motivate whistleblowing of tax fraud. Deontic justice involves holding a third party morally accountable for their unfair actions. Yet recently, tax authorities have offered financial rewards for whistleblowing likely under the assumption that financial rewards always increase taxpayers’ motivation to blow the whistle. This assumption flies in the face of motivational crowding theory. Motivational crowding theory predicts that when financial incentives reinforce intrinsic motivation they increase individuals tendency to act, but when financial rewards undermine individuals’ intrinsic motivation they decrease individuals’ tendency to act. In other words, motivational crowding theory suggests that the effect of financial rewards depends upon the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in affecting taxpayers’ motivation to blow the whistle. Accordingly, we develop predictions integrating deontic justice theory and motivational crowding theory and test our predictions using a 2 x 2 between-subjects fully crossed experiment with 399 taxpayers. We find that moral outrage – an emotional reaction resulting from one’s desire for deontic justice – mediates taxpayers’ tendency to blow the whistle, which is conditional upon financial rewards. Financial rewards augment (diminish) higher (lower) levels of moral outrage. Thus, our findings suggest that financial rewards appear to increase taxpayers’ whistleblowing of morally significant infractions and decrease taxpayers’ whistleblowing of morally insignificant infractions. Implications for practice and theory are discussed.","PeriodicalId":159232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Altruism (Topic)","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131582452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Persuasion, Justification and the Communication of Social Impact 说服、辩护与社会影响的传播

ERN: Altruism (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-08-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3239024

Manuel Foerster, Joel J. van der Weele

引用次数: 11