Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? The Relationship Between Regulators and the Regulated in Banking","authors":"R. Rosen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.257131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.257131","url":null,"abstract":"In some industries, firms are able to choose who regulates them. There is a long debate over whether regulatory competition is beneficial or whether it leads to a race for the bottom. We introduce another possible issue with regulation. Regulators may take actions intended to minimize the effort they spend on work. Using banking as an example, we test this quiet life hypothesis against other explanations of regulatory behavior. Banks are able to switch among three options for a primary federal regulator: the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC. We examine why they switch and what the results of switches are. We find support for the hypothesis that competition among regulators has beneficial aspects. Regulators seem to specialize, offering banks that are changing strategy the ability to improve performance by switching regulators. There is also evidence that the ability to switch regulators allows banks to get away from an examiner that desires a quiet life. I would like to thank Susan Monaco, Terry Nixon, Greg Udell, and participants in workshops at Indiana University and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for comments on the paper. Some of this work was completed while the author was visiting the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"162 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114178778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Empirical Evidence on Managing Networks: The Case of European Banking","authors":"Nayantara D. Hensel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.269889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.269889","url":null,"abstract":"With the movement toward globalization, the question of how efficiencies can be achieved through cross-border integration is becoming increasingly important. This paper argues that one avenue for cross-border efficiency is through the greater utilization of firms with under-used distribution channels by other firms with over-used distribution channels. The analysis examines the contemporary European commercial banking industry, and develops an empirical model concerning the degree to which banks' branch networks are over-utilized or under-utilized and what the efficiency implications would be of further organic growth. I find evidence indicating that larger banks are more likely to have heavily utilized branch networks than smaller banks and to exhibit fewer cost efficiencies from building more branches. I find this result both across countries, as well as within countries. The within-country effect suggests that the result is size-driven and can be independent of competitive conditions?larger banks handle more transactions within their existing networks and have higher physical capital costs in opening up new branches. The variance and magnitude of the findings within each country relative to the findings in other countries suggest the impact of factors related to different competitive environments. The findings suggest that cross-border consolidation between larger banks with over-utilized branch networks and smaller banks with under-utilized branch networks could yield cost efficiencies. The larger banks could market a greater diversity of products to an international clientele using the under-utilized distribution channels of the smaller banks.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"173 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124241572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover","authors":"P. Volpin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.262789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.262789","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes executive turnover and firm valuation in Italy, a country that features all the characteristics of the most common governance structure around the world, as described by La Porta, et al. (1999): low legal protection for investors, firms with large controlling shareholders and pyramidal groups. The main findings are that turnover is significantly lower and unaffected by performance when the controlling shareholder of the firm is also a top executive in the firm, while it is more sensitive to performance when control is, to some extent, contestable and when the controlling shareholder owns a larger fraction of the firm's cash-flow rights. The results on valuation are the mirror image of those on turnover: the firm's Q is lower for companies with the controlling shareholder as a top executive, larger when a voting syndicate controls the firm, and increases with the fraction of cash-flow rights owned by the controlling shareholder.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134192951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies","authors":"Winand Emons","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.37746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.37746","url":null,"abstract":"In a housing insurance market buildings have different damage probabilities. High-risk houses need investment, low-risk houses don't. Insurers use imperfect tests to assess risks. The market is a natural monopoly: with more than one active insurer, high-risk house owners continue to apply to insurers until they are eventually assigned to the low-risk class. The natural monopoly need not be sustainable. In equilibrium the incumbent accommodates entry even when the natural monopoly is sustainable. We explain recent observations from Germany and Switzerland where damage rates and prices went up drastically after the transition from state monopolies to competitive environments. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116770251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competition, Small Business Financing, and Discrimination: Evidence from a New Survey","authors":"Ken S. Cavalluzzo, John D. Wolken, L. Cavalluzzo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.171733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.171733","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze credit applications, loan denials, and interest rates paid by small businesses across owner gender, race, and ethnicity. In addition, we examine data from owners who said they did not apply for credit because they believed that their applications would have been turned down. After controlling for a rich set of explanatory variables, including personal and business credit histories, substantial differences in denial rates between firms owned by African Americans and white males remain. Moreover, consistent with Becker's classic theories (1957), we find evidence that increases in competition in the firm's local banking market reduces these differences.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121729367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Organisational Values as 'Attractors of Chaos': An Emerging Cultural Change to Manage Organisational Complexity","authors":"S. Dolan, Salvador García, Samantha Diegoli, A. Auerbach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.237630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237630","url":null,"abstract":"Business organisations are excellent representations of what in physics and mathematics are designated \"chaotic\" systems. Because a culture of innovation will be vital for organisational survival in the 21st century, the present paper proposes that viewing organisations in terms of \"complexity theory\" may assist leaders in fine-tuning managerial philosophies that provide orderly management emphasizing stability within a culture of organised chaos, for it is on the \"boundary of chaos\" that the greatest creativity occurs. It is argued that 21st century companies, as chaotic social systems, will no longer be effectively managed by rigid objectives (MBO) nor by instructions (MBI). Their capacity for self-organisation will be derived essentially from how their members accept a shared set of values or principles for action (MBV). Complexity theory deals with systems that show complex structures in time or space, often hiding simple deterministic rules. This theory holds that once these rules are found, it is possible to make effective predictions and even to control the apparent complexity. The state of chaos that self-organises, thanks to the appearance of the \"strange attractor\", is the ideal basis for creativity and innovation in the company. In this self-organised state of chaos, members are not confined to narrow roles, and gradually develop their capacity for differentiation and relationships, growing continuously toward their maximum potential contribution to the efficiency of the organisation. In this way, values act as organisers or \"attractors\" of disorder, which in the theory of chaos are equations represented by unusually regular geometric configurations that predict the long-term behaviour of complex systems. In business organisations (as in all kinds of social systems) the starting principles end up as the final principles in the long term. An attractor is a model representation of the behavioral results of a system. The attractor is not a force of attraction or a goal-oriented presence in the system; it simply depicts where the system is headed based on its rules of motion. Thus, in a culture that cultivates or shares values of autonomy, responsibility, independence, innovation, creativity, and proaction, the risk of short-term chaos is mitigated by an overall long-term sense of direction. A more suitable approach to manage the internal and external complexities that organisations are currently confronting is to alter their dominant culture under the principles of MBV.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130762295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Interpreting the \"One Big Wave\" in U.S. Long-Term Productivity Growth","authors":"R. Gordon","doi":"10.1007/978-1-4757-3161-3_2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3161-3_2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133149547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Capacity Planning and Pricing Under Uncertainty","authors":"R. Göx","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.229530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.229530","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes a capacity‐planning and pricing problem of a monopolist facing uncertain demand. The model incorporates “soft” and “hard” capacity constraints (soft constraints can be relaxed at a cost while hard constraints cannot be relaxed) and demand uncertainty. The firm receives additional demand information within the plan‐ning horizon. The solution to the planning problem depends crucially on what is known about demand at the time of the capacity decision as well as the pricing decision. Historical acquisition costs of capacity are relevant for pricing whenever the same information is available for capacity planning and pricing. However, when the firm re‐ceives additional demand information before making the pricing decision, only marginal cost is relevant for pricing. Different types of capacity constraints, i.e., soft vs. hard, affect how much capacity the firm obtains, but not how the firm sets prices.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129521539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Where Does State Street Lead?: A First Look at Finance Patents, 1971-2000","authors":"J. Lerner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.224895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.224895","url":null,"abstract":"This paper empirically examines patents for financial formulas and methods, whose patentability was recently confirmed in the litigation between State Street Bank and Trust and Signature Financial Group. Awards by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office have been accelerating in recent years, with a total of 445 financial patents awarded through February 2000. While the two largest recipients of these patents are major financial institutions, other awardees are very heterogeneous, including many computer hardware manufacturers and individual inventors. The role of universities in financial patenting has been modest, and the role of academic finance in delineating patent awards minimal. The final sections of the paper discuss the challenges that these developments pose to finance researchers and universities more generally.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134531424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Concept of the Market and Antitrust","authors":"P. Sabbatini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.182468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.182468","url":null,"abstract":"The essay examines the genesis of the concept of the market, the conditions that must be met for it to be used in economic analysis, and the reasons why the concept is questionable. In order for the concept of market to play a significant and non-contradictory role in economic (and antitrust) analysis, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the characteristics of demand must be such as to demarcate a market unequivocally. Second, the competition in a specific market must have limited interaction with the rest of economy. In general, these conditions cannot be met. First, the non-constancy of the elasticity of the demand function means that the size of the market depends on its structure and on the behavior of its agents. Second, given differentiated products, the competitive relations between them will be dishomogeneous, giving rise to as many market segments as there are individual products. Third, supply-side substitutability, i.e. the possibility of using a given technique to produce several products (not all in the same market) ensures that intraindustry economic dynamics prevail over intra-market ones. And finally, multimarket contacts between firms generate overall strategic conduct, making analysis of any particular market irrelevant. These four objections do not appear pertinent to markets in which perfect competition obtains. Accordingly, it is only in such markets that the concept of market itself can be analyzed consistently. It is therefore amusing, if disconcerting, to find this concept regularly employed in antitrust proceedings, which are presumed to deal with situations of imperfect competition.","PeriodicalId":151613,"journal":{"name":"Industrial Organization & Regulation eJournal","volume":"298 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116877134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}